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ABSTRACT
PERCEPTION AND SCIENTIFIC OBSERVATION:
A CHALLENGE TO THE ASSUMPTION OF OBJECTIVITY
by
RAYMOND RAINVILLE
This inquiry attempts to determine whether the assump­
tion of objectivity usually made about scientific observation 
is justified. This is considered to be an important question 
because it is usually assumed that scientific knowledge differs 
from the rest of human knowledge precisely because it is ob­
jective. The belief in the objectivity of science is traced 
back historically to the beginnings of science in Western 
civilization. In a brief historical analysis, it is revealed 
that despite many important historical changes in our account 
of scientific knowledge, there are two aspects of scientific 
epistemology which remain constant. These two aspects are 
first, that scientific knowledge differs from the rest of 
knowledge in that it is factual and second, that the scien­
tific method is the only appropriate way to distinguish fact 
from illusion.
This long standing tradition in the Western way of 
knowing presents a unique difficulty to anyone wishing to 
conduct an inquiry into the value of objectivity. The diffi­
culty arises from the fact that most available methods of 
inquiry have the assumption of objectivity embedded in them.
vi
There is, for example, a tendency for methods to be either 
analytical or experimental. This division is believed to re­
flect an underlying separation into subjective and objective.
A method was sought which was not prejudiced by having the 
assumption of objectivity embedded in it. The method settled 
upon is called the method of anomalies, which is modeled after 
the thought experiment. Thought experiments were constructed 
to produce information anomalous to the assumption of objec­
tivity.
Three such anomalies to the assumption of objectivity 
were produced by this inquiry. The first anomaly demonstrates 
the inseparability of logical and empirical elements in per­
ception. Specifically, it demonstrates that the real and the 
illusory can only be separated after certain logical assump­
tions are made. This indicates that the logical assumptions 
are as fundamental to the definition of the real as are the 
sensory elements. The second anomaly demonstrates the in­
fluence of the whole on the experience of the parts in both 
scientific measurement and in normal perception. Specifi­
cally, it shows that concepts or constructs define and select 
the appropriate measurements to be taken, as well as those 
to be ignored. The third anomaly demonstrates that the qual­
itative experience in observation and perception is, in part, 
determined by the purpose of the observation or perception. 
This means that the act of measurement or perception in part 
determines the result of the perception or measurement.
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On the basis of the anomalies generated by the inquiry, 
some important conclusions about the meaning of factual!ty are 
derived. A chapter is devoted to unearthing the various def­
initions and meanings of the word "fact" within existing 
theories of knowledge. When each of these definitions of fact 
is reviewed in light of the anomalies to objectivity, it is 
concluded that none of the available definitions of fact are 
able to deal with all three of the anomalies generated by the 
inquiry. On this basis, it is concluded that the notion of 
factuality is misleading.
It follows that an alternative epistemological unit 
is required to replace the notion of fact in our understanding 
of scientific knowledge. Such an alternative building block 
is described. In addition, a theory of scientific knowledge 
which is not based on the assumption of objectivity is out­
lined. In such a theory, other units of knowledge than 
logical and empirical elements would play an important role. 
Some psychological elements of the alternative theory of 





In 196*+, C.P. Snow published "two cultures", in which 
he distinguished between the literary man and the scientifi­
cally oriented scholar. His central theme was that these men 
represented the way in which scientific knowledge and literary 
knowledge were growing steadily apart. Each of the two cul­
tures was evolving with separate values, methods and pictures 
of the world. At that time, the scientific culture appeared 
to be the more viable in terras of affording us solutions to 
our problems. Or, as Snow put it, it gave us "hope". No lit­
erary man who read Snow's "two cultures" could have escaped 
feelings of inferiority for not knowing the Second Law of 
Thermodynamics. Since that time there has been an increasing 
recognition that our social and ecological fabric required 
sensibilities which apparently are not available within the 
scientific culture. The promise that appeared to rest in 
science and technology in 1956 appears far less promising in 
1970. The industrial might resulting from the application of 
science and technology is a threat to both man's social and 
biological continuation. But whether we see science as a 
positive or negative development in human culture, we cannot 
deny that putting science in its proper place intellectually 
and assimilating it into the general culture is a serious 
problem. It is a problem in both general sociology and in 
the sociology of science. Underlying this significant prob­
lem is a problem in the psychology of knowledge.
These sociological and academic effects behoove us to 
examine carefully the rationale for making a sharp distinction 
between science and non-science, as well as for elevating 
scientific knowledge to the pinnacle of human credibility.
One of the fundamental reasons for believing in science, 
as well as for distinguishing it from other types of knowledge, 
is our belief that science is objective or factual. We know 
scientific knowledge to be based on facts; facts in turn, are 
based on observations. Other aspects of human knowledge, such 
as cultural tradition and folklore, though they are based on 
experience, may call upon us for allegiance but not for the 
same kind of credibility that we give science.
It appears that we evaluate our knowledge according 
to our assessment of its origins. This means that we are 
using epistemological criteria for discriminating between 
science and other aspects of human thought. As indicated 
above, it is not sufficient to say, as is often said, that 
science is empirical while other forms of knowledge are not. 
Since empirical merely implies that knowledge is based on ex­
perience, no one will deny that contemporary religious and 
artistic wisdom is a heritage from past experience. To find 
the basis of the distinction which sets science apart we must 
learn to distinguish between kinds of experience. Only objec­
tive observations can give a proposition the stamp of scienti­
fic truth, and not all of experience is considered to be 
objective. It is not accidental that we speak of a scientist's 
laboratory experiences as observations while we speak of his
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daily experiences as perceptions. The words have a connota­
tion of objectivity and subjectivity, respectively.
It is this separation of sensory experience into two 
qualitatively distinct classes which is the basis of the 
epistemological distinction between science and other kinds 
of human knowledge. Knowledge, scientific or otherwise, is 
not generated by each individual, but rather is passed on to 
us through language in a substantially accomplished form. To 
say that credibility of information depends upon its epistem­
ological origins is merely to express the belief that we 
evaluate knowledge according to the basis we believe it has 
in experience. It is important to stress that our assessment 
of the experiential base for most of our knowledge is itself 
a belief since, as we said before, knowledge is given to us 
not directly through experience but as a second hand report 
of experience.
If this reasoning is correct, the separation of ex­
perience into subjective perception and objective observation 
is of the utmost importance. In the first place, it is one 
of the bases for distinguishing the scientific from the non- 
scientific. The belief in its objective origins is probably 
the most significant reason for the credibility status that 
science enjoys. In the second place, the belief in the dis­
tinction between these two kinds of experience is at the core 
of a methodological debate between Snow's "two cultures".
It is apparent that the assumption of objectivity 
plays an important role in distinguishing between scientific
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and non-seientific knowledge. It is therefore reasonable and 
desirable to conduct an inquiry to determine whether or not 
the assumption of objectivity is justified. A study of the 
history of the assumption of objectivity reveals that such an 
inquiry must first of all deal with a serious methodological 
difficulty. This difficulty arises from the fact that all 
currently available methods of inquiry have imbedded in them 
assumptions which preclude the possibility of using them to 
inquire into objectivity.
An inquiry into the assumption of objectivity is ob­
viously a problem in epistemology. A historical analysis 
(Chapter II) reveals that the distinction between objective 
and subjective knowing is of such long standing that problems 
of epistemology and the disciplines for their study have been 
defined as though the distinction were, in fact, valid. If 
we examine the present state of affairs with respect to epis­
temological questions, we find two groups of scholars actively 
engaged in problems of epistemology.
Psychologists make use of scientific methods to study 
the epistemology of subjective experience. This is the study 
of the psychology of perception. The study of object observa­
tion is for the most part left to historians and philosophers 
of science. The psychology of perception and the philosophy 
of science are the modern inheritors of the epistemological 
question. Nevertheless within these disciplines there is no 
generally acknowledged need for an integration of these 
respective fields.
The reason they do not see such a need is that they 
have accepted the validity of the subjective/objective dis­
tinction. Nowhere is this more evident than in the case of 
the psychologist who places his faith in the objective method- 
ology of science to reveal to him the nature of subjective 
experience. Though this may not necessarily indicate a diff­
iculty since both the analysts of science and the psychologists 
may be justified in assuming the capacity of objective percep­
tion, it is a serious difficulty, for anyone who wishes to 
question that assumption. It would not be logical to inquire 
into objectivity with tools which have imbedded in them a 
prejudice towards objectivity. For this reason we find that 
none of the current methods available is suited for our inquiry.
Psychologists may be divided into two groups, neither 
of which is prepared to deal with an inquiry into objectivity.
The experimental psychologist has the usual assumption of 
objectivity built into his method. The phenomenological psych­
ologist accepts the distinction between objective and subjective, 
and defines his field of study in terms of the subjective. The 
other group of scholars who are interested in understanding 
objective observation as it takes place in science have also 
defined their philosophies and methods in such a way that they 
are committed to the assumption of objectivity. Scholars of 
science who take an empirical approach are themselves committed 
to the view that there are objectively observable facts about 
science. Students of science who are committed to an analytic 
method are for the most part also committed to the view that
there is a significant analytic distinction between episteraic 
and non-epistemic perception and that it is not different from 
the more familiar objectivity/subjectivity distinction. It is 
not surprising to find that contemporary students of epistem­
ology find themselves committed explicitly or implicitly to 
the belief that there is an essential difference between ob­
servation and perception. This results in the fact that the 
distinction between observation and perception is an implicit 
aspect of one of the basic assumptions of logical positivism. 
This basic assumption is that there is an essential difference 
between analytic and synthetic knowledge. Belief in this dis­
tinction is couched in a variety of terminology; such as 
formal and empirical, theoretical and factual, and conceptual 
and observational. Regardless of the terminology, this funda­
mental distinction of logical positivism implies a difference 
between observation and perception.
In Chapter III, a method is suggested which attempts 
to hold the assumption of objectivity in abeyance. This is 
the method of "thought experiments". Reasons are given for 
believing that this method makes no prior commitment to the 
analytic/synthetic distinction which is to say the distinction 
between subjectivity and objectivity. Instead it is committed 
to the view that so called facts get their meaning from the 
context of ideas and artifacts within which they are viewed.
The method which is suggested differs from the usual empirical 
approach in that it does not propose to generate any new facts. 
It also differs from the usual analytical approach in that it
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does not rely on a normative analysis of language or logic. 
Instead, it attempts to give old facts new meaning by changing 
the context from that within which they are normally viewed.
The old facts which are appealed to are all relevant 
to the assumption of objectivity. The new context results 
from holding that assumption in abeyance. Chapter II indicates 
that the epistemic status of perception has been the subject 
of study by two different groups of scholars. Since both 
these groups accept the assumption of objectivity, they have 
conducted their inquiry into perception in "haughty isolation" 
from one another. The psychologist has generated facts about 
perception but has seen no need to incorporate these "facts" 
into his own methods of observation. This is undoubtedly due 
to the belief that a scientist's observations are a qualita­
tively different class of perceptions than the subjective 
experiencing of the subjects in psychological experiments.
On the other hand, historians and philosophers of science 
who have analyzed the role of observation in science have 
for the most part ignored the work of perceptual psychologists.^ 
These men have also seen no need to extend to the world of 
daily experience their analytical insights about the influence 
of perception on knowledge. The method proposed in Chapter III 
attempts to capitalize on the lack of cross-fertilization 
between these two fields of study. It is hoped that the new 
context for the old facts will develop from forcing a cross-
.
Notable exceptions are Kuhn (1962), Polanyi (1958)* 
and Hanson (1958).
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fertilization of these two independently developed sources of 
knowledge about perception.
If, as is maintained in Chapter II, psychologists and 
the scholars of observation have worked in isolation from one 
another because they both accepted the assumption of objectiv­
ity, then it would seem reasonable to expect that holding the 
assumption in abeyance will have the effect of bringing the 
two fields together. Bringing together facts from these two 
disciplines tends to create anomalies to the assumption of 
objectivity. Anomalies are seen as information which contra­
dicts our normal expectations. They may, as has been indic­
ated, be well-known facts which do not become anomalous 
until put in proper context.
Before we can bring facts from these two disciplines 
to bear on the assumption of objectivity, it is necessary to 
know what is meant by objectivity. Chapter IV offers an 
analysis of five important philosophies of knowledge cur­
rently attempting to explain how we know. The purpose in 
reviewing these positions is to obtain an understanding of 
the role of the assumption of objectivity within these var­
ious theories of knowledge. The analysis reveals that, 
though the belief that objective knowledge is possible is 
almost universally accepted by these various theories, the 
exact formulations telling us how objectivity is achieved 
differ significantly from one theory to the next. One char­
acteristic which most theories of knowledge are revealed to
8
have in common, and which demonstrates the almost universal 
commitment to the idea of objectivity, is the promotion of 
an indubitable within each theory. By an indubitable is 
meant an element of knowledge which is given to us in such 
a way that we can have no doubt about it. The fact that each 
of the theories promotes an indubitable indicates that the 
belief in objectivity is very strong. There is also little 
agreement among these theories concerning how such indub- 
itables become incorporated into knowledge. However, the 
lack of concensus concerning the way in which objectivity is 
achieved seems to indicate a need to examine the possibility 
that indubitables do not exist.
Chapter IV concludes that most theories of knowledge 
subscribe to the possibility of objective perception of indub- 
itables. Such indubitables are generally believed to be 
objective in that we can be certain in our knowledge of them 
and confident in their independence of us. Having made 
explicit what is meant by the assumption of objectivity, the 
next step involves presenting anomalies which contradict the 
assumption. Chapter V presents information anomalous to the 
assumption of objectivity. Each anomaly consists of two sets 
of information. One of the sets is taken from the psychology 
of perception and the other is taken from the epistemology of 
-
Transactiona1ism is the only exception.
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science. The two sets in an anomaly consist of information 
which is widely accepted by the specialists in the domains 
which generated them. What is unique about their presenta­
tion in Chapter V is that they are paired together in a new 
context. That new context is the intention of our inquiry. 
This means that the pairing of two sets of information is 
based on the belief that each set has the same point to make 
about the assumption of objectivity. The combination of the 
three anomalies serve as a systematic method for compiling 
counterevidence to the assumption of objectivity. The pur­
pose of compiling counterevidence is twofold. In the first 
place, it gives us a method for evaluating whether or not 
the assumption is justifiable. In the second place, the 
recognition of counterevidence will lay the groundwork for 
establishing the conceptual and factual requirements of 
alternative assumptions to that of objectivity.
In Chapter VI, an attempt is made to re-evaluate the 
status of the assumption of objectivity in view of the anom­
alies presented in Chapter V. In doing so, the various candir 
dates for the position of indubitable which were revealed in 
Chapter IV are reviewed to see how each is affected by the 
anomalies. In Chapter VII, the broad outlines of a satis­
factory resolution to the epistemological problems raised 
by the anomalies to objectivity are discussed. An attempt 
to identify as clearly as possible a positive alternative to 
the assumption of objectivity is connected to recent develop­
ments in both perception and philosophy of science.
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Finally, Chapter VII attempts to present a picture 
of science which does not depend on the assumption of objec­
tivity, and traces some of the implications of such a view 
of science. These implications are discussed in terms of 
three major changes that are suggested by the inquiry. The 
first is a revitalization of the psychology of knowledge.
The second involves identifying some of the negative effects 
the assumption of objectivity had in preventing improvements 
in the psychology of knowing. Finally, alternative methods 
of conducting scientific inquiry are indicated.
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CHAPTER II
IDENTIFYING THE ASSUMPTION OF OBJECTIVITY
Asking whether or not there is justification for dis­
tinguishing between subjectivity and objectivity is a question 
of epistemology. Having developed an interest in such a ques­
tion, one naturally peruses the existing intellectual and 
academic specialties to find how such questions have been 
treated. To do so, the statement of the question must be 
slightly changed. It can be asked what segment of the intel­
lectual community is interested in the role that the senses 
play in knowledge. When the question is stated in this way, 
the answer is immediate and, that is, that both the psychol­
ogists and epistemologists are interested in the role which 
the senses play in the acquisition of knowledge. Why then, we 
ask, do we distinguish between the epistemologists and psychol­
ogists?
The usual reason for distinguishing between a psych­
ologist's and an epistemologist's interest in perception has 
to do with their various purposes and methods in undertaking 
that study. Presumably, epistemologists are interested in 
perception only to the extent that it plays a role in verifying 
knowledge, while psychologists are interested in describing 
the process by which sensory experience takes place. That 
such a difference in interest exists between psychologists 
and philosophers is no doubt true. Whether such a difference 
in interest is sufficient reason to justify the wide gap that
12
exists between the methods and conclusions of these two groups
at the present time is another question.
Hamlyn (1901) tells us that epistemologists are inter­
ested in perception only insofar as it can provide us with an 
indubitable unit of knowledge. Epistemologists are not inter­
ested in how the senses work; they are, instead, interested 
in finding an element in knowledge which can be given to us 
in such a way that we can have no doubt about it. Tradition­
ally that way has been perception. Within contemporary epis­
temology, it is generally recognized that such perceptual 
indubitable units are not available to the average person but 
came to us only through the elaborate methodology of science. 
Debates over the epistemic status of perception are currently 
most viable and relevant in philosophy only within the phil­
osophy of science. (Collins, 1967)
Psychologists, on the other hand, have little or no 
interest in establishing an indubitable unit of knowledge.
They merely wish to explain how sensory experiencing takes 
place. The ontological reliability of such sensory exper­
iencing is a secondary interest. In arriving at his "descrip­
tion of perception," the psychologist will rely on scientific 
methodology to establish the descriptive reliability.
Other than interest, the most obvious difference 
between epistemologists and psychologists is one of methodology. 
The philosopher of science who for the most part has inherited 
the problem of establishing indubitables works either with 
linguistic or historical analysis. The psychologist interested
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in describing perception relies mainly on experimental obser­
vation. The question seems to be, is this methodological 
difference between the two sufficient explanation for the 
lack of interchange between the two disciplines in questions 
of substance? Given that each group has its own methods and 
interest with respect to the problems of perception, should 
there be any cross-fertilization between the two fields? 
Epistemologists, after all, are not interested in the whole 
of perception but merely in the fact that some of our percep­
tions are ontologically reliable. Psychologists, after all, 
are not interested in abstract problems like ontological 
reliability since for that they need only trust a long trad­
ition of laboratory sciences. This suggests that each group 
uses the same rationale (basis) for ignoring the other, and 
that this rationale is a stronger reason for keeping the two 
groups separate than either interest or method. The rationale 
is that both groups rely on the achievements of science as 
proof of the fact that objective perception is possible. The 
philosopher interested in epistemology considers it natural 
to look within the philosophy of science to establish indub­
itables since, after all, science has produced the knowledge 
in which we have the most confidence. Likewise, the psychol­
ogist can accept his methodology on the basis of its long 
tradition of success.
The separation between the psychologist's and epistem- 
ologist's interest in perception is very convenient in that it 
allows them to ignore one another's work. But it presents a
serious problem to this inquiry because it reveals that both 
groups have already accepted as justified the assumption of 
objectivity. It is because the psychologist assumes that 
scientific observations are a different class of perception 
than those which he is studying that he can use observation 
as a tool for studying perception. It is because philosophers 
accept the objectivity of scientific knowledge that they re­
duce the problem of the indubitable to a problem in the phil­
osophy of science.
In order to find an appropriate method for inquiring 
into the validity of the objective/subjective distinction we 
must look into some of the history of this distinction, since 
it is obviously one which antedates current methods of dealing 
with epistemological questions. Such an examination will 
assist us in evaluating currently available methods and in 
discussing the conceptual requirements of a method appropriate 
for an inquiry into the assumption of objectivity.
The division of the world into real and apparent, which 
is the same as its division into the veridical and illusory, 
antedates the current methods available for studying epis­
temological questions. The experimental method and the analy­
tic method used by philosophers of science are relatively new 
approaches for conducting science. They have developed out of 
a tradition which based its presumptions of objectivity on one 
or another version of the distinction between real and appar­
ent. Though many aspects of the account of scientific know­
ledge have changed drastically within the history of science,
15
two principles emerge which have remained constant despite 
other important changes. The first of these, hereafter 
called the "principle of separation", involves a persistent 
belief that the world could be separated into real and appar­
ent. The separation can either be stated in ontological 
terms, such as real and apparent, or in epistemological terms, 
such as veridical and illusory. The second principle to
1
emerge, hereafter called the "principle of verification", 
involves a persistent belief that what distinguishes real 
from apparent is scientific method. Let us now examine the 
views of some of the earliest proponents of a science based 
on observation so that we may see how these two principles 
of scientific epistemology have remained constant.
Aristotle believed that the sensible qualities of
objects were not of the essence of the object, but were merely
a means of differentiating the object. There is no doubt that
to Aristotle, writing about epistemology and perception were
synonomous tasks; therefore, one can understand much about
his metaphysics by studying his perception theory. One can
see how the two balance each other.
By a 'sense1 is meant what has the power of receiving 
into itself the sensible forms of things without the 
matter. This must be conceived of as taking place in
1
The reader must be warned against possibly confusing 
what is here called the "principle of verification" with the 
traditional positivists' verification principle. The first 
is here used only as a convenient tool for discussing some 
of the historical developments.
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the way in which a piece of wax takes on the impress 
of a signet ring without the iron or gold; we say that 
what produces the impression is a signet of bronze or 
gold, but its particular metallic constitution makes 
no differences in a similar way. The sense is affected 
by what is coloured or flavoured or sounding, out (sic) it 
is indifferent what in each case the substance is; what 
alone matters is what quality it has, in what ratio its 
constituents are combined. (Aristotle, 1952B, p. 656)
We can see that Aristotle distinguishes between real 
and apparent by noting that he did not believe that the sensi­
ble qualities were of the essence of things. It follows for 
Aristotle that not all sensible qualities are to carry equal 
significance in knowledge. In addition, his position is 
consistent with the "principle of verification" when he holds 
that science is uniquely qualified in telling us which sen­
sible qualities carry significance. Aristotle's "principle 
of verification" relied upon consistency and coherence.
Sensory experience was to be considered veridical only when 
it gave evidence consistent with our larger picture of 
nature.
The neo-Platonism prevalent in the 16th and 17th 
centuries did much to promote the notion that the world of 
appearance was a poor reflection which in itself could not 
be trusted to reveal the underlying unity and harmony in the 
universe. Kepler (1952) sought to show that the real qualities 
of the world were all quantitative and that the fundamental 
differences were of number and not of qualities. Though he 
did not refer to the difference between quantity and quality 
as primary and secondary, that distinction has persisted in 
the physical sciences to this day.
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Galileo made the distinction between primary and 
secondary far more explicit and central to his work. He 
differed from Kepler in that he was interested in terrestrial 
science and was an atomist who believed the fundamental units 
to have only geometrical qualities. He made the distinction 
more explicit by clearly identifying the secondary qualities 
with the senses. These qualities were considered to be sub­
jective and the primary qualities objective. We can see this 
in his own words.
But that external bodies, to excite in us these tastes, 
these odours, and these sounds, demand other than size, 
figure, number and slow or rapid motion, I do not be­
lieve; and I judge that, if the ears, the tongue, and 
the nostrils were taken away, the figures, the numbers, 
and the motions would indeed remain, but not the odours, 
nor the tastes nor the sounds, which, without the 
living animal, I do not believe are anything else but 
names, just as tickling is precisely nothing but a 
name if the armpit and the nasal membrane be removed...
This form of the primary-secondary doctrine in Galileo 
is worth a moments pause, for its effects in modern 
thought have been of uncalculable importance. It is 
a fundamental step toward that banishing of man from 
the great world of nature and his treatment as an 
effect of what happens in the latter, which has been 
a pretty constant feature of the philosophy of modern 
science, a procedure enormously simplifying the field 
of science, but bringing in its train, the big meta­
physical and especially epistemological problems of 
modern philosophy. (Burtt, 195*+j P» 78)
The distinction between primary and secondary qualities 
was a clear cut part of the scientific heritage to which Newton 
paid tribute. He was probably the first to apply the distinc­
tion explicitly to color. He makes it quite clear that to 
speak of rays of light as having color is a "vulgarity", for 
to speak "philosophically" and "correctly" the rays can only
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be said to have properties that give rise to the sensation of 
color.
Few did more to mold our conception of science than 
Kepler, Galileo and Newton, and it is clear that they were 
not alone in supporting the picture of the world which held 
man's daily experience to be largely illusory. That these 
and other important physical scientists hold this epistemo- 
logical and metaphysical position meant that only pictures 
of the world concordant with that viewpoint could be consid­
ered scientific. There were also some important philosophers 
who expanded on this doctrine, though for them the conse­
quences of the doctrine more often led to divergent world 
views.
The rationalism of Descartes rests in large measure 
on his belief that perception is not epistemic. He divided 
the world into the cognitive and extensive realms. The ex­
tensive realm was made up of primary qualities, which were 
not directly available to the senses. The cognitive realm 
was made up of secondary qualities, which gave rise to the 
world of appearance. To look upon the world through the 
senses and to rely upon this information was seen by Descartes 
as childish naivete. Only through the application of reason 
could one come to know the qualities of the extensive world.
The same division of primary and secondary qualities 
was maintained by Locke (1952) though this led, in his case, 
to empiricism. The primary qualities of things could be 
empirically determined because of their permanence, despite
19
the variation in their secondary qualities; for example "take 
a grain of wheat, divide it into two parts; each part has 
still solidity, extension, figure and mobility: divide it
again, and it retains still the same qualities. These are 
also the qualities which can be detected by more than one 
sense." (Locke, 1952, p. 298)
Combining the doctrine of primary and secondary 
qualities with an empirical philosophy is not quite as simple 
as it seems in the preceding quotation. We can see in the 
next quote from Locke, the precursors of Berkeley's and Hume's 
skepticism.
Besides this ignorance of the primary qualities of the 
insensible parts of bodies, on which depend all their 
secondary qualities, there is yet another and more 
incurable part of ignorance, which sets us more remote 
from a certain knowledge of the co-existence or 
inco-existence (if I may so say) of different ideas in 
the same subject; and that is, that there is no dis­
coverable connexion between any secondary qualities 
and those primary qualities which it depends on."
(Locke, 1952, p. 316)
From Aristotle to Locke, we can see that those who
believe in a science based on observation also believe in the
"principles of separation and verification". The exact form
of the "principle of separation" did, of course, differ in
some important details. For example, Aristotle distinguished
between these sensory qualities which displayed the natural
order, and all the other qualities which were not significant
differentia. The neo-Platonists believed that only these
observables which displayed mathematic harmonies were real.
These early distinctions became a more formalized version of
the "principle of separation" in the doctrines of primary and
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secondary qualities which persisted until Berkeley and Hume, 
and which still persist among some practicing scientists. 
There are also variations in the way the principle of verif­
ication was expressed. For example, Aristotle believed that 
coherence and consistency were the methods by which science 
could distinguish true from false propositions while the neo- 
Platonists relied upon mathematic harmony as a criterion for 
truth. Among the believers in the primary/secondary distinc­
tion, there were those, such as Kepler, who believed that the 
mark of scientific method is quantifiability and those who, 
like Locke, believed that science dealt only with qualities 
which remained the same when perceived by any of the senses. 
Despite these many significant variations, it should be noted 
that all of these men believed that only certain aspects of 
human experience could be trusted and that only the special 
methods of science could distinguish these aspects from the 
rest of experience.
The next important group of theorists of science 
changed our account of scientific knowledge significantly, 
though they did not abandon the "principles of separation and 
verification". The important transition is marked by Berkeley 
and Hume’s challenge of the primary/secondary distinction.
Berkeley took issue with the notion of primary and 
secondary qualities because of his epistemic principle, "esse 
est percipi". This marks a very significant turning point in 
the development of a distinction between subject and object. 
Berkeley laid to rest the argument that the real world is
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made up of more permanent qualities than the ones we are 
capable of perceiving. He did this on the basis of a princi­
ple of knowledge which asserts that all knowledge must ultim­
ately be reduced to perceivables. We can see in this principle, 
the origins of the positivists' principles of verification. "I 
see this cherry, I feel it, I taste it and I am sure nothing 
cannot be seen, or felt, or tasted: it is therefore real.
Take away the sensations of softness, moisture, redness, tart­
ness, and you take away the cherry." (Berkeley, 1952, p. 117) 
Hume made use of the phenomenalist reductionist prin­
ciple to challenge the prevalent view of science which was 
current in his day. That is to say, he applied the "to-be-is- 
to-be-perceived" principle to many of the scientific ideas such 
as the Newtonian view of cause, time and space, and succeeded 
in challenging their credulity. Only those propositions which 
had an immediate connection with sensory experience were con­
sidered to be scientifically verified. All other propositions 
were considered to be tautological or nonsensical.
Hume's analysis of causality rests on a similar 
principle of reductionistic phenomenalism. Causality is an 
idea, which must be reduced to the constant conjunction of 
impressions if it is to be meaningful. In this connection it 
is interesting to note that Berkeley and Hume were both 
extremely critical of Newton's notion of absolute time and 
space. Their criticism of Newton's time and space were essen-
•i
tially no different than those adopted by the Vienna Circle.
V
A more detailed account of reductionistic principles 
of verification used by phenomenalists is given on pages 73-8 1•
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Before the British empiricists, the "principle of 
separation" was understood in such a way that certain sensory 
experiences were inherently subjective while others were inher­
ently objective. The British empiricists maintained that all 
sensory experience is indubitable: the problem is to separate
sensory experience from normal daily consciousness. In normal 
consciousness, language and other habits deceive us into 
attributing equal status to propositions which are very diff­
erent in origin. Our frequent use of words, such as left and 
right, may mislead us into believing that these terms have a 
basis in reality, that is, similar to objects such as tables 
and chairs. In fact, "left" and "right" are organizational 
conventions, logical in origin, while "table and chair" are 
labels for a class of experience, empirical in origin.
Newtonian time and space, according to Hume and Berkeley, are 
merely logical principles, like our number systems and have no 
basis in reality since they cannot be perceived. Science is 
the most reliable method for producing knowledge since it 
substitutes experiments for experience, and in doing so sep­
arates the formal from the empirical. It should be noted that 
the "principles of separation and verification" are still an 
essential aspect of this account of scientific epistemology. 
Verification, in this approach, means an immediate basis in 
sensory experience, best arrived at through scientific exper­
imentation. "Separation," in this context, is between the for­
mal and empirical as parts of experience.
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Since the beginning of British empiricism, there have 
not been any significant changes in the overall view of 
scientific knowledge. British empiricism has developed into 
logical positivism. The many steps by which this evolution 
took place are covered in considerable detail in Chapter IV.
But in essence there is little difference between Berkeley's 
"to-be-is-to-be-perceived" and contemporary, slightly more 
sophisticated principles of verification. The essential point 
which unites them is that one can distinguish objective exper­
ience by making certain that it has a basis in sensory exper­
ience. More recent versions have added the safeguards that 
these experiences must involve publicly observable and repeat- 
able operations.
The "principles of separation and verification", des­
pite the many variations in the manner of their expression, 
remain essentially unchanged aspects of scientific epistemology. 
It was suggested earlier that something more than interest and 
method separated epistemologists and psychologists in the 
pursuit of an account of knowledge. That "something more" is 
a prior commitment of both disciplines to the principles of 
separation and verification. Both groups of scholars accept 
that there is objective and subjective perception. Because 
of his interest in knowledge, the epistemologist can dismiss 
the psychology of perception since he is only interested in 
objective observation. He limits his interest to objective 
observation because it is here he believes that he will find 
a description of the process by which man establishes an
2b
indubitable. The psychologist, on the other hand, is inter­
ested in a description of man's use of his sensory capacities. 
He accepts as part of his scientific tradition the use of 
these capacities as a method of scientific inquiry, but he 
also wishes to understand their use in other contexts.
Commitment to the assumption of objectivity antedates 
the contemporary separation of epistemological interests into 
psychology and philosophy of science. How, then, can we rely 
on either of these methods as tools appropriate to inquire 
into the assumption of objectivity? Let us examine in turn 
the status of each discipline's capacities to deal with the 
question of objectivity.
It has already been indicated that by virtue of inter­
est and methodology, experimental psychologists have only a 
secondary interest in the ontological veridicality of percep­
tion. That secondary interest is usually expressed in terms 
of demonstrating the conditions under which perception can be 
influenced by other processes. For example, psychologists 
are interested in demonstrating the influence of motivation 
in bringing about a misperception. Whenever they are involved 
in this secondary interest, psychologists rely on physicalistic 
methods to obtain the "correct" description of the stimulus 
and consider any deviations from this description to be an 
illusion. In doing so, they indicate their belief that the 
methods of physicalistic observation are qualitatively differ­
ent from normal perception. As was pointed out before, this
25
belief is also indicated by the fact that perception is 
studied by the method of observation.
Experimental psychology is committed to the subject/ 
object epistemology primarily because experimental psychology 
developed in the late nineteenth century at a time when it 
was widely accepted as a credential of science that scientists 
were capable of making objective observations. The question 
as to whether or not objective observation was possible could 
not be asked once the answer had been presumed by the method­
ology. If we look at the current status of the psychologist's 
philosophy of science we find a division which parallels the 
subject/object position that we have repeatedly come across. 
The two predominant ideologies in contemporary psychology are 
behaviorism and phenomenology. These two camps are in agree­
ment that there are two worlds - the subjective and the 
objective. On almost everything else, they are in substantial 
disagreement. (Koch, 196*+)
That behaviorism and phenomenology agree about the 
subject/object split is very significant in understanding why 
neither school is prepared to deal with the subject of this 
inquiry. The purpose of this inquiry is to see whether there 
is any basis for making the assumption of objectivity. Such 
a question is obviously motivated by an interest in the psych­
ology of science.
If this is properly a question of psychology, why is 
it that behaviorism and phenomenology are not prepared to deal 
with it? The answer seems to be that by virtue of accepting
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the separation between subject and object, each of these 
predominant schools of psychology have defined its subject 
matter around the question almost as though they were 
deliberately skirting the question. The behaviorist cannot 
evaluate the assumption of objectivity because he defines 
psychology so as to exclude anything which is not publicly 
observable. He wishes to study only man's behavior. In reac­
tion to this point of view, the phenomenologist defines his 
subject matter so as to exclude anything which is publicly 
observable. He wishes to study man's experience. Questions 
about the psychology of science fall somewhere between these 
two. In particular the problem of assessing the role of 
objective perceptions seems to be outside the grasp of either 
of these points of view, even though it is clear that their 
present juxtaposition is somehow related to the assumption 
that such objective perceptions are possible. Skinner, (1953) 
Rogers, Koch, (196*+)
For historical and conceptual reasons, the methods 
currently available within psychology are not well suited to 
deal with the question we are asking about objectivity. At 
least, this is so if we are speaking of these methods as 
isolated units. The method suggested in the next chapter for 
dealing with the assumption of objectivity will attempt to 
make use of "psychological" phenomena, but it will do so in a 
manner not consistent with either behaviorism or phenomenology. 
Before the psychological phenomena can be rendered useful to
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this inquiry, we must examine the other approach to epistem- 
ological problems, which is the philosophy of science.
It was indicated earlier that the separation of 
experience into objective observation and subjective percep­
tion has led to the development of two separate academic 
disciplines to deal with epistemological problems. It has 
also been indicated that because of historical and concep­
tual commitments to the assumption of objectivity, the first 
of these, experimental psychology, does not have methods 
appropriate to the purpose of this inquiry. We turn now to 
an assessment of the method currently available within the 
other academic discipline which deals with epistemic problems - 
the philosophy of science.
One of the reasons that contemporary philosophers 
who are interested in questions of epistemology turn to the 
philosophy of science is that they believe science has the 
only methods for establishing indubitables. The reduction 
of the field of epistemology into the field of philosophy of 
science constitutes a judgment about the justifiability of the 
assumption of objectivity. The question we must ask to deter­
mine whether there are methods currently available within 
the philosophy of science to deal with the assumption of ob­
jectivity is as follows: do the methods which philosophers use
to study science have any inherent commitments concerning the 
epistemic status of perception? If they do, do these commit­
ments preclude the use of these methods in this inquiry? The 
first thing which is of interest in answering this question is
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that philosophers of science are divided into two major groups 
on the question of method. These two groups are the empirical 
and the analytical philosophers of science. The first of 
these two groups consists of those philosophers who believe in 
an empirical approach to the study of science. According to 
this point of view, the study of science should itself be a 
science. Included within this group are some of the earliest 
and now classical contributors to our understanding of science. 
Notable among these are the work of Mills and Whewell. There 
is much in their account of science which contemporary students 
would consider analytic. For example, the two men debate pres­
criptive questions such as "what is the proper scientific logic 
of induction?" Nevertheless, the method which both men agree 
upon is empirical. They both seek to establish the correct­
ness of their own positions by supporting them with historical 
"facts" within the history of science. Their commitment to an 
empirical approach seems to reveal their belief that scientific 
methods are capable of differentiating between subjectivity and 
objectivity.
Among the empiricist philosophers of science, the 
question of this inquiry - that is, whether or not objective 
perception is possible - is called the problem of semantics or 
empirical significance. (Stevens, 1939> Frank, 1957) A strictly 
empirical interpretation of the problem of empirical significance 
puts this problem squarely in the domain of experimental psych­
ology. This is precisely the way scientists (as opposed to 
philosophers) who write about science tend to see the problem.
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For example, Stevens (1939) has suggested that psychological 
research on problem solving and concept formation is ground­
breaking work in understanding science. Helmholtz saw 
quantification as the distinguishing feature of science, but 
he saw in the rudimentary foundations of counting, a "psych­
ological capacity" which is propaedeutic for quantification.
If we scrutinize closely what is done in counting an 
aggregate or number of things, we are led to the 
ability of the mind to relate things to things, to 
let a thing correspond to a thing, or to represent a 
thing by a thing, an ability without which no thinking 
is possible. (Helmholtz, 1930? P» xiii)
The reasons psychologists have demonstrated little 
enthusiasm for this problem within the science of science 
have already been given. Even though there has not been any 
activity among psychologists attempting to integrate the prob­
lem of empirical significance into their research on perception, 
the reverse is not true. That is to say, some philosophers of 
science interested in the problem of empirical significance have 
attempted to incorporate some principles of perception in their 
account of scientific discovery. In recent years, there has 
been an increasing recognition among some philosophers of science
that the psychological must be included along with the logical
1
in order to obtain a genuine picture of scientific knowledge.
This is particularly true in giving an account of the "context 
of discovery" within science. (Kessel, 1968) The inclusion 
of psychological variables as well as the sociological factors
1
Notable among these are Kuhn (1962), Hanson (1958), 
and Polanyi (1958)
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among this new group's account of scientific discovery has 
had a very profound effect in shifting away from the trad­
itional conception of scientific knowledge. It has forced 
a recognition that intuition, insight or creativity are more 
important factors in the progress of science than had pre­
viously been recognized. Formerly, an inductive prejudice 
as well as a desire to limit analysis to the logical and 
exclude the psychological presented a picture of discovery 
which has been called induction by enumeration. According 
to this view, scientific discoveries came about from induc­
tive processes taking place in a series of repeated observa­
tions. This placed the burden of discovery primarily on 
laboratory observation. By bringing in psychological factors 
the new empirical scientists of science have reduced the role 
which laboratory observation plays in their account of 
scientific knowledge. They have, of course, not completely 
eliminated objective observation from their account of 
scientific knowledge. For this group to do so would run 
counter to their own methodology. According to this school, 
the role of observation is most significant in the "context 
of justification".
For the purpose of this inquiry, even the limited 
commitment represented by the belief that objective perception 
is possible in the "context of justification" is more than 
can be incorporated into the method. For as soon as any 
element of the assumption of objectivity makes its way into 
the method of the inquiry, then we are using it as a tool
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when what we want is to make it the subject of inquiry. There 
is no doubt, however, that this inquiry was inspired by the 
successes realized from the incorporation of psychological 
factors into the epistemology of science by such men as 
Kuhn, Hanson and Polanyi. It is reasonable to expect that 
the influence of psychological factors could potentially 
change our account of justification as much as this new 
group of empiricist philosophers of science have changed 
our account of discovery. The method of this inquiry must 
incorporate the spirit of these accomplishments while ex­
cluding the commitment to an empiricist's account of 
justification.
As indicated above, there are two schools of phil­
osophy of science. They are divided on the question of 
method. We now turn to the second of these, which is the 
analytical school.
Proponents of the analytic methodology argue that 
public objects, such as science, are fundamentally normative 
structures consisting of symbolic language which is controlled 
by regulative principles. (Ayer, 1952; Carnap, 1966 and 
Nagal, 1961) The appropriate method for determining the 
correct use of this symbolic language does not rest upon an
examination of its actual usage. The rules of the game of
chess are examples of such normative.structures and they 
determine what a correct chess move is. We do not say, for
example, that children unaware of the rules of the game, who
are playing with chess pieces, are playing chess. By the
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same token, we cannot rely on our observation of individual 
scientists at work correctly to define for us what is 
science.
Though this is an accurate presentation of the 
analytic point of view, it is by no means one to which all 
analytic philosophers would assent. A notable recent excep­
tion is revealed in the work of Harris. The traditionally 
analytic point of view, Harris argues, (MacKinnon, 1968-69) 
has generated a methodology which involves interpreting 
science by fitting a reinterpreted residue into a predeter­
mined epistemological framework. Rather, he suggests, the 
philosopher must use the evidence afforded by the sciences 
to provide a comprehensive and coherent conception of the 
universe, and examine the methods actually employed in 
scientific investigation to discover standards for the 
reliability of this knowledge.
The various schools of analytic philosophy differ 
with respect to methods of analysis and epistemic commit­
ments. In discussing models of the assumption of objectivity 
in Chapter IV, these schools are discussed with respect to 
their epistemic commitments in particular. At this point in 
the discussion, it will suffice to say that these schools 
maintain that science is the knowledge that is produced in 
the form of language. The philosophy of science, therefore 
is the clarification of the meaning of these languages by 
means of either exhibition or replacement analysis. (Korner, 
19665 Ayer, 1952)
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The word analytic is confusing because its precise 
meaning varies from school to school. For the logical atom- 
ists (Russell, 19^3 and early Wittgenstein,'1922), it meant 
essentially to reduce all propositions to atomic sentences, 
the subject and predicates of which were objects and their 
properties in the real world. Analytic philosophers of a 
positivist conviction (Ayer, 1959) wish by means of sorting 
to clarify all propositions into three classes: the analytic,
the synthetic, and the nonsense categories.
At first glance, it would appear that we have at last 
struck upon a method which is explicitly non-empirical and 
would therefore be most appropriate for this inquiry, since 
we are attempting to avoid methods which have an inherent 
prejudice towards objectivity. This, however, is not the 
case. As we pointed out above, since the time of Berkeley 
the principle of separation has been between analytic and 
synthetic aspects of experience, rather than between inher­
ently objective and subjective elements of sensory experience. 
The analytic philosophers of science accept the analytic/ 
synthetic distinction. They believe that an accurate under­
standing of science can only be achieved if work is done in 
both aspects. The scientist with his experimental techniques 
generates synthetic propositions but the ordering and clar­
ification of such propositions is best achieved by individuals 
trained in linguistic and logical analysis. Consequently we 
find that contemporary analytic philosophy of science is 
committed to both the "principle of separation" and the
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"principle of verification", which is to say, it accepts the 
assumption of objectivity.
Nowhere is their commitment to the epistemic sound­
ness of the analytic/synthetic distinction more evident than 
with respect to the question which is of central concern to 
this inquiry - that is, "what is the epistemic status of 
perception?" The majority of analytic philosophers of science 
maintain that there is an essential analytic difference be­
tween perception and scientific observation. Not only do 
they deny the relevance of psychological perception to know­
ledge but they maintain that the whole problem of perception 
is a metaphysical delusion.
For example, Ayer (1952) maintains that it is an 
accident of our language that we cannot refer in a grammat­
ically correct manner to the qualities of an object without 
first using the grammatical fiction "thinghood"; that is, 
the subject of a sentence is a thing on which its qualities 
are predicated. This accident leads us to believe erron­
eously that the qualities are related to the thing rather than 
being the mere sum of all the qualities. The problem of per­
ception is born from this linguistic delusion, since distinc­
tions between real and apparent are made and create a 
metaphysical substrata.
Thus the problem of showing how statements about 
material things are related to observation-statements, 
which is, in effect, the traditional problem of 
perception, might be thought to require for its 
solution that one should indicate a method of trans­
lating statements about material things into 
observation-statements, and thereby furnish what could
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be regarded as a definition of a material thing.
But, in fact, this is impossible; for, as I have 
already remarked, no finite set of observation 
statements is ever equivalent to a statement about 
a material thing. What one can do, however, is to 
construct a schema which shows what sort of rela­
tions must obtain between sense-contents for it to 
be true, in any given case, that a material thing 
exists; and while this process cannot, - properly 
speaking, be said to yield a definition, it does 
have the effect of showing how the one type of 
statement is related to the other. (Ayer, 1952, 
p. 2b)
The kind of schema recommended by Ayer will be 
examined more carefully in the discussion of the behaviorist- 
positivist model in Chapter IV.
Collins (1967) has developed a schema which is aimed 
at demonstrating the logical independence of knowledge and 
perceptual claims. Though an exposition of this schema is 
too technical for the present context, the following points 
are made to demonstrate this his schema depends entirely upon 
language analysis and says nothing of perceptual abilities. 
Essentially Collins attempts to show that perception verbs 
are used with propositional statements, but this does not 
indicate that the verbs mean both perceptual and knowledge 
claims in the same context. In the claim, "he sees Mount 
Monadnock", we have essentially a perceptual claim since it 
is possible to make the claim about someone who has never 
heard about Mount Monadnock and therefore is not making a 
judgment "that that is Mount Monadnock". There appears to be 
a combined perceptual and knowledge claim in the following 
construction, "he sees that that is Mount Monadnock". Collins 
argues that these can be separated. There is a knowledge
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claim which can be logically separated from the perceptual 
claim by pointing out that it could not be attributed to any­
one who did not know about Mt. Monadnock, even if it could be 
shown that that person is perceiving Mt. Monadnock. Insight 
into the essence of his argument comes from understanding 
his claim that the proposition that "Seeing is believing" is 
not analogous to "swimming is exercising". Doing a little 
seeing is not doing a little believing, as doing a little 
swimming is doing a little exercising. Collins concludes 
from this that even though perception influences knowledge, 
and knowledge influences perception, and that those influences 
can be demonstrated experimentally, this is no basis for 
asserting the inseparability of the two. The distinctions 
made by Collins and Ayer are not necessary conclusions from 
an analytic approach to the problem of semantics. They have 
embedded in them more than the analytic method as a presup­
position. They follow in the tradition of Wittgenstein in 
assuming a representative theory of signs. Wittgenstein 
believed that the modern alphabet is essentially the same 
kind of sign system as was hieroglyphics. There is another 
analytic philosopher who presents us with a contrasting view 
to the notion that signs are representative.
Hanson distinguishes between symbols and signs, 
arguing that signs stand for referents while symbols char­
acterize them. The atomic, protocol, or observation state­
ments in science are not, as Wittgenstein (1922) maintains, 
maps or signs of the phenomena, but are more complex symbolic
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characterizations. It is not possible in Hanson's view to 
separate the knowledge claim from the perception claim, since 
the basic statements of knowledge give rise to alternative 
perceptions.
We shall see later that this is a debate between those 
who hold logical constructs to be fictional conveniences, as 
does Ayer, and those, as Hanson, who holds constructs to be 
"vrhole" principles of organization.
With the exception of Hanson, the large majority of 
analytic philosophers have disassociated the problem of 
observation from the problem of perception. They see no need 
for an integration between their methods and the evidence 
collected by experimental psychologists. In addition, the 
sharp distinction which these philosophers make between 
analytic and synthetic propositions reveals an explicit be­
lief in that "principle of separation" which in turn reveals 
an implicit belief in the capacity of science to make objec­
tive observations by which to produce synthetic knowledge.
We have seen that one of the oldest and most persis­
tent aspects of scientific thought can be understood in terms 
of two principles. The "principle of separation" which 
maintains that only certain aspects of experience can be 
trusted and the "principle of verification" which maintains 
that scientific method is the only way available for discrim­
inating those aspects of experience which can be trusted and 
those which cannot. The "principle of separation" preceded
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the formation of our contemporary academic specialities; 
therefore, we developed a discipline with methods and inter­
ests for each of the two kinds of experiences that the sep- 
eration created. The philosophy of science would answer the 
most important question in philosophical epistemology which 
was, how does man establish an indubitable unit of knowledge, 
while the psychology of perception would give us a descrip­
tion of man's ordinary subjective experience. Even with each 
of these separate disciplines of epistemology there were other 
dichotomies which once again paralleled the "principle of 
separation," so that psychology divided into behaviorism and 
phenomenology and philosophy of science divided into analytic 
and empirical approaches.
Wot all the developments in these fields militated 
against joining scientific epistemology and the psychology 
of perception. We noted above, for example, the work of a 
few philosophers of science who brought psychological factors 
to our understanding of the logic of discovery. There is 
also some evidence that many analytic philosophers are 
realizing that a combination of analytic and empirical tech­
niques must be used to give an account of epistemology. A 
good example of this is available to us in the work of Harris. 
There is, unfortunately, no counter balancing evidence that 
psychologists are becoming more aware that certain analytic 
and normative processes, such as language, must be incorpor­
ated into their study of perception. There is no doubt that
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psychologists have for a long time recognized the influence 
of language on perception. They have not learned from analy­
tic philosophers to analyze language as a set of publicly 
available prescriptions governed by normative regulations.
We have seen that these two disciplines have, as 
Hirst (1959? p. 2*0 puts it, dealt with these questions "in 
haughty isolation from each other", and we have tried to 
argue that there is more than just interest and method which 
has kept the two disciplines apart. That "something more" 
is the assumption of objectivity. What, therefore, can we 
learn about the conceptual requirements of a method to be 
used to inquire into the assumption of objectivity? The 
first thing to be learned is that there are immediate meth­
odological benefits which can result from merely holding the 
assumption in abeyance. We can see this by examining what 
happens to the two major objections which have kept psychology 
and scientific epistemology apart, once the assumption of 
objectivity is held in abeyance.
From the discussion so far, it can be seen that the 
relationship between epistemology and perception is logically 
and historically ambiguous and controversial. Since this 
study intends to show that perception is episteraologically 
relevant in science, at least two philosophical distinctions 
between perception and epistemology must be dealt with. The 
first of these is that raised by Hamlyn (1961) in which he 
says that the purposes of epistemology and the science of 
perception are divergent. Epistemological philosophy is
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prescriptive and aims at justifying claims to knowledge. 
Psychology of perception is descriptive and aims at under­
standing the conditions which give rise to certain experiences. 
This distinction is one which most psychologists would readily 
accept and is one of the reasons which has kept perceptual 
scientists out of the business of developing sign theories 
for the epistemology of science. It seems, however, that the 
distinction must ultimately fail since it is precisely in the 
activity of perception that the normative and the experiential 
become fused. This is true in the ideographic sense that an 
individual in the activity of perception labels his exper­
iences according to linguistic categories, and thereby shapes 
the experiential by way of norms. The normative and exper­
iential also come together in the nomenthetic or public sense 
that language becomes fused to phenomena in science. The 
original intention of perceptual science to describe has lead 
to a description which involves necessarily normative epis­
temic considerations. In other words, some of the most 
important conditions to give rise to certain experiences or 
percepts are linguistic, and therefore normative.
Besides the distinction between prescription and 
description there is the claim made by Ayer (1952) and 
Collins (1967) that perception is a metaphysical problem, 
and therefore by definition falls into the realm of nonsense, 
or at least has nothing to do with the claim to knowledge.
As was implied in a previous section, proponents of this view 
already are relying on a form of perceptual atomism which is
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by no means universally accepted. When Ayer claims that 
those who propose the perceptual problem are being deluded 
by language into thinking that the subject of propositions is 
a real substratum giving rise to its predicated qualities, he 
reveals his phenomenalism, which after all is a theory of 
perception. It is by no means clear from studying experi­
mental psychology of perception that the primitives of exper­
iences, or the givens are what Ayer calls "sense content".
Nor is it clear that man has the capacity to simply and 
directly "represent" these sense contents in atomic sentences. 
It is preferable not to prescribe any limitations on what 
description will ultimately reveal, or to elevate a particu­
lar epistemological commitment to an epistemological 
prescription.
The method we choose will have to- overcome the 
analytic/synthetic distinction: that is, it must somehow
combine normative information with experimental information 
without assigning one to the realm of ideas and the other 
to the realm of facts.
CHAPTER III
THE METHOD OF ANOMALIES
At this point, a method which Is neither analytic nor 
experimental is required. It has been demonstrated that the 
currently existing methodologies for dealing with questions of 
epistemology tend to be either analytic or empirical. We have 
already seen that the almost universal acceptance of this dis­
tinction militates against an inquiry into the question of 
objectivity. It does so by virtue of the fact that current 
methods have imbedded in them a commitment to the assumption 
of objectivity. The method which will be used makes no inher­
ent distinction between analytic or synthetic, subjectivity or 
objectivity, veridical or illusory. In the context of the 
inquiry, perhaps the best name for this method would be the 
method of anomalies. This name suggests a new method, but in 
fact it is a method which is modeled after a scientific method 
which goes back to Galileo. This is the method of "thought 
experiments." (Myers, 1968) The method of anomalies requires 
a considerably detailed explanation but it will be helpful to 
begin by expressing some broad outlines and the major thrust 
of the method.
The method of anomalies provides a systematic way of 
producing counterevidence to an assumption which is the sub­
ject of an inquiry. Broadly speaking, there are five steps 
which must be accomplished. In the first place, an assumption 
of some significance in the current structure of knowledge
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must be identified. The next step requires making this assump­
tion explicit. This involves reviewing the role the assumption 
plays in the various theories relevant to the domain in which 
the assumption is made. Having made the assumption explicit 
makes it possible to hold that assumption in abeyance and there­
by collect anomalies to the assumption. These anomalies chal­
lenge the credulity of the assumption. The next step involves 
seeking an alternative to the assumption which will hopefully 
conclude the inquiry by making possible the last step in which 
the difficulty raised by the anomalies is resolved.
In order to examine the question as to whether or not 
the subjectivity/objectivity distinction is valid, we must set 
it aside in the method we use for examining the question. No 
matter how peculiar the method suggested appears to be, its 
peculiarity is a necessity, for to get rid of it would nec­
essitate accepting a method which would assume in advance an 
answer to the question being asked. A natural question which 
will be asked of anyone who claims not to be working in either 
the analytic or synthetic realm, is: What realm are you
working in? Kant had an answer to this question; he would 
have pointed to the realm of the a priori synthetic. Though 
Kant's a priori synthetic is an appropriate answer to this 
question, it is not one which this author had in mind when he 
chose this method. But if one thinks of Einstein's thought 
experiments in which he proposed physically impossible events, 
such as physicists riding elevators through empty space in order
to get at conceptual consequences about the real world, one 
can easily see that this work is important despite the fact 
that it is neither analytic nor synthetic.
Perhaps the best known example of a thought experiment 
was the one given by Einstein1 in which an elevator containing 
experimental physicists is first dropped in free fall in a 
gravitational field and then pulled at a constantly accelerated 
speed by a supernatural force in an inertial field. Einstein 
demonstrated that the physicists inside would confuse a grav­
itational field for an inertial field and vice versa. It 
should be noted that Einstein came to this conclusion by the 
method which analytic philosophers claim can only be arrived 
at through linguistic analysis. (Ayer, 1952) In other words, 
he proved that the distinction between inertia and gravity is 
analytic, not synthetic. He demonstrated that phenomenally 
you cannot distinguish between the two kinds of forces. This 
important conceptual clarification was done by pushing the 
meaning of the concepts inertia and gravity to the limit of 
their implications.
The method of thought experiments differs from the 
analytic method in that it depends upon propositional conse­
quences. In other words, thought experiments aim to make 
conclusions which are relevant to the real world. They depend 
upon an "if-then" series of propositions rather than a defin­
itional analysis.
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This idealized experiment is described in detail in 
Einstein and Infeld (1938) pp. 21*4-222.
...thought experiments are similar to empirical 
experiments in that the results of both must be 
interpreted by means of propositions having either 
theoretical or factual status. Just as the "facts" 
supposedly revealed by a physicist's experiment are 
established by the experiment only if the notions of 
electricity, optics, heat, and so on governing the 
construction and use of the experimental apparatus 
are correct, so the philosopher's interpretation of 
the results of his thought experiments is acceptable 
only if the propositions he employs in his inter­
pretation are acceptable. (Myers, 1968, p. 191? 192)
The discussion of Einstein's work at this point is 
presented only as an example of the fact that not all good 
scientific inquiry can be easily classified as analytic or 
experimental. Particularly in the context of discovery it is 
becoming more clearly recognized that fanciful imagination 
is an important part of scientific fruitfulness.
The reason so much stress has been placed on the non- 
analytic and non-experimental aspect of this method is that 
the specific assumption which we wish to examine in the 
inquiry is one which is generally used to justify the distinc­
tion between analysis and experimentation. Having made this 
point clear we must examine the various steps in the method 
to see first how they work in general, and secondly how they 
apply to this particular problem. The first step in the 
method of anomolies involves identifying an assumption. To 
understand this step we must begin with an examination of the 
role that assumptions play in knowledge in general.
Webster's tells us that an assumption is anything 
taken for granted, a presupposition. All knowledge systems, 
be they empirical or formal, make use of assumptions as a
necessary beginning place. The important point to be noticed 
is that they are not subject to empirical test, but are used 
as a background for testing propositions of lower order of 
generality. Myers states this proposition very clearly when 
he says,
It is evident that while science is self-correcting in 
respect to the system of belief it produces, it is not 
self-correcting, in respect to those beliefs such as 
that in the existence of reals which the doing of science 
presupposes. If, contrary, to the fact, these pre­
supposed beliefs were wrong, then the practice of science 
would not correct them. Hence science does not provide 
an example of how someone working within a framework 
of material and methodological assumptions can critically 
examine the framework without standing outside it.
(Myers, 1968, p. 18*+)
It is because assumptions are not subject to empirical tests
that other methods are necessary for conducting inquiry into
knowledge which already exists.
According to T.S. Kuhn (1962) it is characteristic of 
normal science that a certain cluster of achievements based 
on common assumptions form a defining network. This network, 
which he calls a paradigm, is accepted by most scientists as 
the source of questions to be worked on. Within such a para­
digm there is no means of questioning the basic assumptions 
which are the starting place that came prior to the achievement 
of facts. Kuhn includes in his definition of paradigms, theories, 
laws, instrumentation and application which grouped together 
create a coherent research tradition. This tradition is what 
must be learned to become initiated into the science as one of 
its practitioners. The viability of the system rests on two 
characteristics. The first is that the paradigm as initiated
is unprecedented enough to attract followers. Secondly, it 
is open ended enough to leave some problems unresolved. The 
course of normal science is characterized by Kuhn as one in 
which the unresolved problems of the paradigm are worked on in 
a"puzzle solving" fashion, but during which there is no ques­
tioning of the fundamentals of the paradigm. (Kuhn, 1962)
A paradigm is defined as a pattern, example or model 
and it is this broad sense of the term which is important in 
the present context. Most historians of science would con­
sent to the existence of paradigms as just defined, even 
though they might disagree with the definition and interpret­
ation by Kuhn.
It should be noted that historians do not agree that 
the notion of paradigm is applicable to all sciences. Watson 
(1967) notes that psychology is an example of science in which 
one can find lacking many of the characteristics of a paradig­
matic science. There is no basic agreement among psychologists 
about theories or methods. Besides this ideological provin­
cialism, Watson points to significant national differences in 
psychology as evidence of the fact that the first paradigmatic 
revolution has not yet arrived in psychology.
For the purpose of this discussion, however, Watson's 
objections are not critical, since he substitutes for paradigms 
the notion of prescriptions. In doing so he differentiates for 
us between those aspects of the Kuhnian definition and the 
broader definition referred to above, making it clear that some
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form of assumptive structure is needed in a science as a set
of guiding principles. Watson says of his prescriptions,
The overall function of these themes is orientative 
or attitudinals they tell us how the psychologist- 
scientist must or should behave. In short they have 
a directive function. They help to direct the 
psychologist-scientist in the way he selects a prob­
lem, formulates it, and the way in which he carries 
it out." (Watson, 1967» p. ^35)
For the purpose at hand, which is to demonstrate what 
the role of assumptions in science is, the differences between 
prescriptions and paradigms are not significant. It can be 
seen that in either case a form of a guiding principle which
is obtained as part of a scientist's training, and can be
traced through a period of time in history, is being taken 
for granted by the individual scientist in his research.
It is clear that there is agreement on the proposition 
that all sciences have imbedded in them certain assumptions 
and that those assumptions are not subject to the self-correcting 
influence of inquiry. They are above those influences and 
therefore one must stand outside the science in order to
question them. The full and complete impact that such assump­
tions have on the knowledge which is generated under them is 
simply not known to us. But there are two important insights 
about the influence of assumptions which have been identified.
The first of these two insights is that assumptions play a 
very significant role in defining the problems and selecting 
the issues which shall be investigated within a discipline*
The second insight into the influence of assumptions is less
definite but probably more important: it appears to be
desirable to eliminate as many assumptions as possible. There 
is some evidence that suggests that some great scientific 
breakthroughs have occured as a result of removing old assump­
tions, rather than by adding new information.
Let us now turn to an examination of the roles which 
assumptions play in defining the problems within a domain of 
knowledge.
It is in the realm of presupposition and assumption
that we find the source of problem definition. For this reason
science must have methods for looking within itself.
Real progress in any science comes not merely by "adding 
to" existing knowledge, but by becoming aware of our 
assumptive worlds, conscious of their inadequacy, des­
troying and disintegrating them, and then rebuilding 
them in the constant search for more adequate formu­
lations. (Cantril, 19^9? p* 375)
In this connection the transactionalists have attempted 
to develop a systematic method by which one can come up with 
new questions in science. This is done in the belief that 
problem definition is as significant, if not more significant, 
than problem solution. Heisenberg agrees that this is a prob­
lem in the physical as well as the social sciences. He main­
tains that we have developed experimental methods to generate 
and evaluate solutions but that we have inherited from the 
Greeks a propensity for an intuitional approach for generating 
and evaluating the validity of questions. Many contemporary 
writers, (Bridgman, 19^9; Stevens, 19^7; Ayer, 1952) have 
taken the position that the principles of operationalism
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constitute one set of criteria for discriminating meaningful 
from nonsense questions, while the meaning of operationalism 
is intimately related to our notions of objectivity. The 
discussion of operationalism as a method for evaluating ques­
tions will be postponed. It is our view that operationalism 
offers no systematic method for generating questions.
The method of challenging assumptions by the means of 
anomalies, which is roughly modeled after the thought exper­
iment, is a method which will yield significant new questions.
An example which we have already discussed at length is the 
set of new questions which become evident from the reintegra­
tion of the epistemology of science and psychology of perception. 
Questions about problems which these two questions have in 
common are not evident as long as one assumes a difference 
between objective observation and subjective perception. For 
example, it is for the most part not recognized that the data 
language problem in philosophy of science and the behavioral 
indicator problem in the psychology of perception are essen­
tially the same problem. In experimental perception there is 
probably no greater difficulty than the fact that the exper­
imenter must rely on some kind of verbal or behavioral 
indicator to evaluate the phenomenological. No definitive 
solution to this problem, is yet available, which can assure 
an experimenter that two subjects responding to the same 
words or other behavioral indicators are experiencing the 
same phenomenological qualities. This problem, which is as fam­
iliar to psychologists, has an exact counterpart in the
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philosophy of science. In this context, the problem has to 
do with the relationship of language to phenomena. The 
philosopher of science must study the language of scientists 
and assume that the language is an adequate indicator of the 
phenomena which the scientists study. Notice the similarity in 
the quotation below to the familiar problem in perceptual 
psychology.
There is no disagreement on the phenomena to be 
studied, but when one comes to tell what these 
phenomena are, or how they are to be categorized, 
then the strife begins. (Kattsoff, 19579 P» 27)
The belief that there is agreement on the phenomena under study
but no consensus as to how to tell what the phenomena are about
or how to categorize the phenomena, is parallel to saying that
certain perceptual experiences are taking place without responses
from which they can be inferred. If all the evidence one has to
go by is in fact public knowledge, then it must consist of the
telling and categorizing of the phenomena by the scientific
community; otherwise, we are forced to maintain that we cannot
express what we are in fact agreed upon.
In addition to suggesting new and important questions, 
there may well be a more direct benefit from challenging exist­
ing assumptions. In recent years some writers have emphasized 
that many of the significant changes which have taken place in 
science came about, not from adding new knowledge to what was 
already known, but from destroying something which had been 
taken for granted within science.
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Agnes Arber (196*0 is one such writer who acknowledges
that basic assumptions are necessary and inevitable. She be*
lieves that we have opened new areas for actual investigation
by reducing these assumptions to the smallest possible number.
As a single example, from biology, of something which 
was long held, without adequate reason, to come into 
the category of the given; and to be thus immune from 
inquiry, we may recall the affirmation that the leaf 
is a basic unit of the plant body in the angiospersms.
So long as this was assumed, any effort to understand 
the morphology of the leaf was forbidden; the leaf 
was a concept which one could not, as it were, get 
behind. 'When, however, the ban was lifted, and the 
leaf lost, the privileged position accorded to it as 
an organ sui generis, the way was opened towards 
interpreting it. (Arber, 196*f, p. 81)
More evidence that it is desirable to eliminate as 
many assumptions as possible comes to us from Polanyi (1967)*
He has investigated the logic of negation and he holds that 
many important scientific breakthroughs are cases in which 
problems arising from a certain assumption are eliminated by 
negating the validity of the assumption rather than by solving 
the problem. Among these are the Principle of Inertia, the 
Second and Third Laws of Thermodynamics, the Theory of 
Chemical Elements, the Principles of both special and general 
Relativity, the Principle of Indeterminacy, and the Pauli 
Principle. Taking only one of these as an example, certain 
ideal conditions which were assumed in mechanics led scientists 
for many years to believe in, and in fact work on, the con­
struction of perpetual motion machines. The fact that no one 
is presently engaged in solving this problem does not mean that 
the problem has been solved. It means that the impossibility
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of the problem has been raised Into a universal principle in 
the form of the Second Law.
If Polanyi and Arber are correct in assuming that by 
reducing the number of existing assumptions we are making 
scientific progress, then it means that challenging assumptions 
is desirable and that we should try to develop systematic 
methods which allow us to challenge assumptions.
Having gained an understanding of the significance of 
assumptions in knowledge we may now turn our attention to the 
next step in the method. That next step involves making as 
explicit as possible the assumption which is the subject of 
inquiry.
After having said -this much on the significance of 
underlying assumptions, it is disappointing to say that very 
little has been written and presumably this means little is 
known about how one identifies such an assumption. As these 
assumptions are related to science they tend to be propos- 
itionalj that is, they tend to be assumptions about the nature
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of things. Classic examples of such assumptions, so blatantly 
identifiable post hoc, are the assumptions of absolute time 
and space. A further example is that described by Arber con­
cerning the status of the leaf. Not all assumptions related 
to science are of this form however. At least one set of 
assumptions in science is concerned with the abilities of 
scientists, rather than the subject matter which they study. 
Among these are the assumptions scientists make about their
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power of observation. It has already been mentioned on 
several occasions that these fall within the domain of the 
psychology of science.
No matter what the assumptions•are about, the fact 
that they are so difficult to identify can be understood when 
we consider that they have an implicit and an explicit aspect. 
The explicit assumptions in a science are always available 
for challenge. A good indication of this is the fact that 
Hume (1952) and Berkeley (1952) as well as Newton himself (Mich- 
elmore,1 9 6 2 ) challenged the assumption of absolute time and 
space. They were not successful because their challenge was 
explicit and they did not carry the challenge through all of 
its implications. Einstein, on the other hand, not only 
challenged this assumption, but showed us what difference it 
made. Hopefully, this dissertation will succeed in justifying 
the belief that explicit assumptions are available in the 
formal structure, and that we can understand their meaning by 
carrying them out to their logical conclusions.
Implicit assumptions make their influence felt in the 
perceptual, rather than in the logical, realm. Changes in 
explicit assumptions can be made without a change in implicit 
assumptions. The consequence of doing so is to produce oddity. 
It has often been said that only a few men truly can understand 
Einstein's theory of relativity. This claim rests upon a 
belief that only a few men can treat physical propositions on 
an exclusively logical level. Having mastered the mathematics 
allows one to calculate consequences which are logically
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independent of absolute time and space. When we convert the 
mathematics to description, we involve a language which is 
based on the implicit assumption of absolute time and space. 
The consequences must necessarily seem to us impossible be­
cause we cannot imagine them.
The seeming impossibility of some of the relativistic 
conclusions is due to the fact that at the level of "common 
sense", and therefore perceptually, we are Newtonians. The 
same kind of discrepancy applies to theories of perception 
and philosophies of science. As professional scientists, 
psychologists may conclude various things about perception 
which lead us to think that everyday perception is not 
veridical. Nevertheless in his everyday experience the psych­
ologist operates on the assumption of perceptual realism. 
Likewise scientists and philosophers of science may take pos­
itivist and other positions which deny any metaphysical claims 
on reality, but in their everyday lives as well as in the 
laboratory they operate as realists. The assertion that 
assumptions can influence perception is made on the basis of 
much perceptual research. The most direct evidence for this 
point is provided by Ames and his colleages. Some of this 
research will be examined in detail in Chapters IV and V.
At this point, Ames' words are sufficient to communicate the 
relationship between implicit assumptions and perception.
That it is our perceptual world and not our abstracted 
world that is most basic and is directly related to our 
purposes is disclosed by the fact that in a concrete
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situation it is our perceptual response (sensations) 
and not our abstracted concepts that determine our 
actions (distorted ROOM). (Ames, 1960, p. 1*f)
In the case of the distorted room, the assumption that 
"this is a room" does not have to be made explicitly by the 
subject, it is immediate in his perception. Furthermore, 
changing the implicit perceptual assumption requires more than 
merely telling the subject that it is a distorted room. One 
must tell the subject how the room is distorted; that is, one 
must carry it out to its experiential consequences. Identifying 
an underlying assumption means more than pointing to its ex­
plicit name, such as the subject/object split or absolute 
time and space. It means getting a feel for the experiential 
consequences of making such an assumption.
At this point, it is of crucial importance to consider 
the use of anomalies in challenging assumptions. To do this 
we must clarify the meaning of the term anomaly and the term 
challenge.
Webster's defines an anomaly as anything which deviates
from the general rule, while Kuhn, to whom we are indebted for
the idea of anomalies, sees them as facts which are contrary
to the existing paradigm. Kuhn himself is unhappy with being
forced by linguistic convention into calling anomalies facts
as opposed to theories.
Discovery commences with the awareness of anomaly, i.e., 
with the recognition that nature has somehow violated 
the paradigm-induced expectations that govern normal 
science. It then continues with a more or less extended 
exploration of the area of anomaly. And it closes only 
when the paradigm theory has been adjusted so that the
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anomalous has become the expected. Assimilating a new 
sort of fact demands a more than additive adjustment of 
theory, and until that adjustment is completed, until 
the scientist has learned to see nature in a different 
way - the new fact is not quite a scientific fact at 
all. (Kuhn, 1962, pp. 52-53)
The first question which we must consider is one of 
factuality. Are anomalies simply experimental facts which 
cannot be accounted for by existing theory? Most observers 
will agree that not all experimental results which cannot be 
accounted for by existing theory are to be considered anomalous 
in Kuhn1s sense of the word. The majority are attributable to 
error and most are ignored.^
Three contemporary philosophers of science who have 
pondered the problem of scientific discovery are important in 
understanding the factuality of anomalies. They are Popper,
Kuhn and Feyerabend. These men hold complex and often con­
flicting views concerning the evolution of scientific ideas, 
yet each is identified with a particular tenet which is relevant 
to this question.
Popper1s views with respect to the problems of induc­
tion are of special importance in an analysis of the role of 
perception in science, but this will be taken up in a later 
section. The part of Popper's philosophy which is relevant 
to this question is his emphasis on the deductive logical 
consistency of scientific knowledge systems. He briefly states 
his position as follows:
1A great deal of relevant literature concerning the 
disposition of counterevidence is available on this point. 
Notably the work of Polanyi, Duhem, Popper and Feyerabend.
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My point of view is, briefly, that our ordinary 
language is full of theories; that observation is 
always observation in the light of theories; and 
that it is only the inductivist prejudice which 
leads people to think that there could be a phen­
omenal language, free of theories, and distinguishable 
from a "theoretical language"; and lastly that the 
theorist is interested in explanation as such, that 
is to say, in testable explanatory theories: appli­
cations and predictions interest him only for theor­
etical reasons— because they may be used as tests of 
theories. (Popper, 1959, P» 59)
That facts do not stand up by themselves is important 
in understanding anomalies. Kuhn has indicated his belief 
that crisis in the evolution of science results from the 
experience by certain scientists of anomalies to the tradi­
tional paradigm. We must keep Popper's perspective in mind 
when using the word anomalies, for it would make no more 
sense to believe that bits of information against a theory 
can exist independently, than to believe that they can exist 
independently to support the theory.
Kuhn himself is not clear on this point. He says on 
the one hand that the discovery of oxygen by Lavoisier was 
anomalous to the existing chemical paradigm. He goes on to 
recite that if the criterion of discovery is the isolation of 
the gas, then it predates both Priestly and Lavoisier. If, 
on the other hand, the criterion be the understanding of the 
chemical qualities of a gas then Lavoisier's attribution of 
acidic and atomic characteristics to the gas means that he 
fails to discover it. He goes on to show that no experiment 
in any specific time or place can be isolated in which oxygen 
was discovered. The term discovery is in part to blame be­
cause it leads us to believe that oxygen was experienced the
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first time through some exclusively inductive process. As 
Kuhn (1962) points out there is evidence to suggest that 
Lavoisier was dissatisfied with the entire existing paradigm 
and that this dissatisfaction was essential to his discovery.
If anomalies are not ontological contradictions 
bumped into by scientists engaged in the evolution of normal 
science, then we must seek an alternative set of dynamics to 
account for the crises that occur in the evolution of science. 
It is Feyerabend (1961) who provides such an alternative by 
suggesting that scientific progress takes place during crisis 
periods while an abnormal pluralism is flourishing. Normal 
science to Feyerabend is monistic and dogmatic and if it is 
not challenged for a sufficient period of time then it will 
become metaphysical. With Feyerabend, the role of anomalies 
is considerably diminished. The view held here falls some­
where between Kuhn and Feyerabend. Anomalies are neither 
ontological stumbling blocks to an otherwise monistic theoretic 
bliss, nor mere fallout of theoretical debate. We must con­
clude, therefore, that at the present time there is no clear 
cut answer as to whether or not anomalies are simple exper­
imental facts.
There is another question which arises out of the way. 
From reading Kuhn one is lead to believe that anomalies arise 
at a time just before revolution to a new paradigm. It is 
the present writer's view that old facts explained by the 
existing paradigm can become anomalous if offered in the right 
context. "The principle of inertia, the law of conservation
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of energy were gained only by new and virginal thoughts about 
well-known experiments and phenomena." (Einstein, Infeld,
1938, p. 96)
With these considerations in mind, let us consider a 
definition of what is intended here by the word anomaly. An 
anomaly consists of phenomena viewed in a context which sug­
gests that our expectations with respect to the behavior of 
the phenomena are in error. As an example, consider Einstein's 
thought experiment. None of the facts concerning the behav­
ior of the physicist's experiments in the elevators is new 
facts; none of the facts is in themselves surprising or 
anomalous, but the total effect of seeing these facts under 
conditions where we expected other facts, gives rise to our 
suspicion that something is awry.
If one has been successful in identifying an underlying 
assumption and understanding its implications, it should be pos­
sible to produce anomalies merely by asking for counterevidence 
to the assumption. Challenging the assumption means looking 
at the anomalies as they fit under the conditions prescribed 
by any paradigm or model which makes use of the assumption. In 
this way we can make comparisons between various models' ability 
to deal with the phenomena. Scientific models are positive gen­
erators of facts. We tend to see the models with the facts they 
have produced. In this situation, we try to make them deal with 
the facts which are relevant to their domain, but not necessar­
ily produced by them. Here we can look again at Einstein's 
thought experiments as an example of this technique. He often
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used facts produced by terrestrial physics in contexts, ideal 
or real, which were not part of the conditions Newton assumed 
in his model. The famous example in which clocks travelling 
at different speeds are found to keep a different time relies 
on the fact that the original context which was assumed by 
Newton has been changed.1 This produces a fact about these 
two different time pieces which Newton should be able to ac­
count for, since his model purports to have general laws 
about time. Hopefully it can be demonstrated that in the 
field of perception, various models have generated facts which 
appear to fall within the same domain but, in fact, these 
models are very often generating anomalies for other models 
of perception. By challenging, we mean that we are making 
demands on the model which we would expect it to be able to 
fulfill if it were an adequate model to account for the do­
main of which it is a model.
Once the assumption of objectivity as it exists in the 
various models of perception has been challenged, we should be 
able to detect the conceptual requirements of an adequate al­
ternative to the assumption of objectivity. Such alternatives 
could involve different kinds of solutions. An alternative 
assumption to that of objectivity might be made which does not 
have the problems which are revealed by the challenge to 
objectivity. Adjustments might be made in other aspects of 
the models so that they no longer depend on an assumption in
This idealized experiment is described in detail 
in Einstein and Infeld (1938), pp. 21^-222.
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this area. This is the same as saying that we might find that 
the assumption did not play an important role. Finally, we 
might conclude that the assumption of objectivity is justified 
under certain conditions and not under others. Whatever the 
case might be, the alternative will have to be explored in 
terms of its consequences for the resolution of problems 
raised by the challenge.
In summary, it will be beneficial to review the five 
essential steps in the method of anomalies.
The method of challenging assumptions by means of 
anomalies does not fit into the usual classifications of 
analytic or synthetic. This is so because the usual division 
presumes objectivity which is the subject of the inquiry.
This method resembles the thought experiment in that it makes 
use of already known facts to explore the implications of com­
bining these facts with assumed conditions.
Challenging assumptions is important because assump­
tions are taken for granted by the usual methods of inquiry. 
Paradigms or prescriptions are examples of sets of guiding 
assumptions in science. They generate the questions scien­
tists ask and the problems for which they seek solutions by 
means of empirical methods. The reduction of the number of 
assumptions seems to be another good reason for challenging 
assumptions since there is evidence that some scientific 
progress came directly from the negation of assumptions.
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Identifying an underlying assumption means more than 
being able to call its name or to isolate it within the formal 
system. It offers an opportunity to trace its logical and 
experiential consequences. Identifying the assumption 
explicitly is an analytical problem. Identifying the assump­
tion implicitly means demonstrating the concrete differences 
the assumption makes in any given system.
Demonstrating the concrete differences that an assump­
tion can make means dealing with phenomena as well as with 
theories. In this method the phenomena which are used are 
called anomalies. An anomaly consists of phenomena viewed in 
a context which suggests that our expectations with respect to 
the behavior of the phenomena are in error. Challenging 
assumptions in this context means making demands on the 
assumption, forcing it to deal with material which is contra­
dictory to it, but relevant to its domain.
The result of challenging the assumption is an assess­
ment of the adequacy of the assumption and the development 
of conceptual requirements for an alternative which would be 
more adequate than the assumption being challenged.
6k
CHAPTER IV
MAKING THE ASSUMPTION OF OBJECTIVITY EXPLICIT
The purpose of this Chapter Is to examine the assump­
tion of objectivity as it fits into various theories of per­
ception and observation. To accomplish this, five different 
models require exposition. These models are complexes of 
philosophical and psychological theories of empiricism. It 
is obvious that not all aspects of these models can be dealt 
with in this context. Our primary goal is to see how each 
defines objectivity.
Two kinds of perceptual theory must be reviewed in 
order to get a proper understanding of the prevalent models 
of perception which are available. They are philosophical 
prescriptive theories and psychological descriptive theories. 
The two kinds of theories combine to form a model of percep­
tion. The prescriptive theory is the more general of the 
two. It supplies us with rules or minimal requirements which 
any of the descriptive theories must meet. For example, the 
prescriptive realist sets up requirements which must be met 
by any description but he will permit any description that 
meets the standards. Five such models will be developed: 
they are the realist, the positivist, the configurationist, 
the neorealist and the transactionalist.
It will become obvious that not all of these five 
models addresses itself directly to the assumption of objec­
tivity. Furthermore, to the extent that they do so, their
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formal definitions differ, as do their emphases on certain 
aspects of these definitions. If we are to maintain the 
criteria of synonamous definitions, we will undoubtedly find 
that all of these five models make different assumptions about 
objectivity.
Webster's defines objectivity as "an objective state 
or quality, or objective reality," objective is further defined 
as "1. of or having to do with a known or perceived object, 
not a mental image or idea. 2. being, or regarded as being, 
independent of the mind; real 3» concerned with the actual 
characteristics of the thing dealt with rather than with the 
thoughts, feelings, etc." Two aspects of this definition are 
worth emphasis. The first is the feature of independence,1 
objective knowledge is independent of the knower. The second 
feature is implicit in all the definitions, but is not stated. 
This is the feature of certainty. When something is objective, 
we are sure of its truth and meaning. We hold the classical 
definition of objectivity to imply independence and certainty. 
Each of the five models which follows will be examined in 
order to answer these questions: Does the model allow for
the classical definition of objectivity? In what ways does it 
differ from the classical definition of objectivity? How is 
the objectivity that it does allow, achieved?
-
The feature of independence is discussed in more 
detail on pages 1^8-150.
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A realist is one who believes that there is an exis­
tential world which is independent of us and external to us 
and that this world can be known by us. Early naive forms of 
realism held that objects conveyed images directly to our 
minds through some ethereal medium. Though this picture is 
still consistent with much of our daily experience, it is 
seldom taken seriously by philosophers or scientists. One of 
the earliest forms of realism to be taken seriously was the 
dualistic position described in Chapter II as the doctrine 
of primary and secondary qualities.
Locke's (1967) theory of perception is an example of 
an indirect realism since it holds that only part of what we 
perceive can be attributed to the object independently of our 
perceiving it. Certain qualities, such as color, are only in 
us and are dependent on the senses. Other qualities can be 
apprehended by several senses and, therefore, they are held 
to be in the object. This view was widely held until very 
recent times. (Montague, 1965) One of the major reasons for 
believing it was that it paralleled the qualitative/quanti­
tative distinction in science.
From the belief that the nonquantitative qualities 
of objects are ineffective and useless, it is but a 
short and tempting step to the belief that they are 
not really objective attributes at all, but merely 
subjective effects which are produced upon the mind 
of the observer, and which exist only therein. The 
dualistic theory makes this step possible, for, 
according to that theory, the objects presented in 
direct perception have their locus with the perci­
pient, and are in no sense numerically identical 
with their extra-organic causes. Then, too, if the 
secondary or nonquantitative qualities have ceased to 
be welcome in the realm of physical causes, they have
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to be, out of mere decency, as it were, provided for 
in an asylum, and what more natural than to regard 
the mind itself as that refuge? Since the secondary 
qualities are restricted in their effects to the 
perceiver's own processes, it seems appropriate to 
think of them as essentially and exclusively mental 
in the nature, and hence as of interest to psychology 
rather than to physics. (Montague, 196?, p. 197)
The primary/secondary position has a complex descrip­
tion of the perceptual process which holds that the qualities 
which we experience are only partially representative. The 
perception of color, for example, has some aspects which are 
primary; that is, they are a function of a feature of the 
incoming light stimulus. Such qualities can be expressed 
quantitatively in terms of duration and intensity. Other 
aspects of color perception are due to the effects of light 
on the sensory system. An example of such a secondary quality 
is hue. We have already quotedLocke to the effect that he 
was in doubt that we could ever discover and describe the 
systematic relationships between primary and secondary qualities.
One theory which attempts a description of the relation
• •
between external and internal qualities is Johannes Muller's 
theory of specific nerve energy. (Allport, 19555 Boring, 19^2)
It holds that the qualities one is aware of are due to the 
nerve which has been stimulated, not the object that stimulated 
the nerve, duller himself held that a nerve could be stim­
ulated by any kind of stimulus and still give rise to the same 
conscious quality. His followers, however, modified the theory 
in such a way that nerves were also specific as to the kind of
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stimulus which would activate them. Helmholtz1 theory of 
hearing which holds that each discriminable tone has its own 
specific nerve, and Herring's theory of color-vlsion which 
postulates a similar recepter specificity, are still generating 
experimental research. (Allport, 1955j Boring, 19^2)
Let us now turn to our questions concerning the status 
of objectivity which implies the certain knowledge of qualities 
independent of the knower. According to this dualistic posi­
tion, objectivity is achieved by making a sharp distinction 
between scientific observation and daily perception. Scien­
tific methods allow us to distinguish the quantifiable quali­
ties from the subjective ones. In normal perception there is 
a confounding of the objective and subjective qualities. 
Scientific observation must develop special techniques for 
reducing knowledge to quantitative variables or qualities.
Those aspects of experience which are due to primary objec­
tive qualities demonstrate their independence and certainty 
by virtue of the fact that they are amenable to quantification. 
The objective world which we come to know through the use of 
scientific observation is therefore different from the world 
of daily experience.^
-
Other forms of realism will be treated in subsequent 
sections. Russell's critical realism is better understood 
within the context of phenomenalism, while perspective realists 
such as McGilvary and Gibson are treated later as neo-realists 
because of historical and philosophical differences.
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Currently, logical positivism is by far the most 
influential philosophy of science among scientists and phil­
osophers alike. In fact, for many, it encompasses all of 
philosophy. Logical positivists are in agreement on two 
fundamental tenets. The first is that there are only two 
kinds of knowledge, synthetic and analytic. Synthetic know­
ledge consists of facts acquired through observation, and 
their validity is determined empirically. Analytic knowledge 
consists of logical operators by means of which facts can be 
related to one another. The proper use of analytic knowledge 
is determined by analytic methods. Analytic knowledge is 
tautological since all analytic propositions are ultimately 
reducible to the form A is A. Even though all their implica­
tions are not intuitively obvious, —  for example, all the 
mathematical derivations of a set of axioms are not intuitively 
obvious —  they are necessarily deducible from such axioms.
The second fundamental tenet to which all logical 
positivists are committed is that the meaning of a proposition 
is the method of its verification. A proposition can only be 
meaningful if it is verifiable in principle. Verifiability is 
always defined in terms of observations. It is over the pre­
cise meaning of observation that logical positivists are 
divided into phenomenalists and physicalists. Phenomenalists 
believe that the referents of observation are sense data, 
while physicalists believe that the referents of observations 
are physical objects. The phenomenalist position is the older
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form of radical empiricism dating back to Berkeley. Among 
its most notable advocates were: Schllck, early Carnap, Moore,
Ayer, Bergmann, Godel, Waismann, Feigl, Price and early 
Russell. Physicalism was developed somewhat later and in part 
as a reaction to the ambiguity of verification principles as 
seen by the phenomenalists. Physicalism ultimately became the 
basis for the unity-of-science hypothesis accepted by most 
members of the Vienna Circle. Among its most important 
representatives are late Carnap, Feigl, Frank, Reichenbach, 
Hempel, and Sellars.
The phenomenalist is one who believes in Berkeley's 
maxim "to be is to be perceived." The phenomenalist believes
that there is only one thing we can be sure of, only one
indubitable: the existence of sense data. All knowledge
must be based on sense data if it is to be viewed as empir­
ical knowledge. It is often said that phenomenalism is a
theoretically neutral position. It is probably better to say 
that phenomenalism asserts nothing about metaphysics and very 
little about epistemology. That very little, however, is by 
no means neutral. How little phenomenalism implies is made 
explicit by H.H. Price:
It may be worthwhile to mention explicitly a number 
of things which we are not committed to.
1. We are not committed to the view that sense-data 
persist through the interval when they are not being 
sensed. We have only to admit that they exist at the 
times when they are being sensed.
2. We are not committed to the view that several minds 
can be acquainted with the same sense-datum. We have 
only to admit that evety mind is acquainted with some 
sense data from time to time.
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3. We are not committed to any view about what is 
called "the status" of sense-data in the universe, 
either as regards their relations with other types 
of existent entities. They may he events, or sub­
stances, or states of substances. They may be phys­
ical; i.e. they may be parts of, or events in, 
material objects such as chairs and tables or (in 
another theory) brains. They may be mental as 
Berkeley and many others have held. They may be 
neither mental nor physical.
*f. We are not committed to any view about their or­
igin. They may originate as a result of processes 
in material objects, or of mental processes, or of 
both. Or again, it may be that the boot is on the 
other legs it may be that they are ultimate con­
stituents of the universe, and material things 
(perhaps minds as well) may be just collections of 
thems in which case they "just are", and have ho 
origin and no explanation, since every thing else 
is explained by reference to them. (Price, 1959>
pp. 1 1 3-111*)
This statement certainly represents the minimal state­
ment of the phenomenal position. But even at this minimal 
commitment, it is necessary to disagree with those, such as 
Ayer and Price, who maintain that all perception theories are 
phenomenal. The most notable exception to the "sense datum is 
primitive" notion are the gestalt psychologists and the neo­
realists, such as J.J. Gibson. These two groups assume that 
perception is primitive and do not agree with the phenomenalist 
presumption that perception is a more complexly organized 
meaningful awareness which is problematically related to a 
more primitive sense data. Despite these exceptions, however, 
phenomenalism does allow a very wide range of positions, both 
philosophical and psychological, concerning the problem of 
perception. It is precisely because seemingly imcompatible 
positions, such as realism and idealism, can agree on the
72
phenomenal test of reducing all things to impression, that a 
phenomenalist like Ayer can maintain that the difference 
between these two positions are nothing more than linguistic 
preferences.
In order to understand the role of objectivity in 
these various models, it is not necessary to compare contrast­
ing phenomenal positions. Whether or not the realist or 
idealist is correct metaphysically will not make any differ­
ence if he is at the same time a phenomenalist. The test of 
propositions for the phenomenalist involves reducing propos­
itions to denotable sense data. It is this which gives a 
proposition its meaning. Whether sense data are signs of 
external objects or internal ideas is a separate question not 
itself subject to the principle of verification, and according 
to some, it is therefore an erroneous question. The search 
for the meaning of objectivity in this model will require 
that we examine carefully all of the available formulations 
of phenomenal verification principles. This will give us the 
prescriptive or philosophical theory of perception. We will 
also find that each of these can be elaborated descriptively.
Berkeley rejected the notion that any qualities could 
be said to be primary, by which he meant existent in matter. 
The same arguments which proponents of the primary/secondary 
view used to dismiss secondary qualities, like heat, are also 
applicable to primary qualities, like figure and extension.
As Berkeley puts it, the same "eyes from different stations",
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or "eyes of different texture" will apprehend figure and 
extension differently. (Berkeley, 1952, p. ^15) For this 
reason the substantive material qualities have no greater 
claim to an independent existence than do the secondary 
qualities. This does not preclude a belief in a science 
based on observation, "...by a diligent observation of the 
phenomena within our view, we may discover the general laws 
of nature, and from them deduce the other phenomena..." 
(Berkeley, 1952, p. ^3^)
According to Hume, the test for any complex idea 
involves examining its definition and determining the simple 
ideas of which it is composed. If there is still ambiguity 
concerning any of the simple ideas we merely have to bring them 
to the final test, which is to revive the impressions of which 
the idea is a faint copy. "The most lively thought is still 
inferior to the dullest sensation." (Hume, 1952, p. **55)
In Berkeley there is an implied distinction between 
sensation and perception. When we say we hear a coach we are 
really inferring that the sound we hear is made by a coach.
The sound in this example is the specie of given which con­
temporary phenomenalists accept as sense data. The coach is 
an interpretation of the sense data. These would be referred 
to today as cognitions. Within his notion of impressions there 
is no clear distinction between perception and sensation.
In most of his applications of the test of reduction 
there are at least the seeds of distinction between sensation
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and perception. When Hume treats "power" as he did "cause",
he says that each man is "conscious" of the power by his will
to move his limbs.
A man, suddenly struck with palsy in the leg or arm, 
or who had newly lost those members, frequently 
endeavors at first to move them, and employ them in 
their usual offices. He is as much conscious of power 
to command such limbs, as a man in perfect health 
is conscious of power to actuate to any member which 
remains in its natural state and condition. But 
consciousness never declines. Consequently, neither 
in the one case nor in the other, are we ever con­
scious of any power. (Hume, 1952, p. V 7 2)
In the question we can see that Hume uses two senses 
of the word conscious. Certainly in the case of a palsied 
man there are some immediate impressions which he experiences 
as the loss of power. It requires a close, diligent analysis 
to realize that the experience of power is but the influence 
of past experience on present impressions. It is consistent 
with Hume's position to say that the sense data or impressions 
combine with past experience or ideas to result in a percept 
of power.
The conception that perception is an interpretation 
of sensation is the fundamental phenomenalist model. It has 
persisted since Berkeley in various forms of psychological 
theories and until recently as a tenet of positivism.
One of the earliest psychological theories to be 
elaborated experimentally, which fits under the rubric of 
phenomenalism, was Wundt and Titchener's structuralism. In 
particular, Titchener's core-context theory had many features 
in common with contemporary phenomenal definitions of meaning.
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Titchener's core was pure sensation, and this was defined by 
the structuralist in terms of elements. It was experimentally 
described in terms which were similar to those used by philos­
ophers of science, such as E. Mach, F.E. Moore, Ayer and Russell, 
in describing "patches of colors". They were "here, now", having 
particular shapes and extensity. Psychologists will recognize 
in G.E. Moore's description below reminiscences of the intro­
spective subjects' diligent attempts to avoid the stimulus error.
I hold up this envelope, then: I look at it, and put
it down again. Now what has happened? We should 
certainly say (if you looked at it) that we all saw 
that envelope, the same envelope; I saw it, and you 
all saw it. And by the it, which we all saw, we mean 
an object,...But now, what happened to each of us 
when we saw that envelope? I will begin by describing 
part of what happened to me. I saw a patch of a 
particular whitish colour, having a certain size, and 
a certain shape, a shape with rather sharp angles or 
corners bounded by fairly straight lines. These things; 
this patch of a whitish colour, and its size and shape 
I did actually see. And I propose to call these things, 
the colour and size and shape, sense-data, things given 
or presented by the senses - given, in this case, by 
my sense of sight. (Moore, 1965? P* 98)
The description given by Moore dates back to approx­
imately 1910 when he introduced the notion of sense data into 
the mainstream of British philosophical thinking. The criter­
ia of sense data had already been applied in a thorough re­
examination of Newtonian physics by Ernst Mach. At the same 
time that the structuralist psychologists were trying to develop 
an experimental description of sensory elements, Mach was in­
sisting that all scientific concepts be reducible to sensory ele­
ments. In addition, it is clear that Mach was in agreement with the
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structuralists that a trained individual was required to 
distinguish between sense data and everyday perception.
(Hill, 1961)
This new form of radical empiricism anticipated much 
of what was later to be called operationism. It represented 
a no nonsense application of a verification principle that 
Mach applied to rid physics of metaphysical speculation. Such 
speculation made its way into science in the form of forces 
and substances for which there was no sensory basis. Many 
writers have since paid tribute to Mach for a conceptual 
clean-up job without which an Einstein would not have been 
possible. (Capek, 1961; Frank, 1957; Einstein and Infeld, 1938)
At this point, a curious involution takes place in 
the development of the status of the perceived object. In 
the philosophy of science the physical object is distinguished 
from the material object while in psychology the object of 
perception is distinguished from the stimulus. Russell and 
Wittgenstein developed their theories of description which 
involve logical maps of the external world. The elements in 
these maps have varying degrees of certitude beginning with 
the only true empirical knowledge in the form of atomic facts, 
which though they cover a small range of generality, they are 
the only things of which we can be certain. Such atomic 
facts can be reduced to sense data. They can be represented 
in the form of sense data statements which are denotable in 
form; for example "Black patch passes red patch now," can be 
contrasted with the less empirical descriptive form which would
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be a pointer reading. Less reliable but useful logical forms 
such as constructs, e.g. time and space, are reliable to the 
extent that they can be supported by atomic facts. They must 
however remain hypothetical. Physical objects such as tables 
and chairs are descriptions; their status is logical, not 
ontological. The existence of material objects (tables and 
chairs) are hypothetical. At the same time, a similar devel­
opment took place in the psychology of perception. A percept 
finds its meaning in the context of associations to which it 
gives rise, not in its external context. Titchener was will­
ing to relinquish the problem of meaning to the logician.
The stimulus gives rise to sensory elements, not to a picture 
of itself.
The early phenomenalists as well as the structuralists 
in psychology, made a clear and firm distinction between ob­
jects and sense data. Objects were the products of perception, 
and perception was a process of interpretation of sense data.
By means of careful analysis or introspection, the perceived 
object could be reduced to the sensations of which they were 
interpretations. For the analyst philosopher of science this 
meant developing a sense data language which would be closer 
to the truth than the object language. It would be closer to 
the truth because credibility is a function of how close a 
statement is to the epistemic root, which is sensation. It 
is curious to find that phenomenalist philosophers debate 
the question, "is a sense-datum language possible"late into 
the early 19*+0's, (G. Bergmann, 1951*; Ayer, 1959) without
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ever considering the fact that the structural psychologists had 
made an experimental attempt at just this question. The phen­
omenalist philosophers write with a great deal of confidence 
that the development of such a language is in fact possible.
But an examination of the structuralists1 work suggests that 
the problem with phenomenalism is not a linguistic short­
coming but a perceptual one. Most critics of phenomenalism 
argue that the phenomenal languages seem artificial. The his­
tory of psychology suggests that a more fundamental criticism 
is that the phenomenal account of experience is artifactual.
Late forms of phenomenalism, such as represented in the 
writing of Ayer and Bergmann, use softened forms of verification 
principles in which it is recognized that propositional state­
ments are verifiable in principle if some kind of experience 
is pertinent to determining their credibility. Such state­
ments tend to be circular and the meaning of the term exper-
i
ience becomes more ambiguous. It is perhaps because of some 
of these logical problems that more recent positivists have 
abandoned phenomenalist verification principles as a criterion 
of meaning.
Let us see how the phenomenalist construction deals 
with the problem of objectivity. The word objectivity is 
inappropriate to the entire way of thinking involved in phen­
omenalism; in fact, the word object has a different referent 
for the phenomenalist than it does in its classical definition. 
As we have seen, an object to a phenomenalist is an inter­
pretation, the product of a language which is already one
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step removed from the indubitable, that is experience. Objec­
tivity in the classical sense, we have defined as assuring 
certainty and to the phenomenalist that is the function of 
sense data, not the function of objects. Despite this pec­
uliar semantic involution, the meaning of the classical term 
objectivity is important to the phenomenalists.
Phenomenalists are not in agreement concerning the 
question of independence. Russell, (1965) for example, insists 
that sense data are independent of the observer, but Price (1965) 
argues that this is a metaphysical position. What the phen­
omenalists are in agreement on is that sense data have inter- 
subjective reliability. What the sense datum language allows 
one to do is to make actual the potential experiences which it 
describes for any particular observer. This is very close to 
a pre-behaviorism description of physicalism. It describes 
in any particular situation what to look for in order to 
verify. Later forms of physicalism get rid of the phenomen­
ological language, and describe what to do in order to verify. 
Just as phenomenalism is associated with experience, the 
later form of positivism which is usually called physicalism, 
is associated with behavior. We will return to this theme 
after we obtain a clear picture of the phenomenalists' rela­
tionship to objectivity.
So far we have seen that objectivity for the phen­
omenalist differs from the classical definition in that it 
substitutes intersubjective reliability for independence. The 
other important characteristic of objectivity is the notion of
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certainty. The fundamental motivation for the phenomenalist 
movement was in the promulgation of this notion more than any 
other derived from the empirical tradition. G.E. Moore (1965) 
^demonstrated his commitment to certainty by describing sense 
data as the one thing about which we cannot possibly be mis­
taken. This also seems to be the reason Mach chose this 
form of radical empiricism with which to eliminate many con­
cepts in physics. It is also the dedication to verifiability, 
as the definition of meaning, which continues the logical 
empiricist tradition even though it abandoned phenomenalism.
For the most part, logical positivists abandoned the 
attempt to reduce protocol statements to sense data statements. 
The impossibility of building a sense data language as well 
as the likelihood that most scientists would not use it if it 
did succeed, made phenomenalism the one aspect of early 
logical empiricism that has almost disappeared. It was 
replaced by the thesis of physicalism.
Meaning was for the physicalists, as for the phen­
omenalists, defined in terms of verifiability. The essential 
difference between phenomenalists and physicalists is in the 
nature of data language and phenomena or what we have pre­
viously called factual reference or empirical significance. 
Physicalists insist that data language be the language of 
physical objects in the Newtonian sense of object, and that the 
referent of this data language be physical objects. Physical 
objects here refer to macro-objects and different physicalists
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use different terms to designate thems Carnap calls them 
"observables", Reichenbach calls them "concreta". We should 
be careful to distinguish between the meaning of the word 
physical in this context, and the meaning of physics as a 
subject matters for example, in microphysics the phenomena 
under study must be translated into the physical language 
which is composed of physical objects capable of entering 
into our experience. Most physicalists argue that this 
object language is the natural language of observation. The 
physicalists come a great deal closer to the classical def­
inition of objectivity than did their predecessors, the 
phenomenalists. They replace the intersubjectivity criteria 
of the phenomenalists with the publicity criteria. Since 
for the phenomenalist the primitives were sense data, inter- 
subjective reliability was the best that could be hoped for.
By making the object the referent to which all other things 
must be reduced, the physicalist is able to re-establish the 
independence of observation.
The obvious psychological parallel to this development 
is behaviorism. Boring (19^2) says of the union of behaviorism 
and positivism that "they could have sensation and eat it too." 
The method of verification in science, as in perception in 
psychology, can be completely externalized and given an indep­
endent referent. The discriminated response and the physical 
definition are attempts to banish the subjective in the two 
domains of perception and observation.
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There can be and usually is a substantial difference 
between the way things appear and the way things are: there­
fore, there must be a difference in the way in which each of 
these is verified. The process of perception can itself be ac­
tually described by relying on people's behavior measured 
physicalistically as an index of their abilities with respect 
to the stimuli. From such a description, it is learned that 
the discrepancy between the stimulus object and the object of 
perception is due to perceptual constancies which tend to 
reduce the amount of heterogeneity in the perceived object 
when it is viewed from all its perspectives.
There is in this an element which remains consistent 
with the interpretation thesis of the phenomenalists. In the 
behaviorist account of perception we find reference to terms 
such as signs, cues or clues, which give rise to a percept 
which is more like the thing being perceived than the sensa­
tions giving rise to the perception. Thus, looking at a dime 
from a few feet away one's perception of its size is more 
consistent with its actual size than with the retinal image 
of its size. The retinal image in this description serves as 
a cue to the distal object. These kinds of considerations do 
not apply to objective observation, that is to physicalistic 
description, because they are public and repeatable.
In a later chapter we will consider the interpretation 
problem that is to be found, even within physicalistic des­
cription. It will suffice to say at this point that in a 
physicalistic description there are analytic conventions whose
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relationship to fact is not clear, and there are physical 
objects which are amenable to more than one physicalistic 
description.
We can see that the classical meaning of objectivity 
is essentially restored by the physicalists. The referent of 
our descriptions is independent objects. Certainty of our 
descriptions rests on the criteria of denotability, publicity, 
and repeatability.
Though the large majority of logical positivists, among 
scientists and philosophers alike, can be placed into either 
the phenomenalist or physicalist camp, there is at least one 
philosopher who is closer to logical positivism than to any 
other recognizable philosophy of science: Carl Popper (1959)
who disagrees with both phenomenalists and physicalists. He 
is an empiricist in that he believes that our knowledge must 
be rooted in observation, but he believes that verification 
or any form of induction necessarily gets bogged down in 
psychologisms. Logical rigor requires that we avoid the psych­
ological, and this requires a deductive empiricism. According 
to this view, science operates by making bold general asser­
tions which can only be evaluated in terms of their ability to 
generate "falsifiable" propositions. Freud's theory is a poor 
one, not because it cannot be verified, since it offers evid­
ence at every turn, but because it cannot produce propositions 
which can be falsified. Compare to this the concrete prop­
ositions generated by Einstein's relativity which could easily 
have gone wrong.
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Popper has concluded that we cannot rely on objective 
perception to confirm hypotheses. At first glance, it would 
appear that Popper has abandoned the assumption of objectivity; 
in fact, he continues to maintain that we can rely on observa­
tions in instances of disconfirmation but not in instances of 
confirmation. There are psychological reasons why this sol­
ution to the problem of perception is not satisfactory and 
these will be dealt with later, (see pages 199-200)
We have seen that one of the elements which united 
physicalists and phenomenonsts was their belief in the 
principle of verification. Meaning for both of these groups 
was obtained by discovering the way in which a term could be 
verified. They differed in their belief concerning the ul­
timate reduction that would result from verification. The phen­
omenalists argued that the primitive indubitable was in the 
private experience of sense data, the physicalist arguing that 
verification would reduce to publicly observable physical 
objects. The group we are about to consider is in agreement 
with the phenomenalists insofar a$ they believe that the 
primitive elements of knowledge are in the private experience 
of the individual. For this reason the group is usually 
referred to as the phenomenologists. The phenomenologists, 
however, do not fall into the logical empirical tradition 
since they do not accept the division of all knowledge into 
analytic and synthetic; rather, they are the descendants of 
Kant in maintaining that certain principles of mental organ­
ization are innate, Just as Kant maintained that Euclidean
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geometry and space and time were a priori synthetic. The 
phenomenologists did not hold meaning to be dependent on ver­
ification. Certain objects are held to have meaning without 
even the possibility of verification. For example, we are 
able to imagine golden mountains and bucolic unicorns, and 
they have meaning for us in that they are capable of entering 
our phenomenological experience through imagination. Such 
objects are said to subsist, rather than to exist, and sub- 
sistent objects are meaningful even though they are not subject 
to verification. (Spiegelberg, 1960)
It has been said that phenomenology is inherently anti- 
scientific in that it has traditionally been associated with 
existentialism and philosophers such as Nietszche and 
Kierkegaard. This negative association is not a fundamental 
problem for our own position. Most of these early existential­
ists were not systematic writers and they did not object to 
science because of any belief that science was fundamentally 
in error; rather, they held that science was ethically unde­
sirable. In addition, the phenomenologists who were interested 
in the problem of factual reference were scientists. They were 
not, however, empiricists. All empiricists wish to reduce 
meaning to a specific set of sensations. Husserl objected to 
this because of his belief that meaning can only be grasped 
lntuitlonally. Take, for example, the meaning of a verbal 
statement; it cannot be said to be discoverable in the utter­
ance since no two utterances can ever be the same. The meaning 
of a statement can be uttered in many different ways. Husserl
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argued that to try to reduce meaning either to objects or to 
a specific sense experience is like maintaining that the 
meaning of a sentence is in its utterance. (Spiegelberg, 1960)
The phenomenologist philosophy of science is different 
from all we have thus far covered in that it attributes dis­
covery to insight. Though this is not an empiricist position, 
it is not necessarily anti-scientific since it does maintain 
that in the context of Justification some empirical testing 
is used.
Let us now consider that aspect of phenomenology which 
is most central to the subject of inquiry. The phenomenologists 
believe that the primitives are whole perceptions which cannot 
be reduced to a more elementary form; therefore, configurations 
are to phenomenologists what sense data are to phenomenalists 
and physical protocols are to physicalists. Though the 
psychological description of such perceptual configurations be­
gan with Ehrenfels and was continued by the gestalt psychol­
ogists, the idea that the primitives of experience involved 
complexly organized patterns was present among philosophers 
who antedated gestalt psychology.
Leibnitz's theory of monads held that mental criterion 
and worldly entities matched one another as a pair. Each such 
monad was a complex whole, therefore an object in the real 
world gave rise in experience to its mental counterpart in 
what is at least a superficial anticipation of the gestalt 
principle of isomorphism.
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William James thought that the greatest error in 
empiricist philosophy was that it based all of knowledge on 
little bits of experience which he pointed out are never 
actually found in consciousness. Consciousness flows, it is 
remarkably unified, and there is nothing in it like the dis­
jointed bits which the empiricists are appealing to. (James, 
1890)
Perhaps the most important historical figure in con- 
figurationism is Brentano. Brentano was not a self-avowed 
phenomenologist, but his thesis of intentionality was a 
starting point for his students, among whom were Meinong and 
Husserl. The thesis of intentionality maintains that in every 
awareness there are two elements, the presentation and the 
object. The presentation is a mental act such as sensing, 
feeling, thinking and perceiving. The object is physical and 
independent of the act as an external object, but in awareness 
it is necessarily bound to the act of awareness. The thesis 
maintains that no object can make its way into awareness 
without an accompanying object. Brentano with his thesis of 
intentionality has established the nature of what is to be 
considered primitive in knowledge for the phenomenologists, 
and these primitives are neither elementary awareness (sense 
data) nor independent objects of awareness (physical objects), 
but perceived objects. Perception is impossible without an 
object, and objects are unknown unless accompanied by 
perceptual acts. (Spiegelberg, 1960)
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Edmund Husserl, referred to as the father of phen­
omenology, developed the method which would lead to a true
intuitive science. According to Husserl, empirical science 
could only lead to relative truth because it distorted the 
perceptual primitives by ignoring their individuality and 
classifying them on the basis of group characteristics. His 
method of bracketing resembles Descarte's method of doubt,
but it is intended to apply to experience rather than to
reason. To come to the essence of a perceived object, one 
must remove from the mind all categories, classes and general 
descriptions. On viewing the work before me, for example,
I must restrain from descriptions based on categories such 
as desk, table, and furniture, and accept the perceptual 
object as it is. This alone can yield an "objective" and 
"essential" knowing of the thing. Such a program of scien­
tific description, though many have deemed it desirable, is 
obviously impossible since the essential objective descrip­
tions cannot be linguistic. Because our very language assumes 
categories and classes, it is an obstructing device. It 
should be obvious that the gestalt psychologists who inherited 
the phenomenological tradition did not accept this radical 
point of view on science, but they did accept perceptual in­
sight as the essential mechanism of learning and discovery.
The gestalt psychologist made by far the most impor­
tant contribution to the configuration!st point of view.
Their contribution falls into this category because they 
accepted the criteria of primitive configurations; that is,
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they accepted primitive perceived objects and sought as their 
goal a description of the perception of such perceived objects. 
Perhaps the most significant contribution of the gestalt 
psychologists was not in their writing but rather in their 
collection of perceptual demonstrations which serve them as 
doubled-edged.pedagogical instruments. They both demonstrated 
the influence of organizational principles on what is perceived, 
and at the same time, served as an example of the significance 
of intuitive discovery. Whenever one wants to explain the 
meaning of pragnanz, proximity, closure or any other of the 
whole-part determinisms, it is best to turn to specific ex- 
amples of each case rather than use verbal description. The 
student will respond with an immediate understanding of the 
principles and an increasing understanding of the meaning of 
insight.
The gestalt tradition followed Brentano in asserting 
that the perceived object differs from the object. This 
difference results from the influence of the perceptual process. 
Much of gestalt work was an attempt to describe the precise 
nature of such influences. The gestalt principles of organ­
ization are just such descriptions. "The whole determines 
the perception of the parts," is probably the most famous of 
such principles, and Ehrenfel's example of the melody is 
probably the most famous demonstration of that principle.
How is it, Ehrenfels asks, that we can hear the same melody
-
A more detailed and illustrated example of whole- 
part determinism is discussed on pages 150-156.
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played in two different keys, if we attribute the perception 
of such melody to the physical dimensions of sound. It is 
not the individual note that shapes the melody, but the melody 
that gives perceptual meaning to each note. Thus it is that 
these organizational principles are characteristic of the 
perceptual fields such that there is always a discrepancy 
between perceptual experience and stimulus geometry. (Kohler, 
1967)
The discrepancy between stimulus and perception is not, 
as the behaviorist describes it, a learned mechanism of effi­
ciency (constancy hypothesis), but it is an innate character­
istic of the organism which is the basis of intuitive learning. 
The gestalt psychologists point to several experiments in 
which lower forms of life such as chicks and infant monkeys, 
as well as near neonate humans, demonstrate that they also 
perceive as though they are subject to the principles of 
organization.
Having said that the gestalt psychologists subscribed 
to a description of perception that elevates illusion to a 
universal principle, and subscribed to a thesis of intention­
ality that makes perception its object $ it will seem curious 
to conclude by saying that the gestalt psychologists were 
realists and believed in a form of verifiability. It is 
precisely on this point that Merleau-Ponty (1963) is critical 
of the gestalt psychologists. According to Ponty's account, 
they discovered form but then made the mistake of putting 
form in nature. The gestalten were elevated to ontological
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patterns of organization and Kohler, for example, sought
examples of physical gestalten. These patterns became
elements in the environment —  i.e., stimuli essentially no
different in their causal effects on consciousness than the
behaviorists' stimuli.
We do not think that the notion of Gestalt is pursued 
to its most important consequences either in those 
materialist conclusions or in the mentalist inter­
pretation which we indicated at first. Instead of 
wondering what sort of being can belong to form and, 
since it has appeared in scientific research itself, 
what critique it can demand of the realist postulates 
of psychology, it is placed among the number of events 
of nature: it is used like a cause or a real thing; 
and to this very extent one is no longer thinking 
according to ’’form." As long as one sees the physical 
world as a being which embraces all things and as 
long as one tries to integrate behavior into it, one 
will be driven from mentalism, which maintains the 
originality of biological and mental structures only 
by opposing substance to substance, to a materialism, 
which maintains the coherence of the physical order 
only by reducing the two others to it. In reality, 
matter, life and mind must be understood as three 
orders of significations. But it is not with the help 
of an external criterion that we will judge the alleged 
philosophy of form. On the contrary, we would like 
to return to the notion of form, to seek out in what 
sense forms can be said to exist "in" the physical 
world and "in" the living body, and to ask of form 
itself the solution to the antimony of which it is 
the occasion, the synthesis of matter and idea. 
(Merleau-Ponty, 1963* pp. 136-137)
This form of realism differentiates between the sig­
nificance of scientific truths and argues that pattern 
discoveries are more significant than that filling in of 
detail which is the confirmatory end of the scientific bus­
iness.
Two noted philosophers of science, Hanson and Polanyi, 
have applied gestalt psychology to the problem of scientific
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observations. Both of these men emphasize the creative aspect
of scientific discoveries and spend much time in rebutting the
idea that discoveries take place inductively. In the following
quotation we can see the strong gestalt influence, both in
giving a whole-part deterministic description of perception
and an intuitional account of discovery.
Perceiving the pattern in phenomena is central to 
their being "explicable as a matter of course".
Thus the significance of any blob or line in 
earlier diagrams eludes one until the organization 
of the whole is grasped; then this spot, or that 
patch, becomes understood as a matter of course.
Why does Mars appear to accelerate at 90 and 
270°?— (P) Because its orbit is elliptical— (H).
Grasping this plot makes the details explicable, 
just as the impact of a weight striking clay becomes 
intelligible against the laws of falling bodies.
This is what philosophers and natural philosophers 
were groping for when they spoke of discerning the 
nature of a phenomenon, its essence;*1 this will 
always be the trigger of physical inquiry. The 
struggle for intelligibility (pattern, organization) 
in natural philosophy has never been portrayed in 
inductive or H-D accounts." (Hanson, 1958, p. 8 7)
In strong opposition to the logical empiricists, 
these configurationist philosophers of science place a great 
deal of value on the logical constructs. It will be recalled 
that, in their disdain for metaphysical speculation, the 
majority of logical empiricists strove for a language, the 
elements of which were either synthetic or analytic. All 
synthetic elements were to have phenomenal or physical refer­
ents: otherwise; they were to be dismissed as nonsense. One
set of elementary terms was especially problematical to this 
program and that was the set which makes up the subjects of 
propositional sentences; for example, the subject "pencil"
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in: "The pencil is yellow, pointed and cone shaped." or the
subject "body" in: "The body had a mass of ___ and a velocity
of ___ ." To the logical empiricist, be he phenomenalist or
physicalist, the status of these subject terms is ambiguous. 
For the phenomenalist it is a construct referring to the 
interpretation of the sense data. To the physicalist it is 
a construct which combines or interprets the measures of the 
object. For neither is it an underlying essence. For the 
logical positivists, these terms are incomplete description, 
less essential “to synthetic truth than the predicate 
statements. As we have seen above, Ayer believes that we are 
forced to use such subject terms merely because of an acci­
dent of our language.
In sharp contrast, the configuration!st sees such
subject terms or constructs as the very essence of science.
Constructs are not primarily an underlying substrata which
gives rise to secondary qualities which are the predicate
statements, but instead they are an organization principle
discovered through insight, thereby giving meaning to the
predicates. Without these constructs past results could not
be interpreted and future research could not be organized.
What Polanyi says below about the subject term organ applies'
to all such subject terms, not simply to teleological ones.
The philosophy of behaviorism does not contest the 
duality of body and mind, but it assumes that all 
mental performances can be fully specified without 
referring to afiy mental motives. Could this be true? 
Consider an analogy. All textbooks of physiology 
refer to organs and the function or organs, and in 
spite of frequent solemn declaractions that such
9^
teleological conceptions are unnecessary and indeed 
objectionable, no one has yet published a textbook 
of physiology that does not speak of organs and their 
functions. For the biological functions or organs 
can be known only as coherent wholes. This also 
applies, of course, to the motions forming a skillful 
performance, or an act of intelligence: these can be 
identified only as parts of their meaningful coordin­
ation. To describe, as behaviorists claim to do, 
workings of the mind without relying on the guidance 
of mental motives is as impossible as it is to 
describe physiological events occuring in an organ 
without being guided by the observation of its
J hysiological functions." (Polanyi, 1968,
The emphasis that the configurationist philosophies
of science place on the role of scientific constructs marks
The positivist tradition viewed constructs with disdain since 
they seem to mark the point at which metaphysics made its way 
into science. More recent configurationists, such as Polanyi, 
Hanson, and Kuhn, attribute most of the progress in science 
to the discovery or creation of such constructs. According 
to these writers, these constructs are simple units discovered 
through insight which change the course of science. They 
point to Kepler's ellipse, Galileo's pendulum, and Newton's 
gravity as the kind of constructs which, despite their 
relative simplicity, change the course of physics in an 
irreversible manner.
All of the configurationists are subject to Merleau-Ponty's
criticism. Like the gestalt psychologists, Hanson and Polanyi
1
We have already discussed some of the background to 
this transition on pages 37- 38*
1
an important transition in our account of scientific discovery.
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diverge significantly from the traditional scientific epis- 
temology. They do so in that they give a non-inductive 
account of discovery and hold that pattern discoveries are 
more significant than detail discoveries. In addition to 
this they wish to apply a coherence criterion to the meaning- 
fulness of scientific propositions. Kohler believed that 
truths are hierarchically arranged, and that those at the
top are more meaningful. A similar position is held by the
configurationist philosophers of science. We can see in the 
quotation that follows a faith in the future of science that 
dramatically differs from the logical empiricists point of 
view.
Once the recognition of anticipatory powers in science 
establishes a conception of reality transcending tan­
gible things, we might be able generally to acknowledge 
higher entities, intangible and yet real— as real as 
matter and yet meaningful. We shall recognize thus 
a cosmic hierarchy in which man has once more his own
place." (Polanyi, 1967-68, p. 196)
Despite these many deviations from the epistemological 
paradigm, Ponty's criticism is appropriate. The configur­
ationists have redefined the nuggets of experience, as well 
as the account of their meaning, but as to their validity 
the empirical test of correspondence remains the traditional 
mark of science. Once more we quote Polanyi to demonstrate 
the faith configurationists place in correspondence.
What we mean is that the thing will not dissolve like 
a dream, but that, in some ways it will yet manifest 
its existence, inexhaustibly, in the future. For it 
is there, whether we believe it or not, independently 
of us, and hence never fully predictable in its con­
sequences. (Polanyi, 1967-68, p. 191)
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In contrast to the logical positivists, truth and 
meaning are separate issues for the configurationists. While 
the truth and meaning of a proposition are the method of its 
verification for the positivists, the configurationists 
maintain that while truth depends on verifiability, meaning 
depends on context. A proposition gets its significance by 
finding its place in the larger whole.
The meaning of objectivity for the configuration!st 
is very close to the classical meaning. As is evident in 
the quotation above, he believes in independence of external 
real objects. In addition, he believes that verification 
makes a thing certain, but that it does not make it meaning­
ful. Therefore without essentially redefining objectivity 
the configurationists deprive it of much of its significance.
Thus far we have described epistemological "isms" 
which are familiar by virtue of a long tradition. What will 
presently be referred to as "neo-realism" does not have as 
clear and unified a traditional position. Several important 
philosophical strains arising out of a reaction to positivism 
in the philosophy of science, and relativism in the theories 
of perception, have resulted in a group of thinkers who share 
several common characteristics without necessarily paying 
tribute to a common label. Among the earliest such movements 
in philosophy was the American and British new realism, as 
well as certain forms of critical realism. In the psychology 
of perception cybernetic and information theorists were
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reacting to the subjectivity implied in much of the relativ- 
istic theories which had been prompted by the gestalt psych­
ologists.
The most important characteristic of neo-realism with 
respect to the assumption of objectivity are its externaliza- 
tion of the object of perception and its active view of the 
perceptual process. We will discuss both of these. There are, 
however, other characteristics that the neo-realists have in 
common which are not so central to this thesis. The most 
striking of these is their acceptance of common sense, ordinary 
language and daily experience as a standard form of knowledge, 
against which to evaluate science and philosophy. Consistent 
with this, and in sharp contrast to the positivists and behav- 
iorists they show no disdain for metaphysical concepts. They 
make free use of terms such as reality and nature. They have 
an affinity for the language of information and communications, 
and spend little or no time clarifying the meaning of the con­
cepts couched in this language. Among the early philosophical 
leaders of this group are M.R. Cohen, T. Nunn and E. McGilvary.
The most outstanding psychological contributors to this point 
of view are Gibson and Attneave. Within the philosophy of science, 
Duhem's work is very important, but current writers such as 
Harris and Hawkins have more of the superficial characteristics 
of neo-realism.
The positivists' relegation of metaphysics to the realm 
of nonsense and the behaviorists1 relegation of consciousness 
to the status of epiphenomena can be viewed as a process
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of internalization. Simply by telling us that belief in reality 
is metaphysical, the positivists did not rid us of our "psych­
ological" need to speculate, which was a hindrance to progress. 
By the same token when behaviorial psychologists chose to ig­
nore the world of private eaqjerience they did not rid the 
individual of his awareness of it, but justified their choice 
by claiming that nothing that happened there could make any 
difference.
Positivists treated metaphysics and consciousness in 
a very similar manner, applying their principle of verification 
as the only criterion of meaning. They found that both meta­
physics and phenomenological awareness were meaningless. This 
means that the language of the ordinary man, as well as the 
ordinary language of philosophers and scientists, is largely 
nonsense. In addition, since it accepted the verifiable 
scientific description as the true and meaningful picture of 
the world it means that most of human experience falls into 
the world of illusion. In the realm of individual experience 
a parallel disdain of phenomenology means that the world of 
perception is largely the product of internal and subjective 
manipulation of unknowable proximal stimuli. The objects of 
awareness can be viewed as internal perceptions. These 
perceptions can be considered the products of internal mech­
anisms, either learned constancies or Innate principles of 
organization, as much as they are the products of stimulation.
Historically, the trend in positivism and behaviorism 
had been to view the world as much simpler than it was
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experienced in consciousness. The secondary qualities with 
which former realists enriched subjective awareness had 
disappeared: but other mechanisms such as constancies, also
had been introduced which organized and enriched proximal 
stimuli. The real world was made up of energies and bodies, 
as described by physicists. The textures, colors and complex 
configurations of awareness were enrichments upon the energies 
arriving at the receptors. The neo-realists are united in 
reversing this situation. The objects of awareness are in the 
real world. The process of perception has them as objects. 
Whatever modifications perception makes upon its objects, it 
is in the direction of impoverishment, not in the direction of 
enrichment.
One of the men who was most influential in reversing 
this trend was T.P. Nunn, who held that all aspects or qualities 
of an object were entirely independent of our perceiving them.
In his view, experience is more veridical than our ideas. The 
different shades of yellow one can see in a buttercup are 
properties of the flower, just as we experience them. Accord­
ing to this view, ideas are poor oversimplifications of the 
experience they represent. (Passmore, 1968)
We can refer to this trend as a process of external- 
ization. Ever since the beginning of the study of perception 
there had been a continually increasing tendency to attribute 
the qualities of experience to internal (inside the perceiver) 
mechanisms. A good early example of the process of external- 
ization can be found in McGilvary's (1965) work on perspective
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realism. MeGilvary argues that contrary to earlier phil­
osophies, relationships are reals a geometrical object, for 
example, has many perceptual faces depending on the perspec­
tive from which it is viewed. Traditionally it was thought 
that perspective was an inherently subjective notion. 
MeGilvary makes use of projective geometry to calculate 
various perspectives of a cube, and argues that none of these 
perspectives is dependent on a viewer; therefore, they are 
as much a feature or property of the cube as its Euclidean 
dimensions.
••
If perspective is real, why not texture, pragnanz 
or all the constancies which make up the behavlorists’ appar­
ent world. This is precisely the thesis that Gibson offers 
as the only hope for a true stimulus-response psychology.
The first would be a psychophysical theory of the 
correspondence between variables of stimulation and 
qualities or dimensions of experience. Its chief 
novelty would be the explicit postulate that for 
every quality of experience there is a discoverable 
variable of stimulation. This means not only that 
the sensory qualities, so called, have stimuli, but 
that all the qualities of surfaces, edges, slopes, 
and shapes have stimuli, and that all the qualities 
of motion, action, and causality have stimuli, and 
that all the qualities of persons, groups, insti­
tutions, words, and symbols have stimuli. Its method 
would be the psychophysical experiment with optimal 
conditions for discrimination. Admittedly, the 
isolation and control of the stimulus variables for 
most of the latter qualities would be fantastically 
difficult. In this sense, the theory might never be 
fully verified. It is, however, simply the extension 
of the accepted theory of sensory experience to spa­
tial and social experience and it provides a straight­
forward program of experiments. (Gibson, 1951> PP« 
10»f-105)
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We can see the same process of extemalization in
Hawkins' reasonings
My criticism of the way of thought that is common to 
Kant and the relativist is that it arises from a 
broken-down analogy. Perception is not perception 
of a received-mental-object, problematically related 
to a real object that we do not perceive. The proper 
counterpart to the received message in communication 
is not the object of perception, but the perception 
itself, the psychological act - whole object is. 
precisely, the physical object of perception. (Hawkins,
196M-, p. 5 0
The extemalization of the object of perception as it 
is advocated by the neo-realists is not without its difficulties. 
The most important of these difficulties is understanding the 
ambiguous residual of the internal object, what Gibson calls 
"stimulus information" or "invariances in experience" and what 
Hawkins terms it "message". In order to understand this we 
must look at their description of the perceptual process.
The neo-realists are united in viewing perception as 
an active process leading to an achievement. The originator 
of this view of perception was Gilbert Hyle. Hyle, however, 
did not agree with Gibson, Attneave and Hawkins, these men 
having devoted more time to the psychology of the problem than 
to the philosophy of the problem. Ryle did not agree that 
seeing or touching referred to any mental or physiological 
capacities of the organism. For Ryle these were merely 
achievements in the same sense as is implied by the terms 
"winning" or "catching" as in the phrases "winning a race" or 
"catching a ball". To the psychologist Gibson, achievements 
implied activity leading to the achievement, and in his The 
Senses Viewed as Perceptual Systems, the subject matter under
102
study were composed of the activities of listening, seeing 
and touching, and not the senses of touch, audition and vision. 
Only in sensation do the five senses operate as separate pas­
sive receptors. These are merely the energy receiving systems 
which bring stimulus energy into contact with the nervous 
system. In perception the entire body works as a single 
system in processing stimulus information, the order embedded 
in stimulus energy. Stimulus information can go through sev­
eral transformations without losing its significance and it 
makes use of stimulus energy only as a carrier in the same 
way that the telephone uses currents of electricity. Con­
tained in the message is information which comes from the ob­
ject of perception, not from the energy which carries the 
message from the object. In this way, all the riddles of 
constancy and other discrepancies between proximal and distal 
stimuli are resolved.
The retinal image of a coin held at a slant a short 
distance from the eye is for sensation an ellipse, but for 
perception it is circular. Prior theories have tried to 
explain this by introducing some form of mediator between 
sensation and perception. Gibson (1966) merely held that the 
information of circularity is present in the retinal image.
It is a higher order invariant and it is invariant with 
respect to all the rest of the stimulus information entering 
into perception at that time. For it must be remembered that 
perception involves not just the eye, but other information 
available to the perceptual system about the perspective of
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of the eye with respect to the coin. Such information is 
given by certain invariant ratios existing in optical array.
In the case of the coin, the invariance which serves 
as information for the perception of circularity is, according 
to Gibson, "ratios and other invariances in the optic array" 
(Gibson, 1966, p. 306). It is safe to assume that Gibson 
means by ratios, relationships such as the mathematical rela­
tionship between radius and circumference. These ratios need 
not be conscious. Assuming that Gibson's notion of invariance 
in the optic array is an adequate substitution for the constancy 
hypothesis, there still remains a difficulty with the example 
of the coin. It just so happens that slanted coins seen from 
a distance are like railroad tracks seen from a distance; that 
is, they are cases of incomplete constancy. According to both 
the constancy hypothesis and Gibson's invariance hypothesis, 
the tracks should not appear to converge at all and the coins 
should appear completely circular. In fact, experiments dem­
onstrate that perception falls somewhere between complete 
constancy and an exact reading of the optical or retinal image. 
Gibson attributes the incompleteness of the constancy to a 
special case of sensation intruding on perception due to the 
learning of perspective.
Some sorts of visual sensation, especially linear 
perspective, are very obtrusive, the more so when 
attention has been educated to it by having learned 
to draw pictures. The result may be the illusory 
appearance of foreshortened surfaces and decreasing 
size with distance. VJhen this attitude is adopted, 
the information for the slant of the coin becomes a 
sensation of elliptical shape and the information for 
the recession of distance becomes a sensation of
10lf
angular convergence to a vanishing point. I do not 
know of any good evidence to show that animals or 
young children are subject to these illusions of 
perspective. (Gibson, 1966, p. 307)
Unlike the behaviorists and the gestaltists the con­
stancy or invariance of perception is not problematically 
related to sensation. It is immediately present in the stim­
ulus information and has its ontological existence in the 
message which is the ordering of stimulus energy. Unlike the 
behaviorists1 constancies such invariances do not have to be
learned by the associating of sensations, although they must
1
be discriminated. Gibson agrees with the gestalt psychol­
ogists that the ability to detect such invariances is present 
in young children and animals. (Gibson, 1966)
When the senses are used as a perceptual system, the 
perceptual activity involves the processing of information 
which is brought to the senses. In the ordering of stimulus 
energy, the perceptual process decodes this message and refers 
to its object which is external to the body. This reference 
to the object is best understood if one thinks of the telephone 
analogy in which the message is what is understood even 
though it is attributed to the sender. This view of perception 
emphasizes veridicality and is in marked opposition to most 
of the work that was being done in perception when Gibson 
promulgated it. Most of the neo-realists take it as a 
matter of course that our ordinary experience is correct in
^Most learning theorists would not accept the dis­
tinction that Gibson makes here between discriminating and 
learning by association. Nevertheless it is presented here 
since this is an attempt to express his theory as he sees it.
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assuming that we perceive things as they are. To put it in
Hawkins words, "The sensory channels are too well matched to
the normal message source to allow any consistent decoding of
message sequences that violate the basic customs of nature."
(Hawkins, 196M-, p. 5 0  Hawkins goes on to argue that there
are two convincing reasons for believing that nature’s encoding
is well matched to our decoding.
The first fact is that the set of possible messages 
from nature is much larger than the set that nature 
actually uses. This is demonstrated by the ease with 
which, in artificial laboratory situations, perceptions 
can be disoriented and judgment misguided. (Hawkins,
196k, p. lf9)
While this first argument is most often used to support 
the opposing point of view, Hawkins seems not only to have 
assumed a veridical decoder but also a cooperative encoder. 
Further, Hawkins argues that our decoders are not tuned to all 
possible sorts of messages, but only to those nature is in the 
habit of providing.
Finally we arrive at the question of scientific obser­
vation. How, if at all, does scientific observation differ 
from ordinary perception? In any of its essential aspects it 
does not. According to the neo-realists, veridical perception 
is always a capacity that man can employ. All of the percep­
tual research which has accrued in demonstrating the influences 
of motivation, purposes and selective attention does not dem­
onstrate that perception cannot be veridical. For example, 
Gibson distinguishes between literal and schematic perception. 
Literal perception is veridical in that it depends on the
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stimulus which is independent of the subject. Schematic 
perception demonstrates that attention and poor perceptual 
conditions such as are used by most researchers in social 
perception, can and do distort the stimulus. Gibson does not 
address himself to the question of scientific observation, but 
it is clear that the objective observation, as classically 
defined, is possible under what Gibson calls "literal per­
ception". (Gibson, 1950
Knowing that the perceptual process is capable of 
both literal and schematic productions we merely have to 
enhance those conditions which produce literal perception and 
minimize schematic perception. This is what we do in the 
process of measurement. "Every measurement involves a part­
icular finding or set of findings, certified by perception 
and independent of wish or bias." (Hawkins, 1961*, p. 86)
At first glance it would appear that the meaning of
objectivity for these neo-realists has been fully restored, 
but upon closer analysis their concept of objective percep­
tion deviates from the classical concept of objectivity in 
several important ways. The first deviation from the trad­
itional concept of objectivity in the neo-realist epistem- 
ology is related to the extemalization of the object of 
perception. Early neo-realists, such as T.P. Nunn, repeat­
edly emphasized that reality is more diversified in its 
properties and perspectives than is our perception of it.
The neo-realist account of scientific observation has im­
bedded in it an element of this problem. The early
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new realists would criticize it because it inherently glosses 
over many of the potentially discriminate properties in the 
perceived object. This is in essence Husserl's criticism.
He held that in scientific description the use of data lang­
uage to represent observations —  impoverishes reality. 
(Spiegelberg, 1960) Nowhere among the more recent writers 
included above as neo-realists can we find a clear discussion 
of this issue. In fact, there are only hints that the per­
ceptual oversimplifies the actual, and never is there dis­
cussion of the implications of this kind of misrepresentation 
in scientific epistemology.
We can see the residue of this problem in those few
places in which writers like Gibson and Attneave fall back
on the principle of economy, rather than the principle of
correspondence, as a criterion of truth. Gibson is clear in
maintaining that his is a theory of strict psychophysical
correspondence.
The test is simple: does a specific variation in the
observer's experience (or behavior) correspond to a 
variation of the physical stimulus? Although this 
experiment has seldom been applied to what are trad­
itionally called perceptions, it can and should be 
performed. (Gibson, 1950, p. 62)
But, on the other hand, when Gibson is forced to explain how 
perception yields a message more closely identifiable with the 
distal than the proximal stimulus, he falls back on the con­
cept of invariance. All the incoming information is processed 
to produce the most invariant percept possible. This is sim­
ilar to Attneave's argument that perception reduces uncertainty
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by producing the most "economical’1 picture of the stimulus based 
on the available information. Economy and correspondence seem 
to be quite different criteria. Whether they can be compatably 
mixed in the fashion suggested here is not a question with which 
these writers deal. It would seem clear, however, that the 
criterion of economy is one which deviates from the strict cor­
respondence implied in the independence feature of the classical 
definition of objectivity.
In passing, it is instructive to repeat an interesting 
reversal in perceptual theories that is related to this prob­
lem. It was pointed out earlier that, before the neo-realists, 
the tendency within the field of perception was to accept the 
physicist’s description of the stimulus and to view the process 
of perception as one which takes advantage of past experience 
in order to bring to consciousness a very complex and highly 
enriched representation of the stimulus. It would appear that, 
by externalizing the object of perception, the neo-realists have 
inherited the mirror image of the problems that are inherent in 
the constancy hypothesis. They began with an extremely complex 
stimulus situation containing so much variation that the process 
of perception must reduce its complexity in order to bring to 
consciousness a rather constant picture of the world. Neither 
of these pictures seems to render the use of correspondence crit­
eria possible in the philosophy of science.
The second important difference between the neo-realists view­
point and the classical definition of objectivity is in their belief
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in a hierarchy of factuality. In this we can see their con­
nection to the ordinary language analysts with whom they share 
an affinity for common sense. For Gibson anything that can 
be measured is a fact, which can be measured. Higher order 
variables, such as the dimensions of a human smile may some­
day be measurable, but whether we can successfully incorporate 
this meaning of factuality with what is usually connoted by 
the facts of physics seems doubtful. Gibson himself says 
that there are facts at all levels of "sensibility". That 
this is true as a common sense proposition few will question, 
but the fact that the level of their existence depends on 
human sensibilities would ban many such facts from the realm 
of science. Most scientists would agree that the range of 
observables to which man has been able to bring his senses 
has and will continue to expand, but the range of sensibilities 
which man may bring to scientific observation is prescriptively 
limited.
YJhat is here called transactionalism has even less of 
an explicit tradition than the neo-realists who were discussed 
in the previous section. Philosophically this position has 
been called pragmatism or instrumentalism, but the two most 
important contributors to what is called transactionalism pay 
no homage to this tradition and are more scientific than 
philosophical. In particular this refers to Werner Heisenberg 
and Adlebert Ames, whose work in quite different sciences led 
them to very similar conclusions with respect to the problem 
of observation and perception.
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There is a very significant and important link between 
philosophical pragmatism and psychological transactionalism. 
Pragmatic transactionalism is the one school of philosophical 
psychology which received both its initial philosophical 
expression and its later psychological amplification in the 
United States. Pierce was the first to develop it as a phil­
osophy, and James as a psychology. Later Bentley and Dewey 
refined the philosophy and Ames, and Cantril made the psych­
ology more concrete.
Transactional!sts are united in agreeing that the 
primitive of knowledge is a relationship between instrument 
and the given;Instruments include such things as physical 
apparatus, overt and covert operations, and constructs and 
assumptions; the givens can only be known in the way they 
relate to any of these instruments. The primitive element of 
knowledge is a transaction in which one becomes aware of the 
consequences of his actions under this set of initial condi­
tions. The percept or the observation is the relationship 
between what the perceiver or observer brings to the situation 
and what is given by the situation. This relationship, 
although it is not a clearly defined unit, is to transaction­
alism what object protocols are to physicalism, sense data is 
to phenomenalism, gestalten are to configuration!sm, and 
information to the neo-realist.
William James offers the following pragmatic edict:
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...to attain perfect clearness in our thoughts of 
object...we need only to consider what effects of 
a conceivably practical kind the object may involve - 
what sensations we are to expect from it, and what 
reactions we must prepare. (James, 1969) P« *+11)
This is the pragmatist's counterpart to the positivist's 
verification principle. The positivists, whether physicalists 
or phenomenal!sts wish to use sense data or protocol objec­
tivity to establish that the idea was valid because of exis­
tential independence. Pragmatists not only doubt the 
possibility of establishing correspondence, they also assert 
the undesirability or at least irrelevance of doing so. In 
that they hold concepts to have meaning independent of their 
existential representativeness, they are similar to the 
configurationists. The concept guides experience and there­
fore influences consequences. We can demonstrate the irrel­
evance of the correspondence by using James' famous argument 
for the belief in God. Justification for the belief in God 
does not come as an answer to the question, "Does God exist?" 
but rather to the question "What difference does the belief 
in God make to the human experience?" If today were the last 
day of human existence then the belief in God would truly be 
meaningless, since concepts have no retrospective significance. 
But since it is not man's last day, a continued belief in the 
existence of God makes a significant difference in the per­
spective which molds future experience. No doubt James would 
have used this argument as in fact some of his philosophical 
descendents have against the positivist disdain for meta­
physics.
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In his analysis of perception, James also came very 
close to the position of the contemporary transactionalists 
in psychology. Concepts are useful abstractions which have 
their influence on perceptions by selection, organization, 
and anticipation. In certain contexts he refers to these as 
"supposals" which have a self-fulfilling influence upon 
perception and which can only be evaluated in actual instances 
of carrying out a purpose.
F.C. Scheller, is one of the best known pragmatists, 
and was in fundamental agreement with James' view. Scheller 
and Alfred Sidgewick developed a pragmatic logic, which in 
sharp contrast to that of logical empiricists involved consid­
erations such as cognitive satisfaction and task completion. 
Most logicians would consider these factors to be psych­
ological. Scheller1s concept of reality is strikingly sim­
ilar to that of contemporary transactionalism because it is 
both subjective and evolutionary. Reality, as well as logic 
and methodology are by no means defined for all time, but are 
subject to change with man's condition. All of these usually 
static terms are seen as variables dependent upon man's pur­
pose. (Scheller, 1912)
An evolutionary and psychological view of the analytic 
aspects of knowledge is one of the hallmarks of pragmatism. 
Mathematics, logic and conceptual requiredness are empirical 
in origin in the broadest sense of that term. None is clearer 
on this point than Dewey. All such analytic considerations 
are based on prior successes. One of the best examples of
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the evolutionary nature of analytic knowledge comes to us 
from Bentley and Dewey's analysis of the evolution of what is 
to be considered a satisfactory scientific theory. Not only 
does the content of our explanations progress with scientific 
success, but also there is a change in the very nature of 
what we consider to be a satisfactory explanation.
Bentley and Dewey (19*+9) review the nature of explan­
ations in the history of physics and abstract three types of 
explanations which have evolved. They are given here in 
historical order, which represented not just change but 
improvement in their view. Taken together, they provide one 
of the broadest philosophical definitions of transaction and 
do so in a contrasting context. In addition, they demon­
strate that these functionalists would never be satisfied 
with any static definition of logical necessity, so typical of 
the positivists. The three kinds of explanations are:
SELF-ACTION: where things are viewed as acting under
their own powers.
INTER-ACTION: where thing is balanced against thing
in causal Interconnection.
TRANSACTION: where systems of descriptions and naming
are employed to deal with aspects and phases of action, 
without final attribution to "elements" or other pre­
sumptively detachable or independent "entities." 
"essences," or "realities," and without isolation of 
presumptively detachable "relations" from such 
detachable "elements". (Bentley and Dewey, 19^9> p. 108)
In the transactional point of view, the repeated 
emphasis upon the "non-detachability" of any of the elements 
of knowledge is one of the factors which distinguishes trans­
actionalism from the previous four theories of knowledge that
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we have examined. In each of the others, the indubitable was 
characterized by what Dewey calls detachability and what we 
have called independence. The search for an element of know­
ledge which we could attribute to nature, rather than to 
ourselves, was abandoned by the pragmatists. This represents 
the important transition in the perspective on knowledge. 
Despite all the differences which exist between the other 
theories of knowledge that we discussed previously, the fact 
that they all have proposed an indubitable means that the 
fundamental task of the creators of knowledge is to read the 
book of nature. When the pragmatists abandoned the hope of 
isolating a detachable element, they established a completely 
new perspective on knowledge. The creators of knowledge, 
according to the pragmatist point of view, are not reading 
the book of nature; instead, they are charting a course of 
human achievement. One of the most important characteristics 
of the transactional position held in common with the neo- 
realists, is an active view of perception. But, in the context 
of transactionalism, the activity is an essential aspect of the 
relativity of perception. Bentley and Dewey have stressed the 
significance of this point within the framework of scientific 
experimentation. Dewey urges that we substitute the word 
"taken" for the word "given" when referring to the observables 
of an experiment, emphasizing that man is not a passive 
recipient of information but an active resolver of problems.
Man is in no position, nor should he want to be, of ever
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apprehending the pre-cognized givens. The objects of inquiry 
are the products of previous inquiries both in the private and 
the public sense.
In accordance with the new perspective mentioned above, 
inquiry is conducted into problems of knowledge, not problems 
of nature. The need for inquiry is the result of noting 
inadequacies in what we already know. As Dewey puts it, it 
is work to be done "usually at the edge of knowledge."
(Bentley and Dewey, 19^9) We are conducting our inquiries 
into anomalies that exist in the present state of knowledge. 
Therefore even the problems we work on are molded by past 
knowledge. The methods or instruments we will use for working 
with the problem were once the object of inquiry for someone 
else. Dewey includes among instruments, concepts, meanings, 
overt and covert operations, and apparatus. The results of 
an inquiry are "taken" by all of these instruments, not given 
by nature. Our knowledge is to be evaluated, not according 
to its ability to represent nature, but according to its 
reliability in achieving human purposes.
The development of a descriptive psychology of percep­
tion based on the pragmatic philosophies presented above was 
undertaken by Adlebert Ames and his followers, Cantril and 
Ittelson. Following in the gestalt tradition they rested 
their case primarily upon a set of experimental demonstrations, 
which it was Ames' genius to construct. For purposes of 
discussion here we will refer to the distorted room experiment.1
detailed description for the construction of distorted 
rooms as well as descriptions of typical observations made in 
the room are given in Ames. pp. 182-196)
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Such demonstrations carry the same amount of conviction as do 
the gestalt displays, but they are more elaborate and the 
principles of their construction are more explicit.
The distorted rooms are built on the principle that 
several different actual configurations can give rise to the 
same retinal image. The walls in the trapezoidal room appear 
rectangular because one assumes walls to be rectangular. If 
this is the case than any piece of furniture placed in the 
trapezoidal room will appear distorted. This creates a sit­
uation in which a distorted room appears normal, while making 
its normal contents appear distorted. Here we have in essence 
the first important principle of transactional perception, which 
is that assumptions influence what is perceived. The second 
principle has to do with the role of action. The way to come 
to see the room trapezoidally is by acting with respect to it.
If a subject tries to catch a ball which he has bounced off 
the various surfaces of the distorted room, he will at first 
fail to catch the ball. With practice his catching will im­
prove, and his perception of the room will gradually shift.
Take the same subject immediately to a room which was con­
structed rectangularly and he will perceive it trapezoidally. 
Only with additional practice of action will his perception 
return to that of a rectangular room. The second principle 
is, therefore, that assumptions and purposes are intrinsically 
related to one another. The assumptions one initially made 
concerning room did not come from the correct perception of 
all rooms in prior experience, but from the set of purposes
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one has had with respect to similarly constructed rooms. That 
our present assumptions with respect to rooms are dependent on 
purpose, and not the similarity of room constructions, can be 
demonstrated by considering the fact that Ames1 distorted rooms 
would have entirely different consequences for a blind person 
or for an acoustical engineer.
We are never afforded the opportunity of perceiving
the world without any assumptions. This is probably why Husserl's
new science did not flourish.
The fact that the world can be apprehended in accord 
with various schemata implies that there exists one 
world which does not depend for its existence on how 
it is differentiated and that schematization creates 
some, but not all, of the differences in the world.
However, nothing follows concerning the possibility 
of apprehending the world in a pre-schematic, or 
pre-linguistic way. (MacKinnon, 1968-69, p. 126)
The transactional description of perception corresponds 
to Bohr and Heisenberg's description of observations in quantum 
physics. This correspondence is of the utmost significance and 
creates the basis for a new epistemology. Ames' description of 
perception is that of an individual bringing a set of assumptions 
to a set of givens; what he experiences is the relationship be­
tween the assumptions and the givens. The individual is never 
afforded a view of the givens independent of any assumptions.
He can obtain alternative views by bringing to the same givens 
alternative assumptions. Bohr and Heisenberg's descriptions of 
a measurement procedure in quantum physics, are cases in which 
the measurement obtained is not attributed to the phenomena, 
but to the relationship between the phenomena and the apparatus.
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Just as Ames says that what you see is a function of how you 
look, Bohr and Heisenberg say that what you obtain is a func­
tion of how you measure. This is not a solipsistic position: 
it merely denies the possibility of direct apprehension.
Both Instances are analogous to one of the favorite 
transactional analogies, in which it is said that the world is 
only viewed through transformation lenses. The transformations 
of the lenses can never be separated from that which is appre­
hended with them, and what is apprehended can never be known 
independent of the transformations. In the case of the per­
ceptual demonstrations, the rooms perceived are as much a 
function of the assumptions made about what is perceived as 
they are a function of the visual display. In the case of 
the quantum measurement, the numbers obtained do not refer to 
the phenomena, but to the relationship between the phenomena 
and the apparatus. Heisenberg's apparatus and Ames' assump­
tions have their analogy in the transformation lenses. We 
can see the parallels between Ames' view of sensation, and 
Bohr and Heisenberg's view of measurement, in their own words,
We can no longer speak of the behavior of the particle 
independently of the process of observation. As a final 
consequence, the natural laws formulated mathematically 
in quantum theory no longer deal with the elementary 
particles themselves but with our knowledge of them.
Nor is it any longer possible to ask whether or not 
these particles exist in space and time objectively, 
since the only processes we can refer to as taking 
place are those which represent the interplay of 
particles with some other physical system, e.g. a 
measuring instrument.
Thus, the objective reality of the elementary particles 
has been strangely dispersed, not into the fog of some
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new ill-defined or still unexplained conception of 
reality, but into the transparent clarity of a math­
ematics that no longer describes the behavior of the 
elementary particles but only our knowledge of this 
behavior. (Heisenberg, 1958, p. 15)
We conceive that we cannot directly know external 
events; that our senses and sensations and ideas 
give us, at most, a prognosis of their significance. 
What is known can never exactly correspond to the 
immediate occasion. At best their relationship can 
only be a similarity or analogy. The degree of this 
similarity may vary, but we can never know the inher­
ent nature of objects and their relationships as such.
The fact that WE CAN NEVER KNOW what we commonly con­
sider as facts and truth is rather appalling. It is 
as if nature had set about to create a super hoax 
with humans, like donkeys chasing the "feed bag."
But we are in that situation as long as we insist 
on believing that knowledge of the constitution of 
things as such and their relationships, is the 
final goal. (Ames, 1960, p.
The status of objectivity from the point of view of
transactional!sm is curiously muddled. This is so particularly
if one relies exclusively upon Ames and Heisenberg as spokesmen.
For example, Ames, who persistently maintains that we can never
know the essence of things independent of our purposes and
assumptions, nevertheless distinguishes between subjectivity
and objectivity.
Both the subjective and the objective worlds are 
essentially humanistic in their essence. The differ­
ence between these two worlds is not that one is 
subjective and humanistic and that the other is 
objective and nonhumanistic, but that one is uniquely 
personal to the individual experiencing it, disclosing 
those aspects of nature that can be experienced by him 
and by him alone; while the other discloses the hum­
anistic aspects of nature that can be the common 
experience of all men. These aspects must be imper­
sonal, that is, exclusive of individualistic signif­
icances (cf. modern science)." (Ames, 1960, p. 8)
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This position is similar in some respects to the 
publicity criterion of physicalists. It separates private 
significances from public significance. One further compli­
cation with respect to the transactional position has to do 
with what Ames may mean in the quotation above when he refers 
to ’’all men". This is puzzling since Cantril, his closest 
colleague, through whom all of Ames1 work is known, explicitly 
promotes the notion of cultural relativity in which assump­
tions, purposes and language define reality differently for 
different groups.
Heisenberg's view of objectivity is no more clear
than is Ames'. On the one hand he says,
While political ideas may gain a convincing influence 
among great masses of people just because they corres­
pond or seem to correspond to the prevailing interests 
of the people, scientific ideas will spread only be­
cause they are true. There are objective and final 
criteria assuring the correctness of a scientific 
statement. (Heisenberg, 1958, p. 19*0
On the other hand he does not identify scientific propositions
with reality,
Furthermore, one of the most important features of the 
development and the analysis of modern physics is the 
experience that the concepts of natural language, 
vaguely defined as they are, seem to be more stable 
in the expansion of knowledge than the precise terms 
of scientific language, derived as an idealization from 
only limited groups of phenomena. (Heisenberg, p. 185)
An assessment of objectivity from this perspective 
reveals that, at least with respect to the feature of indep­
endence, objectivity in the classical sense is not acceptable. 
Precision and accuracy can be achieved and through these we 
can be certain of reliable results. But reliable results in
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this context have a different meaning since they do not refer 
to the phenomena independently of the conditions under which 
the results were obtained. There is still an "if-then" 
quality to the knowledge, but the "if" refers to something 
one can do in order to obtain certain results and never allows 
one to know essences.
Objectivity is also different with respect to the 
criterion of certainty; in both the quantum situation and 
with respect to any of the perceptual demonstrations, what is 
known or perceived is in principle expandable on the basis of 
ways of knowing. We have always recognized that as our 
instruments of observation improve, knowledge expands; but 
this was seen as due to the limitations of our senses. The 
transactional position maintains that there is no one descrip­
tion which is correct, proper or complete with respect to a 
set of givens. The limits of what is to be perceived are not 
inherently bound in the stimulus, so that with respect to 
certainty we can assign only a probability to a particular 
percept arising from a combination of assumptions and givens. 
Similarly, in the quantum mechanical experiment, descriptions 
are not of phenomena, but of the relationship between phen­
omena and other physical systems; therefore, the limits of 
description are not inherent within the phenomena, but depend 
on man's ingenuity in devising means of actualizing the 
phenomena's potential. All we can hope to do is assign a 
probability to a given outcome given a particular set of
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initial conditions. Transactionalists, therefore, do not accept 
the finality that is implicit in the goal of description.
Since any particular description involves assumptions and goals, 
as well as givens, no description is ever considered to he the 
correct description. Instead, descriptions can he given a 
probability of occuring, given a set of initial conditions and 
a purpose. Since any of these factors may change with the hu­
man condition, finality is impossible.
In this form of transactionalism, there is an important 
change with respect to the notion of certainty. The change can 
be best understood in terms of a change of interpretation of 
the meaning of probability. Prior to the development of quan­
tum physics and the principle of indeterminacy, probabilistic 
prediction systems were used in classical physics but in a very 
different way than they came to be used in quantum physics. 
Probability theory was employed as the appropriate mathematical 
system to make predictions about physical systems in which there 
were technical limitations preventing the accurate measurement 
of that physical system. For obvious technical reasons, an 
analysis of the kinetic motion of gas particles cannot rely on 
the direct measurement of individual molecules in the gas. 
Therefore, probability theory was used to estimate the parame­
ters of interest on the basis of the behavior of large groups 
of gas molecules. This application of statistical inference 
is used to overcome instances of human ignorance due to tech­
nical limitations. The principle of indeterminacy changes
123
the interpretation of the role of probability theory by chang­
ing the status of the measurement problem from that of a tech­
nical problem to that of a logical problem. In the quantum 
physical experiment, the impossibility of measuring the traj­
ectory of an individual particle is not a technical problem 
but a logical and physical impossibility. Therefore, the use 
of probability inference techniques is an inherent aspect of 
"knowing" in this domain. It is not a temporary substitute, 
eventually to be replaced. We can either interpret this 
ontologically or epistemologically. That is, we can say that 
there is either an inherent element of chance in nature or an 
inherent element of ignorance in knowledge, but we can no 
longer interpret it as a matter of technical error, which, at 
least in principle, could be overcome.
Thus we see that both of the fundamental features of 
the classical definition of objectivity have been replaced in 
the transactional account of knowledge. The search for the 
independent in the form of the indubitable given of knowledge 
was abandoned, making knowledge relative to man's purposes.
The feature of certainty was also abandoned by elevating in­
determinacy from.the technical realm to the logical realm.
For this reason, it is correct to say that the transactional 
theory of knowledge does not accept the assumption of objec­
tivity. It is because of this that many of the methods and 
experimental demonstrations developed by the transactional­
ists have been incorporated into this inquiry.
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CHAPTER V
THREE ANOMALIES TO THE ASSUMPTION OF OBJECTIVITY
We have already explained what is meant by an anomaly 
in our section on method. In the following material, the 
anomalies are constructed with a definite plan in mind. As 
indicated previously, one of the fundamental reasons for sep­
arating perception and observation was based on the assumption 
that observation is objective and that perception is subjective. 
To go along with this distinction would be to prejudge the 
question of objectivity: therefore, much care has been taken
in selecting anomalies which can be exemplified in what might 
be clearly recognized as coming from each of these two domains. 
This is why the first anomaly deals with geometry and illusions, 
the second deals with reversible figures and a simple problem 
in physical description taken from the history of physics, 
and the third deals with the problem of equivalent configur­
ations in perception and complementary description in quantum 
physics. The examples selected have been paired off in this 
manner in the hope that parallel abstractions could come from 
each half of the pair, thereby making the same point with 
respect to the assumption of objectivity.
The anomalies result from two steps which have al­
ready been discussed in some detail. The first step involves 
the bringing together of two currently separated fields of 
epistemological research. If, as argued previously, the 
assumption of objectivity is what keeps philosophy of science
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and the psychology of perception separated, then the effect of 
holding that assumption in abeyance is to allow us to see 
their commonality of interests. This is why each anomaly con­
sists of information that has been collected from each discip­
line and brought together to bear on one problem. The second 
step involves the selection of items which, in the combined 
context of the two epistemological disciplines, appear to be 
counterevidence to the assumption of objectivity.
Each of the three anomalies is designed to make a 
different point about the objectivity of observations. The 
first anomaly is counterevidence to the assumption of objec­
tivity in that it demonstrates that what is observed depends 
in part on assumptions being made by the observer. The second 
anomaly attempts to demonstrate that the observed is influenced 
by patterns of organization brought to it by the observer. 
Finally, the third anomaly attempts to demonstrate that what 
is observed is influenced by the goals of the observer.
In 1955? Floyd Allport thought it was necessary to 
begin his textbook on perception by giving a clear and simple 
demonstration of the difference between subjective and objec­
tive reports. He believed that we could abstract from this 
simple situation some general principles for distinguishing 
between these reports. The principles were to be applied to 
reports concerning more complex subjects such as are usually 
studied in psychology, wherein the distinction between objec­
tive and subjective is more difficult to make.
1 26
Allport presented the simple geometrical illustrations 
that are shown in Figures 1 and 2. He held that we can dis­
tinguish the objective from the subjective by observing the 
methods the subject uses in arriving at his reports.
Allport asks two questions of the subject, looking
at Figure 1. The first question calls for a subjective answer.
It is, "How does Figure 1 look to you?". The subject merely
glances at the figure and replies that Figure 1 appears to be
two straight horizontal parallel lines. The second question
Allport asks of his subject is, "What are the facts about
Figure 1?" This calls for an objective answer. The subject
takes a ruler, which is a straight edge, and compares the
straight edge to both lines. He then measures the distance
between the two lines at various points along the lines. The
subject then replies that the facts about Figure 1 are that
it contains two straight lines, and that these lines are
parallel. Though the subject gives the same reply to both
questions, it is clear that he has used a different method to
arrive at each answer. The significance of the difference
between these methods becomes clear only when the two methods
are applied to Figure 2.
Here we see lines like those of Figure 1, but in a 
different setting. If the reader will not repeat his 
two observations exactly as before, the point can be 
readily made; and in making it we shall come at last 
to a true understanding of the problem of perception.
First we ask, as before, the phenomenological question:
"How do the lines appear?" The reply will probably be, 
for both the upper and the lower figure, that they look 










be that they look closest together at the extremes and 
furthest apart at the center, while for the lower fig­
ure they look closest together at the center and 
divergent at the extremes. Now we ask for the obser­
vation corresponding to the physicalistic question; 
"What are the facts regarding the lines?" If the 
reader will again use the straightedge or ruler for 
testing both the upper and lower figures, thus again 
bringing in denotation, he will probably, report that 
the lines in both cases are STRAIGHT and PARALLEL. 
Clearly then, phenomenological and physicalistic 
procedures may differ not only methodologically BUT 
IN THEIR REPORTED RESULTS. The two methods of observ­
ing give answers that disagree. It cannot be alto­
gether true that things look as they do because they 
are what they are.
Moreover, if a large number of observers went through 
the same two procedures for Figure 2 we would doubtless 
find this same difference of outcome in all the obser­
vations. Each type of description is in this case 
general for a population of observers and follows its 
own laws. It is evident that pursuing the objective 
method and satisfying the criteria of denotation, 
relative observer-freedom, and publicly performable 
operations may lead to an experience content that is 
different from that produced by the phenomenological 
method with its failure to satisfy these criteria.
The question of whether objectivity-criteria are to 
be used or not; therefore becomes significant. One 
of these methods cannot be substituted for the other 
without running the risk not only of eliminating the 
type of experience pertaining to first, but also of 
changing the report. Phenomenological descriptions 
must be used to state how the lines "look"; but if 
we want to know the "facts" about them, we must place 
our reliance upon the physicalistic account. (Allport, 
1955, PP. 38-^0)
It appears that this is one simple situation from which 
we can abstract some clear cut principles for discriminating 
between objective and subjective reports. This is possible 
only if we accept that the description the subject gives as 
an answer to the question "What are the facts about Figure 1 
and 2?", is in fact an objective description. By objective,
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we assume Allport means that the description depends on the 
stimuli and not on an arbitrary bias that the subject brings 
to the stimuli.
We will demonstrate that in fact the description 
"straight and parallel" in response to either Figures 1 or 2, 
has imbedded in it arbitrary subjective biases brought to the 
situation by the observer. In addition, it will be shown that 
another answer can be given to the question "What are the facts 
about Figures 1 and 2?" besides the answer "straight and 
parallel lines." This alternative answer deviates as much 
from "straight and parallel" as does the phenomenological reply, 
but nevertheless satisfies all of Allport's criteria for 
objectivity.
The bias which we refer to is the assumption of an 
Euclidean geometry along with certain conventions of measure­
ment and certain other assumptions about physics. There is 
nothing inherent in the stimuli of Figures 1 and 2 to justify 
any of the assumptions that are implicit in the Euclidean 
description given by Allport. We will demonstrate that 
alternative assumptions about geometry, physics and conven­
tions of measurement will give us a description of these same 
figures, that is just as objective as the one given by Allport, 
but is nevertheless different. We will then be forced to face 
the question, "How can there be more than one objective 
description of these stimuli?"
Since the publication of Lobachevakii's New Elements 
of Geometry (1955) it has been well known that Euclid's geometry
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is only one of many geometries or theories of relations. Since 
antiquity it had been assumed that Euclid1s was the only geom­
etry and geometers have concentrated on problems within that 
systematic body of knowledge. In particular, proving the fifth 
postulate, which is the axiom of parallels, is a problem which 
had especially interested geometers. It is said that Gauss, 
Bolyai and Lobachevakii concluded at about the same time 
that a geometry was possible which did not assume the axiom of 
the parallels was in fact possible. For a long time, such 
non-Euclidean geometries were considered logical curiosities, 
of interest only to mathematicians and logicians. It was not 
until Einstein used it as the physical geometry appropriate 
to the theory of Relativity that non-Euclidean geometries be­
came widely accepted as candidates for physical descriptions.
It was at this time that the non-Euclidean descriptions were 
recognized as possibly more "real” than Euclidean descriptions. 
(Aleksandrov, 1963j Reichenbach, 1958)
To say that formal, purely mathematic geometry is a 
convention simply means that its terms are arbitrary symbols 
organized on the basis of logical consistency. Several such 
logically consistent systems can be constructed. The elemen­
tary definitions of a geometry are similar in many respects 
to the dictionary definitions of languages: therefore, it is
possible to construct an Euclidean, non-Euclidean dictionary 
which gives the non-Euclidean definitions that most nearly 
approximate their Euclidean counterparts. (Table I is borrowed 











portion of space situated above 
the fundamental plane
sphere cutting the fundamental 
plane orthogonally





logarithm of the cross ratio of 
these two points and the inter­
sections of the fundamental 
plane with a circle passing 
through these two points and 
cutting it orthogonally, etc.
TABLE I
ALTERNATIVE DEFINITIONS OF ELEMENTS IN 
LOBACHEVAKII AND EUCLID*S GEOMETRIES
like.) The use of such a dictionary allows us tp make logical 
translations from one geometry to another, only in principle. 
In actuality, such translations require the complex mathemati-
i
cal theorems of Riemannian geometry.
As long as non-Euclidean geometries were not involved 
in describing the physical world, the possibility of such 
geometries was not considered significant. The philosophical 
significance of the Theory of Relativity was in demonstrating 
that not only were alternative geometries possible, but alter­
native conventions of measurement were also possible. This 
meant that the non-Euclidean geometries could be applied to 
the real world, including even those situations which could 
be equally accurately described by Euclidean geometry. Basic 
measurement conventions were shown1to be definitions rather 
than empirical truths. Non-Euclidean descriptions of space 
could only be applied to the real world if we constructed new 
definitions of measurement which would allow us to make the 
appropriate observations. We suddenly discovered that, since 
the geometry had made its way into the instrumentation of 
measurement, many of the Euclidean verities were true only 
by definition. Three different sets of assumptions are in­
volved at arriving at our conventions of measurement. All of 
these are arbitrary definitions for which it is possible to 
construct logically consistent alternatives. The first of 
these which is most obviously relative is the conceptual 
definition of units. Basic units such as feet and meters are 
arbitrary conventions and we can devise methods for translating
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from one such system to another. The second of these involves 
the physical coordination of the defined units. This is a 
matter of building instruments which are coordinated to the 
scaling system devised. Certain assumptions about physics 
are involved when we define a foot rule on the basis of its 
rigidity and the stability of its shape.
The third set of definitions has to do with the rule 
for taking measurements. For example, when measuring distance 
in the ordinary Euclidean approach, we assume that the unit 
of measurement remains the same when transported from one 
plane to the next, and we therefore add equal values for each 
adjacent application of the instrument. It is possible to 
devise other rules which are as logically acceptable as those 
we are accustomed to using. Such rules must be stated in 
terms of a simple regulation which applies to each time and 
place a measurement is made. In the usual Euclidean approach 
such a rule simply states that an equal unit is added, let 
us say, one foot, each time the foot rule is placed exactly 
adjacent to the previous measurement. An alternative might 
be a rule which calls for a reduction in the size of the unit 
as a function of either the time or the place of the measure­
ment. This alternative would call "constant" in length a unit 
ruler which from the point of view of Euclidean geometry would 
be said to shrink in size. In other rules the size of the 
unit could vary as a function of the distance from a defined 
point. The important point is that the combination of the
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possible rules of measurement is practically infinite and the 
selection of any particular rule is a matter of convenience.
It is precisely because these definitions are coordin­
ated to physical objects like instruments of measurement that 
we must be careful not to mistake the definitions for empirical 
facts. That a foot rule remains a foot long is not something 
we can test, rather, it is something we have defined. If two 
foot rules have the same length at point A and then are 
transported to point B, we must find that they are the same 
length at point B or assume that one of them, or perhaps both
of them, are no longer foot rules. We do not reject the
definition for to do so would be to disrupt all previous 
measurements; rather, we assume the deviant rule to be an 
exception.
Thus we could arrange measuring rods, which in the 
ordinary sense are called equal in length, and laying 
them end to end, call the second rod half as long as 
the first, the third one a third, etc. Such a defin­
ition would complicate all measurements, but epistem- 
ologically it is equivalent to the ordinary definition, 
which calls the rods equal in length. In this statement 
we make use of the fact that the definition of a unit
at only one space point does not render general measure­
ments possible. For the general case the definition of 
the unit has to be given in advance as a function of 
place (and also of the time). It is again a matter of 
fact that our world admits of a simple definition of 
congruency because of the factual relations holding for 
the behavior of rigid rods: but this fact does not 
deprive the simple definition of its definitional char­
acter. (Reichenbach, 1958, p. 1 7)
A geometry, therefore, cannot be applied without first 
developing conventions of measurements appropriate to it. 
Riemannian geometry has provided the mathematical abstractions
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necessary to enable mathematicians to describe non-Euclidean 
relations. Most of us must accept the fact that such 
non-Euclidean geometries and metrics are logically consistent 
since we are unable to internalize the conventions of measure­
ment and the logic of the geometry in the same way we have done 
for Euclidean geometry. Generally speaking, when we are faced 
with a problem in geometry we test the correctness of the log­
ical steps in the problem by visualizing or drawing the conse­
quences. Thus, for the axiom of the parallels we would draw 
a straight line with a point next to it and "see" that only 
one straight line can be drawn through that point which is 
equidistant at all points with the one line. Our ability to 
do this rests upon our implicit knowledge of the definition 
of the elements of Euclidean geometry such as lines, points, 
planes and parallels; also, it rests on the implicit knowledge 
of the conventions of measurement to be used to test the 
straightness of lines and the distances of lengths. For this 
kind of implicit knowledge about Euclidean' definitions we 
have no non-Euclidean counterparts. Mathematicians who have 
developed non-Euclidean counterparts for these definitions 
through the use of Riemannian analytic geometry claim that 
they gradually develop an intuitive grasp of such non-Euclidean 
relationships. For the sake of those of us who do not have 
the mathematical facility, mathematicians have devised a 
method of depicting non-Euclidean relationships in Euclidean 
diagrams. Perhaps the most famous of these diagrams is' given 
in Figure 3» It was first developed by Klein, who with
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FIGURE 3
KLEIN'S DEPICTION OF A NON-EUCLIDEAN SPACE
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Poincare did much to amplify the significance of the develop­
ment of non-Euclidean geometry to non-mathematicians. (Hilbert, 
1952; Poincari, 1953)
The circle forming the boundary of Figure 3 is also 
the boundaries of a Lobachevakii space. Since in Lobachevakii1s 
geometry straight lines are geodesic, they do not travel infin­
itely as in Euclidean geometry. We may therefore represent 
the entire non-Euclidean space within this circle. If we 
limit ourselves to the space within the circle it can be seen 
that more than one straight line can be drawn through a point 
which does not intersect another straight line some distance 
from that point. To understand how we can limit the space by 
a circular boundary it must be understood that distance within 
the space is measured by means of a non-Euclidean convention.
Mathematicians have worked out complex formulae which 
describe in Euclidean terms the non-Euclidean metric for 
measuring the distance between two points. Mathematicians 
tell us that the consequence of this metric is that the unit 
of measure gets smaller and smaller as it approaches the 
periphery of the space. This simple statement of the effects 
of the metric has been seized upon as a heuristic device for 
the communication and depiction of non-Euclidean spaces.
Rather than explicating the complex mathematical 
functions which represent the conventions of non-Euclidean 
geometries, Poincar4 (1953) Klein and Reichenbach (1958) make 
use of a universal force which affects the instruments of 
measurement in the same way the mathematical functions affect
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the conventions of measurement. In order to simplify the 
situation, Poincar4 even reduces this force to something 
as simple as heat. Using this heuristic, we can explain how 
the circular boundary of Figure 3 could never be reached by 
anyone taking measurements from within the space. Poincare 
merely postulates a decreasing amount of heat emanating from 
the center of the space. This mysterious heat affects all 
bodies, immediately placing them in thermal equilibrium. As 
we look upon it from outside the space we can see that the 
observer from within the space who is making observations as 
he moves toward the periphery of the space is gradually de­
creasing in size. His instruments also decrease in size as 
do the steps he takes in walking toward the periphery. It 
becomes obvious that the observer within the space will never 
reach the periphery.
Reichenbach has addressed himself directly to the 
visualization or graphic representation of non-Euclidean 
spaces. In this he makes use of Poincare's technique of 
projecting 3 dimensional curvilinear Euclidean spaces onto 
planes which yield 2 dimensional non-Euclidean spaces. Us­
ing this technique we can describe Allport's stimuli as they 
would appear in a non-Euclidean space. Figure depicts the 
projection of a 3 dimensional Euclidean hemisphere into a 2 
dimensional positively curved non-Euclidean space. Figure 5 
shows the 2 dimensional non-Euclidean surface. We will 
follow Poincare by describing the non-Euclidean convention
FIGURE If
THE STEREOGRAPHIC PROJECTION OF A 
3 DIMENSIONAL CURVILINEAR SPACE ONTO 
A 2 DIMENSIONAL NON-EUCLIDEAN SURFACE
FIGURE 5
2 DIMENSIONAL NON-EUCLIDEAN 
SPACE OF POSITIVE CURVATURE
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of measurement appropriate to this surface in terms of a 
universal force which influences instruments within this space. 
The force expands all tangential lines and it increases in 
strength as one approaches the periphery. The force does not 
influence radial lines. This means that if a rigid rod were 
held perpendicularly against the radial AB in order to draw 
an equidistant CD, that the rod would increase in length in 
moving from the midpoint towards A and B, since as it travels 
from the midpoint towards either A or B it becomes increasing­
ly tangential. If we wish to connect the points CD in this 
space, according to the Euclidean definition, the straightest 
line between CD is the dotted line. Since the dotted line 
CD is farther removed from the midpoint it carries the rod 
through that portion of space of maximal influence of the 
universal force; therefore, the full length of the rod can 
be laid down fewer times along dotted CD than it can along 
solid CD. Thus, we have a non-Euclidean description wherein 
straight and parallel do not coincide, and it is in this sense 
that the axiom of the parallels cannot be demonstrated in this 
non-Euclidean space. (Reichenbach, 1958, Hilbert, 1952)
The non-Euclidean description appropriate to Allport's 
stimuli in figure 1 is obviously different from both the phen­
omenological and the Euclidean description. Despite this 
difference, the non-Euclidean description satisfies all of 
Allport's standards of objectivity, and therefore it stands 
on an equal footing with his own physicalistic description.
He gives us three standards of objectivity, all of which
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are to be applied in evaluating the method that a particular 
observer uses in achieving a description. According to Allport, 
if the three standards of objectivity are met, the object of 
description can be said to have an existence apart from us and 
belongs to the world of the natural sciences. The three stand­
ards are: the degree of observer involvement, denotability and
operationism. Of these three, the most difficult standard to 
apply is the first one.
Is it not clear what Allport means by subjective involve­
ment. For example, in the problem of describing the stimuli in 
Figure 1, is it more or less subject involvement when the obser­
ver makes explicit the role that geometry and conventions of 
measurement play in the description which he gives? We are all 
more willing to rely on a non-mathematical intuitional appli­
cation of Euclidean geometry than on a non-Euclidean geometry.
It is therefore proper to say that a Euclidean description is 
more subjective because it relies on psychological rather than 
on logical analysis? Despite this fundamental ambiguity in the 
standard of observer involvement it seems clear that the diff­
erences in observer involvement between the Euclidean and non- 
Euclidean descriptions are trivial ones that are due to cul­
tural prejudice.
The standard of denotability means, according to 
Allport, coming into physical contact with the object. In 
Jlgure 1, Allport means by denoting, placing a ruler in phys­
ical contact with the figure. It should be clear that accord­
ing to this criterion the Euclidean and non-Euclidean do not 
differ at all. What differs with respect to rigid rulers is
the manner in which they are coordinatively defined and the 
rules for their application, not their coming into physical 
contact with the stimulus.
The third of Allport's standards of objectivity is 
operationism which can be subdivided into the criteria of 
publicity and repeatability. By publicity is meant that the 
process of observation must involve operations such as those 
undergone with the ruler, which can be observed by anyone 
present. Repeatability means that such operations would yield 
similar results when carried out at a future time. With re­
spect to the criterion of operationism it should be obvious 
that the Euclidean and non-Euclidean descriptions of the stim­
uli in Figure 1 are on equal footing.
We are forced to say that there is more than one 
physicalistic description of the stimuli of Figure 1 which 
meet the criteria of objectivity. Allport would probably 
retort that even though this is true we have only managed to 
complicate the meaning of physicalistic description, and have 
not understood his central thesis which is an attempt to 
differentiate the phenomenological from the physicalistic.
He could at this point maintain that the Euclidean and non- 
Euclidean descriptions combine to define the objective methods 
for the physicalistic description of the stimuli in Figure 2, 
and that these physicalistic descriptions form a class still 
essentially different from the phenomenological. To make this 
point, Allport would probably rely on the distinctions he 
made with respect to Figure 2, which is, according to Allport, 
a phenomenological illusion. To refer to this stimulus
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as an illusion means that the phenomenological deviates from 
the physicalistic and is therefore a distortion of reality.
This is the case if one accepts the Euclidean description as 
the only legitimate physicalistic description of either the 
stimuli in Figures 1 and 2. It can be seen that if we use 
the non-Euclidean physicalistic description as our "true" or 
"real" description of the stimuli, then the phenomenological 
description of Figure 1 becomes an illusion and in the relev­
ant segment of Figure 2 the phenomenological and physicalistic 
correspond.
To demonstrate this we have drawn dotted lines through 
the stimuli in Figure 2 in such a way as to reduce Allport's 
illusion to its fundamental elements. From this demonstration, 
it can be seen that the apparent curvature of the parallel 
line is always in the same direction. The ends of the straight 
line appear to curve towards the point of origin of the 
radiating lines. Explaining this illusion requires an accurate 
description of the segment A since the more complex illusion 
is made up of various combinations of this simple segment.
We can superimpose segment A of Figure 2 onto a positively 
curved non-Euclidean 2 dimensional surface such as the one 
given in Figure 5. If we assume that the line MN (Figure 2) 
is a straight line, then it will curve as does the dotted 
line CD (Figure 5). Having done this we can see that the 
physicalistic non-Euclidean description of the segment A 
(Figure 2) corresponds to the phenomenological description.
All of the straight lines radiating from point 0 in Figure 2
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can be superimposed upon the non-Euclidean space without any 
change in their apparent or physicalistic dimensions since 
radials are not affected by the universal force in this non- 
Euclidean space. It might be objected that the line MN 
(Figure 2) is a parallel rather than a straight, but in order 
to make this objection one must bring in Euclidean geometry, 
since in non-Euclidean geometry straights and parallels never 
coincide. It would be possible to construct a non-Euclidean 
surface of negative curvature in which solid CD (Figure 5) 
would be the straightest, while dotted CD would be the equi­
distant. Constructing such a surface would merely require 
reversing the position of the pole and the circumference of 
the hemisphere being projected in Figure if. In such a non- 
Euclidean space, the universal force would reduce the size 
of all tangential lines as a function of the distance from the 
midpoint.
If we review each step that was taken we can see that 
the word illusion makes sense only in a very narrow application.
I
Figure 2 demonstrates an illusion if our standard is Euclidean 
geometry, and Figure 1 represents an illusion if our standard 
is non-Euclidean geometry. The error in Allport's analysis 
is characteristic of most of the work done on illusions in 
that it seeks to establish a hierarchy of description in which 
the physicalistic narrowly construed is held to be the standard 
against which all the descriptions are to be Judged. Allport 
claims his comparison is between the phenomenological and the 
physicalistic. Our demonstration shows that Allport is
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contrasting the phenomenological with the common sense view, 
which is certainly different from the physicalistic.
The fact demonstrated above, that the phenomenological 
can sometimes be Euclidean and sometimes be non-Euclidean, 
suggests that a description of phenomenological geometry might 
give us standards by which to evaluate other types of descrip­
tion. The beginnings of the kind of research which might lead 
to a phenomenological geometry is indicated by Luneburg1s 
(19*+8) work. Luneburg and his associates have demonstrated 
that the geometry of binocular vision can take on different 
kinds of metrics and for certain circumstances non-Euclidean 
metric is assumed. Non-Euclidean metrics, are associated 
with the perception of a large array of stimuli at a substantial 
distance from the subject. (Hardy, Rand, Rittler, Blank,
Brider, 1953)
The demonstration given above and Luneburg’s prelim­
inary research seem to indicate that what we call illusions 
are phenomenological experiences for which we have not yet 
identified an appropriate geometry and metric. Furthermore, 
it suggests that the separation of phenomenological and 
physicalistic descriptions into two qualitatively distinct 
fields of experience is unjustified.
We have seen in our review of various perspectives 
concerning objectivity that the notion of independence is one 
of the basic standards by vdiich objectivity can be established. 
The idea of independence can be expressed in both the jargon 
appropriate to perception, and that appropriate to observation.
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We assume a feature to be a part of the stimulus when all 
subjects can discriminate it by means of verbal or other re­
sponses. By the same token we assume an observation to be 
factual when repeated public operations yield similar obser­
vations. We have already seen that the manner in xirhich such 
observations are made is a point upon which there is less 
agreement than there is upon the belief that factual observa­
tions can be made.
The most important feature of factuality is indep­
endence. When we assert something to be a fact we mean that 
it in no way depends upon us. Feyerabend (1965) refers to 
the independence of facts as the "autonomy principle", which 
he says is one of the most basic implicit assumptions of 
contemporary science. The autonomy principle does not insist 
that the "discovery" or generation of facts is independent of 
theory or of the observer's cognitions, but that once they 
are established they remain facts forevermore and become 
an essential unit of knowledge within the discipline.
T.S. Kuhn (1962) concurs with Feyerabend in holding 
that the most important assumption of the traditional epis- 
temological paradigm is the belief that facts have an indep­
endent existence which, once established, makes them stable 
elements of knowledge. According to Kuhn, this leads to a 
theory of history of science in which knowledge is considered 
cumulative. In this view theories merely serve to generate 
the building blocks of knowledge which are the facts.
1^9
In this section, we wish to examine the phenomena of 
patterning, or as the gestalt psychologists call it, form 
perception. In doing so we will look at an example of form 
perception taken from the science of perception and one taken 
from the history of physics. It Is hoped that the reader will 
see parallels between the two examples to be given. The pur­
pose in examining patterning is to demonstrate that perception 
and observation are similar in that they select from the given 
only certain features, and that these features are selected on 
the basis of a pattern brought to the situation by the observer.
In the field of perception such patterns are usually referred 
to as predetermining tendencies. With respect to scientific 
observation, these patterns are theoretical concepts. The 
implication which will have to be examined subsequent to the 
discussion is that the line between logical and empirical or 
theoretical and factual is difficult, if not impossible, to 
draw.
Figure 6 is the stimulus of a reversible figure which 
can be seen either as a goblet or as two profiles. Literature 
in perception is replete with examples of such reversible 
figures, yet for all practical purposes they remain curios­
ities. "There is not much history to the reversible perspec­
tive because the fact was obvious and no one has been successful 
in offering a plausible explanation of it." (Boring, 19*+2, p. 271)
In the example of the goblet, we can see the fundamental 
argument of the configurationists: the whole determines the





then one can see its stem, base and rim in Figure 6. On the 
other hand, if one begins with the whole "profiles" one can 
see the noses, lips and brows. In this example we find the 
basis of the argument that facts are dependent on some kind 
of pattern. This becomes clearer if we consider the "whole" 
as a hypothesis which can be tested. If this is a goblet then 
one should be able publicly to denote its rim, stem and base.
Is it possible to establish that this is in fact a goblet? The 
answer must be affirmative but by the same token it also must 
be said that we can demonstrate by publicly denoting noses, 
lips and brows, that it is in fact two profiles.
The most difficult question seems to be whether we 
interpret the pattern or whole as something inherent in the 
stimulus, or as a factor brought to the situation by the sub­
ject. The opposing points of view with respect to this ques­
tion will be reviewed in a subsequent section.
In order to demonstrate that this example is not a 
psychological problem pertinent only to perception, let us 
look at another example from the history of mechanics. This 
example (Figure 7) is borrowed from Kuhn and it demonstrates 
that two scientific descriptions of an object have no nec­
essary overlap in the attributes they wish to measure. IJhen 
viewing a body in constrained fall, the Aristotelian measured 
the weight of the stone, the vertical height to which it had 
been raised, and the time required for it to achieve rest, 
and he considered such measurements an adequate description 
of the phenomena. Galileo's description of the pendulum
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FIGURE 7
ALTERNATIVE VIEWS OF A 
SWINGING BODY 
ARISTOTLE GALILEO
describes Figure 7 as describes Figure 7 as
. a body in constrained a pendulum
fall
He measures: He measures:
1. the weight of the 1. weight
stone 2.. radius
2. the vertical height 3- angular displacement
to which it had *+. time per swing
been raised
3. the time required 
for it to achieve 
rest
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required the measurement of wight, radius, angular displace­
ment and time per swing. It is obvious that the dimensions 
being considered by each observer with the single exception of 
weight, are not interchangable. If we consider the total sets 
of measurements made in describing a phenomenon, then we are 
forced to say that one is incorrect, or that they are different 
phenomena, or finally that neither fully represents the phen­
omenon. (Koyre, 1939, 19^3)
The difficulty presented by both of these examples is 
the identification of the independent element in observation 
or perception. Once we are operating from a particular theor­
etical construct it is impossible to disprove it unless we 
are provided with an alternative theoretical construct. One 
could have made a thousand observations on bodies in con­
strained fall and never have concluded that they were in fact 
pendulums. The larger concept is a prerequisite to the 
empirical test. The questions one asks about the phenomena are 
determined by these constructs. It does not make sense, for 
example, to ask "Where is the goblet's nose?" Before one can 
start looking for the noses, he must know that they are a pos­
sibility, and such knowledge depends on the assumptions he is 
making about the array or stimulus before him.
There are other ways in which the examples given above 
can be interpreted. It can be said that the individual measures 
taken are the objective facts which remain stable over time 
and that the pattern is an interpretation of these measures. 
According to this account the measurements cannot be challenged.
This point of view is consistent with phenomenalism in which 
the primitives of knowledge are individual sense data. Though 
this position can he defended with respect to many kinds of 
descriptions, it is fallible with respect to the kinds of 
situations in which more than one objective description is 
available. Given the parameters selected by Aristotle, one 
could not arrive at an interpretation equal to Galileo's 
pendulum anymore than one could make profiles out of bases, 
stems, and rims.
The examples presented above are anomalous to the 
idea of objectivity since it is impossible to separate the 
elements which are independent of the observer from those that 
the observer brings to the situation. This is particularly 
significant if one accepts the fact that the most important 
steps forward in science are made through the creation of 
such constructs such as that of a pendulum which gives us 
insight or a new way of looking at something.
The idea that constructs guide us in the selection of 
the significant parameters to be measured is not a new one.
We have expressed this in our discussion of the configuration- 
ist's view of science. What is important to notice in this 
context is that it occurs at the perceptual level. It is not 
entirely an intellectual matter. Furthermore, there are 
parallels between the anomaly and the one presented before it 
concerning the appropriate geometry to be used in describing 
the stimulus. In each case, we are given seemingly contra­
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dictory descriptions of a single stimulus or object, and yet 
it is impossible to assign preference to one or the other of 
these by using any of the criteria of objectivity. Again we 
are faced with the question, "How can there be more than one 
objective description of a single thing?"
In this section we will look at examples in which the 
qualities of perception and the properties of observation are 
demonstrated to be the function of a relationship between the 
observer and the observed. It might be argued that this is 
precisely what we have already examined in the cases of the 
alternative geometries and reversible perspectives; however, 
as we will see later the cases of the geometries and the 
perspectives are subject to various interpretations, some of 
which are not consistent with a relativistic point of view. 
The three examples which we wish to examine are also 
subject to various interpretations. We will present them 
here as they were interpreted by the men who created them. 
They are, a specific example of a transactional demonstration, 
an examination of I. Kohler's prismatic lens experiment, and 
an experimental exposition of indeterminacy relations in 
quantum mechanics. These will be presented from the points 
of view of Adlebert Ames and his colleagues and Werner 
Heisenberg and Bohr respectively. In discussing the exper- 
ments we will be presenting nothing which is essentially new. 
The benefit in doing so should derive from the context of 
combining the perspectives of observation and perception and 
from noting parallels between Ames' and Heisenberg's contri-
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ROTATING TRAPEZOID WINDOW DEMONSTRATION
ACTUALITY
T R A PEZO ID  WINDOW ROTATES 
COUNTER-CLOCKWISE ( A - B - C )
W ITH CUBE ATTACHED
PERCEPTION
RECTANGULAR WINDOW OSCILLATES 
FROM A' TO B’ COUNTER-CLOCKWISE 
AND FROA\ 3 ‘ TO C' CLOCKWISE • 
WITH CUBE DETACHED
N O T E  : DRAW ING SHOWS E F FE C T  DURING 
PERIOD OF A PPA R EN T REVERSAL 
OF ROTATION DIRECTION
butions. Finally, it is important to remember that the purpose 
in reviewing these phenomena is to see how they can be incor­
porated into our assumptions concerning objectivity.
To understand the basis of all of Ames' demonstrations 
requires understanding what Ames means by "equivalent config­
urations." In Figure 8 we have depicted a stimulus which has 
equivalent configuration values as a trapezoid or as a rec­
tangle viewed from a particular angular perspective. In many 
respects what we have here is a simple reversible figure.
This particular example of equivalent configuration is the 
basis of several of the Ames' demonstrations, the most famous 
of which is the rotating trapezoid.
In the rotating trapezoid demonstration we can see 
how Ames employs the equivalent configuration principle to 
demonstrate the role that assumptions play in perception.
When the trapezoidal shape is shaded to appear as a window 
frame, the assumption that it is rectangular gains strength. 
When this frame is rotated on its vertical axis and viewed 
monocularly it appears to be an oscillating rectangular window 
frame, rather than a rotating trapezoid.
The use of the phrase "appears to be" requires clar­
ification. Allport (1955) describes the rotating trapezoidal 
window as a "dramatic masterpiece of ambiguous stimulation". 
When we combine phrases such as "ambiguous stimulation" and 
'hppearing to be" it might be supposed that the subject is in 
doubt about what he sees, and that phenomenologically his
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experience is fuzzy, unstable or unclear. But this is not at 
all the case; if the subject assumes the rectangular shape 
and he views the stimulus monocularly, his description will 
remain stable and definite. He will unambiguously perceive 
an oscillating rectangular window frame.
The stability of this perception can be demonstrated 
by attaching to the trapezoidal shape other objects which will 
rotate syncronously with it. If a rigid tube is attached to 
the apparatus, as in Figure 8, the tube will appear to rotate 
rather than oscillate.- The assumption of rectangular!ty will 
persist in making the window oscillate. At first, subjects 
will assume the two to be pliable and under this condition 
will report that the tube "bends" around the window in order 
to accomplish its rotation. The role of cognitive factors 
can be further demonstrated by informing the subject that the 
tube is rigid. Given this information the subject will report 
that the tube appears to be cutting through the -window frame 
when the window and tube are seen to be moving in opposite 
directions. When a small cube is attached (Figure 8) to one 
end of the frame we get an even more dramatic result. The 
subjects1 report that the cube moves in a rotary motion, 
seeming to detach itself during part of its motion, and pro­
ceeds to move with no apparent source of support for half of 
its rotation.
It has been said of this stimulus that it is a master­
piece of ambiguity. Certainly, this observation cannot mean
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that the subject is in doubt or is unclear whether the window 
is oscillating or rotating. When this stimulus is viewed for 
the first time from a perspective of equivalent configurations 
by a subject raised in Western culture, he always reports, 
immediately and without doubt, that the window oscillates. We 
must conclude that Allport means by "ambiguous" to refer, not 
to the experience of this stimulus, but to his knowledge of 
the experimental history. In fact, Ames has demonstrated that 
knowledge of the two perspectives or of the experimental his­
tory of the stimulus will not in itself significantly influence 
the probabilities of either experience. This means that even 
if a person knows that he is viewing the Ames' rotating trape­
zoid when he views it from the perspective of equivalent 
configurations, he will unambiguously perceive an oscillating 
window frame.
The dramatic reports given as a result of attaching 
the tube and cube are dependent on the weight or probability 
valuation that the subject holds with respect to the assump­
tion of rectangularity. Similarly, how close one approaches 
the optimum degree of equivalence configuration is a function 
of the viewing conditions. The optimum conditions specify a 
monocular viewing of the rotating trapezoid from 20 feet away. 
The subjects' weighting of the rectangularity assumption can 
be influenced. Ames has indicated that oscillatory motion can 
be perceived when the rotating trapezoid is a simple cut-out 
of uniform color and shading, but under these circumstances
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viewing conditions must be closer to the optimum, and even then
the oscillatory effect is more tenuous. The addition of
mullions, panes and shading adds weight to the rectangularity
assumption by taking advantage of the familiarity of windows.
In his past experience the observer, in carrying out 
his purposes, has on innumerable occasions had to 
take into account and act with respect to rectangular 
forms, e.g., going through doors, locating windows, 
etc. On almost all such occasions, except in the rare 
case when his line of sight was normal to the door or 
window, the image of the rectangular configuration form 
on his retina was trapezoidal. He learned to interpret 
the particular characteristic retinal images that exist 
when he looks at doors, windows, etc., as rectangular 
forms. Moreover, he learned to interpret the partic­
ular degree of trapezoidal distortion of his retinal 
images in terms of the positioning of the rectangular 
form to his particular viewing point. These inter­
pretations do not occur at the conscious level, rather, 
they are unconscious and may be characterized as 
ASSUMPTIONS as to the probable significance of indi­
cations received from the environment. (Ames, 19511 
P. 1*0
There is cross cultural evidence which supports Ames' 
contention that such assumptions are culturally determined.
In an experiment conducted by Allport and Pettigrew (1957) it 
was shown that the degree of susceptibility to the perception 
of oscillatory motion of the rotating trapezoidal window was 
a function of the individual's past experience with rectangular 
forms, especially windows. It was of course impossible to get 
a population of subjects who had no experience with rectang­
ularity, but at least two of the groups in this experiment 
were young Zulu herdsmen with little formal education. Zulu 
culture is such that rectangular forms are not to be found 
among their artifacts. Zulu homes, windows, and doors are 
all constructed with curved lines. These subjects were tested
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with the trapezoidal window in a building of western construc­
tion, and thereby assuring that they had had at least one 
actual contact with rectangular windows. Nevertheless, in 
order for these subjects to report oscillatory motion, all 
the conditions had to be optimal, and they reported oscillatory 
motion less frequently than did western acculturated Zulu boys 
of their own age. The difference between the western accul­
turated and Zulu acculturated boys in the frequency of their 
perception of the oscillatory motion in all but optimal cir­
cumstances was statistically significant at the .001 level 
of significance.
Two important points must be emphasized in order to 
understand Ames clearly. The first one is that all percep­
tions are probabilistic, and therefore correspondence is 
between experiences and not between experiences and reality. 
Because the Ames demonstrations seem to be contrivances under 
which the individual is not operating normally, there is a 
tendency especially noticeable in secondary source accounts 
of Ames' work to view one of the perceptions as an illusion 
and the other as correct. Ames (1960) himself is hostile to 
this interpretation.
The second point to be emphasized is that the prob­
abilistic nature of perception is not revealed in the percep­
tion itself. It is for this reason that the tendency referred 
to in the last paragraph seems so natural to us. Each per­
ception has the same quality of certitude or the same degree 
of "sureness" as any other in experience until such time as an
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alternative is available. It is for this reason that the term
"ambiguous stimulus", to refer to the Ames' demonstrations, is
misleading. The ambiguity is known only to those who are
familiar with the two views. Ittelson (1960) can help us to
clarify this point.
How can anyone act in the fac e of the probability of 
failure? Action implies certainty. If the percep­
tions on which actions are based necessarily prove to 
be to some extent imperfect, and if our actions will 
inevitably be unsuccessful to this extent, we might 
eventually reach a condition where we would hesitate 
to act at all. The answer to the question is to be 
found in the nature of the perceptual process— when the 
predictive reliability of a perception becomes high 
enough we act "as if" we were dealing with certainty.
Even if the predictive reliability is low, so that we 
lack a sense of surety, when we finally do act we 
must act with certainty if we are to have any chance 
of being successful. One aspect of perceiving, then, 
is the creation of certainty out of uncertainty or 
probability. Every perception is an act of creation; 
every action is an act of faith. Every action is 
based on the belief that highly probable events are 
certain events. It is an act of faith in the relia­
bility of one's own assumptions, of faith in oneself. 
Accordingly one product of perceiving is our creation 
of a world of FUNCTIONAL absolutes. At any given moment, 
these functional absolutes are treated as if they were 
certain but, concurrently, are held open for modification. 
(Ittleson, 1960, p. 38)
The meaning of the term "interpretation" in our dis­
cussion of Ames' work may be the source of some confusion.
Many secondary sources view Ames' demonstrations and his 
functional analysis as a continuation of the Helmholtz 
"unconscious inference tradition." (Allport, 1955) There 
are aspects of this tradition which are inconsistent with 
Ames' (1960) own interpretation of his work. Generally 
speaking, unconscious inference implies that in sensation 
there are the raw qualities of experience which are subject
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to the various interpretations by perceptual processes. The 
problem with this analysis is in identifying what qualities 
are a function of sensation, and what modifications are 
attributable to perception. Though it is not explicitly 
stated in many places there is the implication that the sen­
sations, or that which is interpreted, contain the more fun­
damental qualities, and that the modifications imposed on 
these by perception are organizational and do not effect the 
basic qualities. This view of the matter is particularly 
applicable to the notion of equivalent configurations. When 
we have equivalent configurations it seems that in the stimulus 
the basic qualities such as color and size are given and that 
the process of interpretation is one which influences their 
organization. Ames (1960) himself does not subscribe to the 
distinction between sensation and perception, and holds that 
all the qualities of perception are "interpretations" or 
" prognostic directives". It must be admitted, however, that 
Ames' own demonstrations are not sufficient evidence for dis­
missing the notion that basic qualities are given in sensation.
A review of the many perceptual demonstrations devel­
oped by Ames and his colleagues at the Hanover Institute 
reveals that the kinds of configurational equivalencies Ames 
worked with were in the broadest sense geometrical. That is, 
the features of stimulus array, which he demonstrated could 
be perceived in more than one way, tended to be holistic and 
organizational. It Is possible to interpret the Ames' dem­
onstrations as instances of the perceptual reorganization of
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of more elementary sensory input. For this reason it is 
desirable to look for another source of experimental informa­
tion which demonstrates that other than organizational char­
acteristics are the function of perceptual interpretation.
Ivo Kohler 0 9 6 1*) conducted an experiment which re­
lied on a principle that resembles Ames' equivalent config­
uration; it demonstrated that at least one so-called "basic 
quality" is not given in sensation, but is as much the func­
tion of interpretation as are organizational qualities. In 
this experiment Kohler wore prismatic lenses for a long 
period of time. The effect of wearing such lenses is well 
known. When they are first put on, the lenses distort the 
subject's perception in a direction consistent with the 
optical transformations. But with continued use under con­
ditions in which the individual is involved in activity, the 
visual perceptual processes compensate for the optical trans­
formation and render the transformation "normal". Upon 
removing the transformation lenses, there is a prolonged per­
iod of aftereffects which distorts the visual perception in 
exactly the opposite direction from the optical transformation 
of the lenses. For example, if the lenses worn distorted 
straight vertical lines so as to curve them to the left, then 
the aftereffect of removing these lenses would be to perceive 
straight vertical lines as curved to the right. Presumably, 
the reason for this opposite effect is that the optical input 
is still being transformed or interpreted as though the person
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was wearing the lenses, and what was a compensating transforma­
tion now becomes the source of distortion.
The specific kind of transformation which is of inter­
est to us here is one which deals with color perception. The 
reason for our interest in color perception is that color is 
usually considered one of the "basic qualities" which is given 
us by sensation. In this respect, color is sharply distinguished 
from such qualities as curvature and texture, which seem to be 
more subject to interpretation. In this experiment Kohler’s 
prismatic lenses diffracted light so as to produce small rain­
bows of color. Much to Kohler's own surprise, he discovered 
that there was a complementary aftereffect which gave him the 
experience of seeing the opposite end of the rainbow along the 
contours of white objects whenever he removed his prismatic 
lenses.
The diffracted color bands seen upon putting on the 
lenses for the first time came as no surprise. They were 
fully predictable from our knowledge of optics. The discovery 
of the complementary color after-effect was absolutely unpre­
dictable. This kind of aftereffect simply would not be antic­
ipated from our knowledge of color after-effects, and in fact 
it is inconsistent with all existing theories of color percep­
tion. We quote directly from Kohler's (196*f) diary to capture 
some of the excitement that he experienced in this serendipitous 
discovery. The account refers to Kohler's experience at the 
time when he removed his lenses and gave them to someone else
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to look through. The two men compared one another's perceptions 
of the room, Kohler's companion gave a description commensurate 
with what is known about the prismatic distortions which occur 
prior to a period of adaptation while Kohler's description re­
sults from having worn the lenses for a long period and there­
fore are after-effects from adaptation.
Finally, he casually mentioned that the edges had 
colored bands. He was referring to the vertical 
beam, on the right side of the window, which was 
illuminated by the light on the ceiling and stood 
out in sharp contrast from the rest of the window, 
which was dark. I asked him what the color was, 
but before he told me I clearly noticed— without 
spectacles— that it was a YELLOWISH-RED, belonging to 
the longwave extreme of my spectrum, and that it ap­
peared on the outermost edge of the white crossbars.
I was so struck by this observation that I seized 
the spectacles and put them on myself. Lo and be­
hold, the edge glimmered in a beautiful, saturated 
blue. I tried this experiment over and over again, 
until late into the night, on all kinds of objects.
The result was always the same. Whenever I looked 
at an edge without the spectacles, I saw a dim 
yellowish-red or bluish-violet band: as soon as
I looked at it through the spectacles, the edge took 
on a complementary hue. (Kohler, 1964-, pp. 60-69)
These after-effect colors were complementary in sev­
eral ways to the ones induced by the prismatic lenses* The 
first and most important of these complementarities was be­
tween the ends of the spectrum seen as an after-effect and 
with the lenses. The color bands seen with the lenses were 
at the short end, while those seen as an after-effect were 
at the long end of the spectrum. The optimum conditions for 
seeing the color bands were also complementary opposites.
With the lenses, the color bands were most conspicuous under 
bright sunlight illumination, while the after-effect bands 
were seen most conspicuously at dusk or under artificial 
illumination.
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Kohler was surprised to find that there were these 
color after-effects because such an after-effect suggested 
that the color perceptions were subjective. Our notions con­
cerning color perception rely on a correlation between bio­
chemical activity in the retina, and the frequency of light 
stimulation. The reason Kohler's findings are anomalous is 
that they could not be connected to the frequency of light 
stimulation unless the transformation came between the source 
of stimulation and the retina, as was the case with the pris­
matic lenses. Kohler then naturally hypothesized that the 
adaptation effects were to "prismatize" the lens of the eye 
in order to counterbalance the optical diffraction of the 
prismatic lenses. Such an effect on the lens of the eye would 
account for all the phenomena observed. Kohler devised an 
experiment to test this hypothesis. He merely put himself in 
a room in which the only light source was incandescent sodium 
which produces light which is homogeneous and cannot be 
diffracted.
The results of this attempt were unequivocal: even
in the homogeneous sodium light, I saw TOTH or WITHOUT 
spectacles the SAME color bands which in normal day­
light I could see only WITHOUT spectacles. This 
evidence clearly indicated that the phenomenon in 
question was a purely subjective one, that is, a 
specific kind of afterimage. (Kohler, 196*f, pp.
69-70)
The significance of these findings and their connec­
tion to Ames' work rests in their similarity to Ames' prin­
ciple of equivalent configuration. What Kohler shows us is 
that for a perceptual quality as basic as color there can
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more than one kind of stimulation; that the experience of 
color depends as much upon what the individual brings to the 
situation as upon the situation itself. It also makes explicit 
that assumptions may be viewed as unconscious mechanisms. The 
prismatic adaptation of the visual perceptual system is anal­
ogous in Kohler's experiment to the assumption of rectangularity 
with respect to trapezoidal retinal images of windows. The 
only difference is that it is easier for us to believe that we 
can have perceptual assumptions about'geometry, than it is for 
us to believe that we can have such assumptions about hue.
With each anomaly that we have discussed so far, we 
have tried to develop parallels between material taken from 
perception, or the psychological realm, and material taken 
from other science, or the physical realm. Finding such 
parallels is important to our central theme: perception and
observation are essentially the same kind of activities, and 
one set of principles should be capable of encompassing them 
both. The physical parallel to Ames (1960) and Kohler (1961*) 
is given to us by Heisenberg (1958A, 1958B) in his famous in­
determinacy principle and by Bohr (1962) in his principle of 
complementarity. These two principles of quantum physics are 
the essence of what is referred to as the Copenhagen inter­
pretation. The Copenhagen interpretation is an account of 
quantum mechanics which, for the vast majority of physicists, 
is at the present time the only acceptable account. We will 
accept the Copenhagen interpretation without delineating its 
relationship to earlier more classical interpretation, such
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as Born's (1960), or what some would consider presently com­
peting interpretations, such as DeBroglie's (1960) hidden 
variable interpretation. It will suffice to say that the 
Copenhagen interpretation is the only available account which 
does not require the addition of special constructs for each 
case of quantum phenomena. The hidden variable theories in 
their present development have not been successful in present­
ing one account for all the various phenomena, but must resort 
to the use of unparsimonious special rules. (Capek, 1961; 
Jammer, 1966; Putnam, 1965)
Our concern with indeterminacy and complementarity 
does not rest on an intrinsic curiosity about the physics for 
which they were developed to deal. Instead we are Interested 
in these principles because they represent a fundamental 
change in the epistemology of physics. This fundamental change 
is conceptually equivalent to the changes urged by the trans- 
actionalists in the field of perception. Indeterminacy and 
complementarity suggest the same kind of transition for our 
notion of "property” in physics that the transactionalists 
wish to bring about in our notion of "qualities" in perception.
It is necessary to begin at the level of phenomena in 
order to understand how indeterminacy and complementarity com­
bine to resolve the problems inherent in quantum mechanics and 
also to change our epistemological account of properties. As 
a starting point, we will present two eaqaeriments which give 
us seemingly anomolous information concerning the nature of 
elementary particles.
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The first of these is Einstein's (1905) interpretation 
of the photoelectric phenomenon. In a typical photoelectric 
experiment a source of ultraviolet light which is mono-chromatic 
is shown upon a metal surface. The result is that electrons 
are given off by the metal. The older wave theory of light 
could have predicted that the light energy would increase the 
energy levels in the metal, and consequently that electrons 
would be emitted. The problem with the classical interpreta­
tion was that the energy of light was held to be a function of 
the light intensity; consequently, a classical prediction was 
that as one increases the intensity of the light the emission 
of electrons begins at an intensity threshold and proceeds to 
increase in proportion to the light intensity increments.
Such a prediction does not square with experimental evidence 
that no intensity of red light could produce the photoelectric 
phenomenon, while very low intensities of ultra-violet light 
would produce electron emission. Einstein related the connec­
tion between energy and frequency to a similar relationship that 
Planck had noticed in black-body radiation. He demonstrated 
the accuracy of Planck's formula E = hv, wherein E is the 
energy of the light, or photon, and v is the frequency of the 
light wave, while h is Planck's constant. In other words, 
Einstein was saying that light was made up of particular 
photons, each having an equal amount of energy, and that that 
energy is a function of the frequency of the light, not its 
intensity. The intensity of the light governed only the 
number of photons carried by a light wave. Given that the
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photons were of sufficient energy to cause electron emission 
in metal, then an increase in their number or in the intensity 
of the light would increase the number of electron emissions. 
However, below a certain frequency an increase in intensity 
would not produce any photoelectric emission.
What is most important at this point is that in 
Einstein's solution E = hv there is a curious mixture of par­
ameters taken from classical mechanics and classical optics. 
Energy (E) which is a parameter of particles in classical 
mechanics, is said to be a function of frequency (v), which 
is a parameter of waves in optics. The photoelectric effect 
clearly demonstrates that light comes in quanta, particles of 
energy, but the value of such particles can be determined by 
observing one of light's wave characteristics.
The seeming contradiction in E = hv is amplified when 
we consider another phenomencnof quantum mechanics, which is 
the interference of electrons. Elementary units of matter 
were classically considered to be particles, but in deBroglie's 
(19^-^2) interpretation of the interference of electrons we 
find that such elementary particles as electrons are asso­
ciated with a wave characteristic which is frequency.
Interference was first demonstrated by Young. (Silva, 
1969) In this simple experiment Young pierced two small 
holes in a screen and light shone through these two openings. 
When one of the openings was covered up, the pattern of light 
that was projected on the surface behind the screen was 
homogeneous and circular. When light was shown through both
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openings, the projected pattern which resulted contained 
bright and shaded striped areas. Young (Silva, 1969) inter­
preted this to mean that light was a wave and that the projec­
ted pattern resulted from the cancelling and amplification 
which occur when waves interfere. What deBroglie was interes­
ted in explaining was that a similar interference pattern can 
be obtained by projecting electrons through two slits onto a 
surface which is capable of showing scintillation points 
resulting from electron contacts. His problem was exactly 
reversed from that of Einstein1s in the photoelectric phen­
omenon. Einstein (1905) started with the knowledge of a wave 
characteristic of light and wished to account for its seeming 
particle behavior; deBroglie (19l*0-2) began with the knowledge 
of particular matter and wished to explain seeming wavelike 
behavior. deBroglie concluded that for an electron with the 
mass M there would be associated a wave with the frequency 
which can be determined by the formula hv = me2. From this 
he was able to calculate the wave length of any given parti­
cle. We are faced with a situation in which parameters class­
ically associated with waves can be used to calculate the 
values of parameters usually associated with particles, or 
vice versa. It is this dilemma which the principles of indeter­
minacy and complementarity clarify, and in so doing change the 
epistemological status of properties. How can it be that light 
behaves like a shower of particles and elementary particles 
behave like waves? How can seemingly contradictory properties 
such as wave length and energy both be descriptive of the same 
thing?
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Heisenberg (1930) arrived at his principle of uncer­
tainty by means of a thought experiment. He realized that in 
experiments such as those in which interference patterns were 
obtained from a scattering of elementary particles there was 
an inherent conceptual difficulty in which the classical 
language of optics and mechanics was 'being mixed together in 
a way simply not feasible in classical physics. In his thought 
experiment Heisenberg tried to trace the trajectory of an 
elementary particle in the same way trajectories are traced 
in classical mechanics.
We can extend his thought experiment to apply to the 
interference experiment already described. In describing the 
trajectory of a particle, two parameters are necessary, 
position and momentum. We can calculate the position of a 
particle from knowing the probabilities of its arrival at a 
particular point on the scintillation screen. deBroglie's 
equations allow us to calculate precisely the probabilities 
of such scintillations, and therefore through retrodiction 
we can establish where a particle must have been if it went 
through the slit and caused this particular scintillation.
But if we wish, at the same time, to know the parameter 
momentum of that particle we must attach a device to the slit 
which is attached to the framework by an elastic connection; 
so that as particles go through the slit some of them will 
collide with our measuring instrument and give us an estimate 
of their velocity. If we do this we will find that we have 
destroyed the interference pattern on the scintillation
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screen. The loss of that interference pattern, however, makes 
the measure of position impossible. It may appear that this 
is unique to the situation, hut physicists have come to rea­
lize that this is in fact an example of a principle which is 
true for all complementary parameters in quantum mechanics.
The principle is simply that one can never obtain an accurate 
measure of both position and momentum at the same time.
Stating the principle positively, we can say that the measur­
ing of one of the pair to arbitrary accuracy necessarily 
reduces the possibility of equally accurate measurement of 
the other of the pair. (Frank, 195^5 Silva, Lochak, 1969)
The reader must be warned against a very common mis­
interpretation since we are all subject to what Putnam (1965) 
calls the assumption of "no disturbance." "The measurement 
does not disturb the observable measured— i.e., the obser­
vable has almost the same value at an instant before the 
measurement as it does at the moment the measurement is taken." 
(Putnam, 1965» P* 83)
In making the assumption of no disturbance we are led 
to believe that before measuring either position or momentum, 
a particle existed which had both position and momentum, but 
that by virtue of taking one of the measurements we disrupted 
the other. This is a metaphysical position which by virtue 
of the principle of indeterminacy could never be subjected to 
an empirical test. Heisenberg (1958B) makes very clear that 
for an elementary particle to possess both position and mom­
entum, at equal degrees of accuracy, is a mathematical as well as
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a physical impossibility. The formalism of wave mechanics 
does not allow for the description of a packed wave, which is 
what high accuracy in both parameters would imply.
Bohr's (1962) principle of complementarity is an
1
extension of the logic of indeterminacy. It maintains that 
seemingly contradictory properties may be ascribed to the 
same system because they are experimentally exclusive of one 
another. Wave and particle characteristics which are intui­
tively contradictory are in fact complementary, since no ex­
periment can be devised which allows you to measure a wave 
characteristic accurately which does not, at the same time, 
preclude the accurate measurement of a particle characteris­
tic. Jammer (1966) makes clear the relationship between this 
notion of complementarity and Heisenberg's principle of indet­
erminacy.
For the interaction between the object of observation 
and the agency of observation— which interaction in 
accordance with the quantum postulate cannot be 
neglected as it could in classical physics— makes it
1
Jammer (1966) offers documentary evidence to counter 
the popular notion that Bohr took directly from Heisenberg's 
principle, merely extending his logic. Bohr did not have the 
interest in formalism that Heisenberg had and the historical 
evidence suggests that Bohr had considered complementarity as 
a solution to the dual nature of light before he became fam­
iliar with Heisenberg's indeterminacy. Nevertheless, it is 
still legitimate to say that indeterminacy and complementarity 
are logically the same principle. Whether it is expressed by 
saying that indeterminacy is a logical deduction from com­
plementarity, or that complementarity was generalized from 
indeterminacy is a moot point. We will see in the discussion 
that Jammer promotes the idea that Bohr got his notion of 
complementarity from William James.
impossible to separate sharply the behavior of the 
atomic system from the effect on the measuring instru­
ment whose behavior must be expressed in classical 
terms. By combining the atomic system with different 
classically descriptable devices one may measure 
complementary variables, and by expressing the results 
of these measurements in classical terms one may des­
cribe an atomic system in terms of complementary 
classical pictures. (Jammer, 1966, p. 3^8)
It is important to note what happens to the notion of 
physical property, according to Bohr and Heisenberg. Which of 
the two contradictory properties will be observed depends on 
the instruments and the decisions of the observer as much as 
on the system being observed. There are similarities between 
what we have said here about properties of experimentally ob­
served physical systems and what we said before about the 
qualities experienced in the perceptual experiments of Ames 
and Kohler. In all of these cases it is impossible to separate 
factors in the observer from factors in the observed. Another 
interesting similarity between the aforementioned observations 
is that they all seem to be cases of complementarity. The 
simplest example for intuitive appreciation is the case of the 
reversible figure. In each of these cases we are led by common 
sense after experiencing the complementary properties; in the 
case of the goblet and the profiles we ask, "But what is it 
really?" We must be careful not to confuse common sense with 
scientific procedures, for as Putnam (1969) says about the 
Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics, experimental 
evidence must be preferred to intuitive conviction.
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CHAPTER VI
THE EFFECTS OF THE ANOMALIES ON 
THE ASSUMPTION OF OBJECTIVITY
One way to evaluate the significance of the anomalies 
presented in the previous chapter is to review the five models 
presented in Chapter IV in order to assess how each deals with 
the anomalies. An alternative, and hopefully more economical 
approach, is to deal with the notion of objectivity directly. 
We have seen that there are two features of objectivity; these 
are independence and certainty. Chapter IV presented alterna­
tive ways which have been proposed to establish independence 
and certainty. In this section we will take each of these 
independently and see whether the anomalies give us any rea­
son for preferring any of these over the others.
The most important method for establishing the indep­
endence of knowledge has been to establish an epistemic root, 
wherein certain elements of knowledge have been specified to 
be independent. These roots or independent elements are 
usually called facts, and a fact is established by means of 
objective observation. Not all proponents of independent 
knowledge wish to rely upon observed facts for establishing 
credence. There are some exceptions among philosophers of 
science; most notable among these is Karl Popper, (1959) who 
has suggested an alternative to a reliance on objective per­
ception for establishing independence. Before we can deal 
with such alternative suggestions we must review the several 
methods of establishing factuality through observation. As
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was Indicated in Chapter IV there is a great deal of agreement 
concerning the proposition that there are facts, but not as 
much agreement as to how it can be established that any partic­
ular proposition is a fact. There also is agreement concerning 
the notion that facts are established through observation, but 
the exact meaning of observation differs for each of the five 
models presented in Chapter IV. Each seeks to establish an 
indubitable, a primitive of experience about whose indepen­
dence there can be no doubt.
Lockean realism, which divides experience into primary 
and secondary qualities, is not an epistemology which is taken 
seriously by philosophers and psychologists today; but in an 
alternative form it is still a viable epistemology for many 
practicing scientists. As was pointed out in Chapter IV, one 
of the most appealing aspects of the primary/secondary dis­
tinction, is that it parallels the often made distinction 
between quantifiable and nonquantifiable variables. According 
to this distinction scientific progress is made by extending 
quantitative techniques, since it is by quantifying variables 
that we establish their independence from the observer. In 
other words, this form of realism maintains that we establish 
the primitives of experience by their quantiflability.
Using quantifiability as a criterion of independence 
is based on the common sense assumption that our number sys­
tem is either neutral or empirical. There is growing agree­
ment that such number systems are in fact relative conventions. 
It was demonstrated in Chapter V that the geometry one uses
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is neither neutral nor empirical and that the choice of a 
geometry makes a difference in the description obtained. Ad­
vancements in our description are therefore not dependent on 
improvements in the realm of observation alone. Non-Euclidean 
geometry gave Einstein (Polanyi, 1967-68) a new way of looking, 
not a better look at the universe. The differences in the 
descriptions obtained, using Euclidean and non-Euclidean 
geometries, cannot be ascribed to empirical progress alone.
The discussion of the role of patterning in Chapter V 
suggests another difficulty in relying on quantiflability as 
a criterion of independence. The variables selected to be 
quantified are not selected by standards which are inherent 
in the system of quantification. Even if it is agreed that 
Aristotle’s and Galileo’s descriptions of a swinging body are 
equally objective, because they are both quantifiable, it 
would be impossible to maintain that the variables quantified 
are independent of the observer's conceptual system.
As we have seen, logical positivists subscribe to two 
fundamental tenets. The first of these is that there are 
only two kinds of knowledge, analytic and synthetic, or formal 
and empirical. This distinction is one which both phenomenal- 
ists and physicalists agree to. The second fundamental tenet 
of logical positivism is the belief in a principle of verif­
ication. Phenomenalists and physicalists are not in agreement 
on the exact nature of verification. We shall, therefore, 
deal with the first of the two fundamental tenets and leave 
the discussion of verification for later. Each of the three
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anomalies casts doubt on our ability to separate the formal 
from the empirical aspects of knowledge. Philosophical crit­
icisms of the analytic-synthetic distinction based on logical 
and linguistic analysis are available from Quine (1953) and 
Putnam (1962). Putnam (1962) tells us that among the most 
convincing evidence for the logical empirical distinction is 
the abundance of everyday examples. Statements such as "Bach­
elors are all unmarried males!' are clearcut instances of 
analytic statements, which sharply contrast with statements 
of the type "There is a book on the table." Quine (1953) and 
Putnam (1962) give linguistic and logical arguments why such 
examples are not correct, despite their intuitive appeal. The 
three anomalies presented in Chapter V can be seen as counter 
examples to the belief in the analytic/synthetic distinction.
In the first anomaly we demonstrated that the descrip­
tion of a space depends as much on the geometry and coordin- 
ative measurement conventions as it does on observations. The 
two descriptions of a curvilinear 3 dimensional Euclidean space 
and the 2 dimensional non-Euclidean space of positive curvature, 
depicted in Figures and 5 on pp. 1*t1 and 1^2 could be com­
plementary descriptions of the same real space given that the 
instrumentation of the non-Euclidean coordinative definition 
of measurement were physically available. The reason physicists 
can choose between one or another geometry is because they 
elect to keep coordinative definitions constant. Such coordin­
ative definitions are arbitrary; it is not possible to establish
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them empirically. This means that the selection between geom­
etries is a logical impossibility, not a technical impossibility.
There is an impossibility of making measurements which 
is due to the limitation of our technical means; I 
shall call it TECHNICAL IMPOSSIBILITY. In addition, 
there is a LOGICAL IMPOSSIBILITY of measurement. Even 
if we had a perfect experimental technique, we should 
not be able to avoid this logical impossibility. It 
is logically impossible to determine whether the stand­
ard meter in Paris is really a meter. The highest 
refinement of our geodetic instruments does''not teach 
us anything about this problem, because the meter can­
not be defined in absolute terms. This is the reason 
why the measuring rod in Paris is called the definition 
of a meter. It is arbitrarily defined as the unit, and 
the question whether it really represents this unit has 
lost its meaning. The same considerations hold for a 
comparison of units at distant places. Here we are not 
dealing with technical limitations, but with a logical 
impossibility. The impossibility of a determination 
of the shape of a surface, if universal forces are 
admitted, is not due to a deficiency of our instru­
ments, BUT IS THE CONSEQUENCE OF AN UNPRECISE QUESTION.
The question concerning the shape of the surface has 
not precise formulation, unless it is preceded by a 
coordinative definition of congruence. What is to 
be understood by "the shape of a real surface"?
Whatever experiments and measurements I make, they 
will never furnish a unique indication of the shape 
of the surface. If universal forces are admitted, the 
measurements may be interpreted in such a way that many 
different shapes of surfaces are compatible with the 
same observations. There is one definition which 
closes the logical gap and tells us which interpreta­
tions of our observations must be eliminated: this
task is preformed by the coordinative definition.
It gives a precise meaning to the question of the 
shape of the real surface and makes a unique answer 
possible, just as a question about length has a 
unique meaning only when the unit of measurement is 
given. It is not a technical failure that prevents 
us from determining the shape of a surface without 
a coordinative definition of congruence, but a 
logical impossibility that has nothing to do with 
the limitations of human abilities. (Reichenbach,
1958, pp. 28-29)
It is often said that the differences between 
Euclidean and non-Euclidean descriptions of the same space 
are not significant differences, but are of the same order
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as the differences between meters and feet. Within the science 
of physics the debate over this question is still not resolved. 
Those who maintain that geometries are mere conventions are 
charged with the responsibility of making available translation 
rules which will demonstrate that the differences between 
geometries do not make a difference in physical geometry. As 
it is, in order to maintain a single set of coordinated defin­
itions of measurement, it was necessary for Einstein (Reichen­
bach, 1958) to use non-Euclidean geometry in his Relativity 
description of gravity. To extend the Euclidean geometry of 
Newton's universe would have required a change in our defini­
tions of measurement and this would have presented complica­
tions far more disruptive than a change in geometry.
Leaving the problem of physical geometry for the 
physicist to resolve, we are still faced with the epistemo- 
logical consequences of the fact that Euclidean descriptions 
are not unique. The most important of these consequences is 
that the Euclidean physicalistic can no longer be relied upon 
as a standard for realistic description. The fact that such 
Euclidean descriptions are not unique physicalistic descrip­
tions means that there is no justification for giving them 
primacy over phenomenological descriptions since the latter 
may come to encompass all of the former.
The anomaly of the pendulum versus the body in con­
strained fall is also an example of our inability to draw the 
line between facts and ideas. If we maintain that Aristotle's 
description of a body in constrained fall and Galileo's des­
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cription of a pendulum are both factual, then we are forced to 
admit that some factual descriptions are somehow better than 
others, even though they both maintain the same degree of ob­
jectivity.
If, on the other hand, we wish to draw the line between 
facts and ideas at an even lower point we may choose to say 
that the terms "pendulum" and "body in constrained fall" are 
ideas which represent interpretations of the facts. According­
ly, the facts are viewed as the measurements taken. The ob­
vious difficulty with this account of the matter is that the 
two ideas are not dealing with the same facts.
If we followed this logic to its natural conclusion 
we will still have to conclude that "body in constrained fall" 
is probably the best interpretation to refer jointly to the 
parameters in which Aristotle was interested. Consequently, 
we still do not have a basis for preferring one description 
over the other.
The anomaly of the pendulum not only demonstrates 
the difficulty of drawing the line between analytic and synthe­
tic, but it also violates the other basic tenet of positivism, 
which is that factuality is established via a verification 
principle. According to the positivist's verification principle 
the meaning of a proposition is discoverable in the method of 
its verification. The method of verification for either the 
Galilean or Aristotelian descriptions involved taking certain 
measurements, but it is not correct to say that these measure­
ments alone define the meaning of "pendulum" or "body in
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contrained fall". In order to take the right measurements in 
the right order, one first must have the idea that selects the 
relevant parameters. When looking at a swinging body, no num­
ber of observations of its weight, the height to which it had 
been raised, and the time required for it to achieve rest, would 
ever lead to the conclusion that what is being observed is a 
pendulum. The difficulty in reducing the verification or 
perception to a set of physically observable operations, is 
that the ideas which select and organize the operations are 
not themselves inherent in those operations. It follows that 
verification principles can only be used to account for con­
firmation, they cannot be used to account for discovery or 
learning. There are more difficulties with the verification 
principles than the fact that they cannot account for the 
context of discovery. These other difficulties differ for 
physicalists and phenomenal!sts, and, therefore, will be con­
sidered later. At this point we wish to limit our comments 
in such a way that they apply to all positivists, whether they 
be physicalists or phenomenalists.
Nowhere is the distinction between formal and empir­
ical more clearly violated than in the case of microphysical 
measurement. The instrument or apparatus in an experiment is 
a physical representation (a coordinative definition) of the 
experimenter1s formalism, just as is a ruler in the simple 
measurement situation. The Copenhagen interpretation holds 
that in principle there is always interaction between instru­
ment and system in the quantum physical situation. Whether
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one measures a wave or particle characteristic depends on the 
instrument one uses. Complementarity further indicates that 
if you choose to actualize a wave characteristic you thereby 
automatically eliminate the possibility of actualizing a parti­
cle characteristic. They are mutually exclusive, yet com­
plementary descriptions.
The data in a quantum experiment is in principle 
different from that which we usually think of as data. Data 
traditionally are attributable to the system under investi­
gation. In the quantum situation, the data refer to the re­
lationship between the system and the instrument. A change in 
instruments means a change in the knowledge of the system.
This means that you cannot separate discussion of the phen­
omena from discussion of the instruments by which they are 
studied. The phenomena have no specifiable characteristics 
of their own, but can be viewed only as they relate to other 
systems.
The three anomalies are also directly relevant to the 
two prevalent points of view within positivism about the nature 
of the primitives of observation and perception. The phenomen- 
alists are in agreement that an observer must be present so 
that there can be sense data, but any normal observer with 
the right training will be able to verify a scientific obser­
vation. This belief is obviously based on the idea that sen­
sation, if not perception, is the same for all "normal" human 
beings. The first difficulty with this point of view rests 
in the assumption that someplace in the complex perceptual
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apparatus of man there are some fundamental qualities which 
stand in a one to one relation or perfect correspondence with 
their source of stimulation. The search for such elements of 
consciousness has long been abandoned by psychology, but the 
belief in their existence is still strong, particularly among 
theorists who distinguish between sensation and perception.
The phenomena most anomalous to this point of view is that which 
was given to us in Kohler's (196*+) experiment with prismatic 
lenses. Frequently, in the writings of phenomenalists, "patches 
of color" are used as examples of sense data. Kohler's (196*0 
experiment demonstrates that color cannot be used as an example 
of sense data, since the experience of it can arise from more 
than one set of physical conditions. It does not depend ex­
clusively upon a perfect correspondence to the frequency of 
light arriving at the eye. Phenomenalists attempt to refute 
the argument from hallucinations by holding that they are 
ideographic peculiarities. In Kohler's (196*f) experiment, as 
in Ames' demonstrations, (1960) we are not dealing with the 
perceptions of madmen, but clear cut demonstrations that 
sensation is influenced by experiential and conceptual factors which 
may be shared by all the Individuals in a culture, thereby 
influencing what each of them experiences in the same way 
without being attributable to a direct correspondence to the 
source of stimulation.
The case of Euclidean geometry is a good example of a 
culturally acquired set of descriptive biases, which is so 
widespread in Western culture that many thinkers, such as
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Kant (1963), attributed them to man's native intelligence. The 
ability to visualize or in other ways rely on psychological 
capacities in dealing with Euclidean geometry, means that 
Euclidean assumptions are to most of us perceptual mechanisms, 
operating at the same level as Kohler1s diffraction mechanism 
in the prismatic lens experiment.
If we are prepared to admit that the experience of sense 
data, such as color, can be influenced by past experience, then 
how do we evaluate sense data with respect to the criterion of 
independence? In the first place, phenomenalists were never 
committed to the notion that the sense data were independent 
of the observer. They were merely committed to the notion of 
intersubjective reliability. As was pointed out in the last 
paragraph, this implies that similar stimuli give rise to 
similar sensations, even though phenomenalists need not commit 
themselves to this metaphysical position.
If this option is excluded and phenomenalism is defended 
in terms of intersubjective agreement, then we have the diffi­
culty of defining what is meant by "normal observer". When 
Kohler's (196*+), colleague, looking through the prismatic lenses, 
saw the violet end of the spectrum everywhere Kohler (196*0 saw 
the red end, do we say that one of these men is a normal ob­
server, and the other not? Or perhaps, we will maintain that 
neither observer was normal. Either of these possibilities 
seem defensible, but each has the consequence of placing cul­
tural limitations or sociological brackets around our scien­
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tific propositions. This seems to run counter to the initial 
reasons for resorting to sense data as the indubitable.
In Chapter IV we pointed out that, for the most part, 
logical empiricists abandoned sense data as the primitive of 
knowledge in favor of physical objects. The physicalists do 
not avoid many of the problems of logical positivism by going 
from sense data to physical objects. In the first place, 
physicalists tend to assume that there is no need to explain 
what a physical object is; but the case of the swinging stone 
demonstrates how the same physical object can be described 
physicalistically, in more than one way, with very different 
outcomes. We have also shown that there is no sense in 
appealing to the distinction between measurements and inter­
pretations of measurements, since it is the interpretation 
that governs which measurments will be taken. Furthermore, 
the same logic can be carried one step further to demonstrate 
that each measurement is based on certain complexes of assump­
tions and coordinative definitions, as was demonstrated in 
our discussion of geometry. The case of the pendulum is par­
ticularly relevant to this point since it later became part 
of a coordinative definition of time. The interplay between 
ideas and instruments is striking when we think of Galileo, 
noting the regularity between his own pulse and time per 
swing of the pendulum. The evolution of the concept of time 
was such that pendulum clocks would someday be used to 
establish the regularity of the human pulse.
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We have seen that another suggested primitive was an 
intuitive configuration. Kant (1963), who was the father of 
the intuitive configuratist's tradition, believed that the 
basis for such intuition was a priori synthetic knowledge.
Among the elements of Kant's (1963) a priori synthetic know­
ledge was Euclidean geometry. By a priori Kant (1963) meant 
that geometry, as well as other parts of the a priori synthetic 
were not learned from experience, but were part of man's innate 
abilities. For Kant the a priori synthetic ordered and organ­
ized sensation into perception; therefore, in order to identify 
the a priori synthetic, experience was necessary, since its 
influence could only be detected in experience. By synthetic, 
Kant meant that this intuitive innate capacity told us some­
thing about the real world in much the same way that, geometri­
cal axioms led to specific knowledge about real triangles in 
the physical world.
The discovery and elaboration of non-Euclidean geom­
etry is a serious setback to Kant's (1963) notion of the 
a priori synthetic, particularly if it is not possible to 
establish any logical or physical basis for preferring Euclid­
ean geometries to non-Euclidean geometries. Because many 
neo-Kantians maintained that the intuitive visualizing of 
Euclidean geometry demonstrated its claim to primacy,
Poincare (1953) and Reichenbach (1958) were very concerned 
to demonstrate that non-Euclidean relationships could be 
visualized by those who are familiar enough with the conse­
quences of its axioms.
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Kant's a priori synthetic asserted that the origin of 
geometry was not empirical, but that geometrical knowledge was 
synthetic. This assertion means that empirical techniques 
would allow us to demonstrate that the geometry is in fact a 
physical geometry. There are in these relationships beliefs 
which are similar to those held by the gestalt psychologists. 
According to the gestalt psychologists, the principles of 
organization were innate and immediate, but according to the 
principle of isomorphism they were also a phenomenon influen­
cing the natural environment. For this reason, the same 
principles of organization influenced the stimulus (physical 
gestalten), the neurological processes (physiological gestal- 
ten), and perception (phenomenological gestalten).
As THINGS, phenomenal objects have definite proper­
ties. Apart from their resistance to distortion we 
have encountered their impenetrability, and their 
inertia, according to which bigger objects move more 
slowly than smaller ones. This correspondence be­
tween phenomenal and real things is, according to our 
theory, not primarily a matter of experience— although 
we do not deny that experience may influence thing 
properties— but the direct result of organization. 
Psychophysically, the process distributions which 
correspond to perceived things must in several re­
spects be similar to physical things, and therefore 
we must, on the basis of isomorphism, conclude that 
behavioral things have autochthonously characteristics 
similar to real things. Here, as in so many other 
fields, a purely empiristic theory is bound to run in 
a vicious circle. Our theory avoids not only this but 
at the same time a Kantian apriorism. (Koffka, 1935j 
P. 305)
The experiments of Ames (1960) and Kohler (196*+) 
suggest that the principles of organization are not innate 
or natural, but dependent upon experience. The discovery of 
perceptual learning, as exemplified in the adaptation phen­
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omena in Kohler's (196M-) experiment, and the cultural depend­
ence of assumptive worlds in Allport's (1957) experiment, have 
effects on the gestalt principle of isomorphism that are sim­
ilar to those that the discovery of non-Euclidean geometry 
had on Kantian a priorism. The belief in a priorism and 
isomorphism were abandoned, but the belief in intuitive spatial 
organization and perceptual insight remained.
Once the principle was established that the forms of 
perception— and by extension the forms of belief—  
were mind-dependent and not determined by the intrin­
sic character of things perceived, it was only 
necessary to add that these forms were themselves a 
function of psycho- and socio-dynamic development, and 
one went from Kantianism to all the verities of sub­
jectivism, relativism, and cultural determinism that 
have at once plagued and enriched modern philosophi­
cal thought. (Hawkins, pp. ^-^9)
Configuration!sm as a philosophy of science was
m
promulgated by Kohler (1967) as a method to achieve superior 
knowledge, but Kohler (1967) explicitly accepted that physi­
cal gestalten contained their own pattern of organization.
This pattern was not imposed upon the phenomena. Using this 
approach, Kohler (1967) would have a criterion for preferring 
certain physical descriptions over others, since it was pos­
sible to give' accurate descriptions that lacked insight into 
the physical gestalt. Such insightful descriptions could be 
distinguished by virtue of their internal harmony and by 
virtue of their consistency with the rest of acquired know­
ledge.
More recent configuration!st philosophers of science, 
such as Hanson (1958) and Polanyi, (1967-68, 1958) have aban­
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doned the principle of isomorphism, viewing the patterning as 
the influence of the conceptual on the observational. These 
patterns are seen as evidence of conceptual creativity. As 
we pointed out previously, Hanson (1958) and Polanyi (1967-68, 
1958) both subscribe to the notion that only the details sub­
sumed under the pattern are subject to empirical test.
Polanyi (1967-68, 1958) in particular maintains that patterns 
in the history of science can only be evaluated on the basis 
of consistency and coherence criteria. Polanyi (1967-6 8,
1958) has collected examples of scientifically sound research 
which have been ignored or denied by various disciplines be­
cause their results do not fit in to the prevailing paradigm.1
The configurationist philosophers of science tend to 
agree that the meaning of consistency and coherence is to be 
defined by the standards by which an explanation is accepted. 
If this is the case then there is a sense in which the Copen­
hagen interpretation is an indication of a change in our 
fundamental notions of consistency and coherence. The prin­
ciple of complementarity in fact elevates inconsistency to 
the level of understanding. Certainly in classical physics 
the properties of objects must be stable in space and time, 
and cannot be inconsistent with one another. According to 
complementarity, properties only exist when they are being 
observed, and therefore need not be consistent with one
1
One example, familiar to psychologists, is the 
experimental work on ESP by Rhine. (Polanyi, 1958)
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another. Polanyi (1958) and Hanson (1958) do not tell us how 
such shifts in our notions of coherence and consistency can 
take place.
The configurationists have forced the recognition of 
the phenomena of patterning in both the realms of perception 
and observation. It is impossible to ignore the fact that 
our knowledge contains these somehow irreducible units with 
stable organization and impelling perceptibility. It Is also 
impossible to ignore that through his creative activity man 
has been able to augment the number of such units. Despite 
this contribution, there are some very important omissions in 
the configuration!st1s account of these irreducible units. A 
nativistic a priorism has lost its credibility, and because 
of this loss the mechanism of intuition inevitably gets 
replaced by sociological and psychological compulsions, which 
run counter to Kantian rationalism and gestalt naturalism.
We have reviewed four candidates for the position of 
independent indubitable: primary qualities, sense data,
physical objects, and configurations. We now turn to an 
assessment of the neo-realist candidate— information. Informa' 
tion was defined in Chapter IV as an invariant set of rela­
tionships existing among a set of measurements.
In Chapter IV we concluded our discussion of neo- 
realism by remarking that there were conceptual differences 
between the kind of objectivity implied by the independence 
criteria and the kind of objectivity which is promoted by 
Hawkins (196*0 and Gibson (1966). Despite Hawkins1 (196*0
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claim that the message is entirely independent of the receiver, 
and Gibson's (1966) claim that his is a theory of strict psych­
ophysical correspondence, it was pointed out that both men re­
sort to the criterionof economic description and to a hier­
archical arrangement of factual!ty. In their view, the use of 
the criterion of economy in no way violates the independence 
of the facts, since economy merely refers to the most reason­
able arrangement of all the incoming information and it can 
be defined in terms which are entirely measurable in that 
information. Even if we assume their own prediliction for 
the jargon of information theory, such a view of the criterion 
of economy is only justified if the set, to which the incom­
ing information belongs, is known, The most clearcut demon­
stration of this set dependence is the contrasting descriptions 
which result from using different geometries. Within either 
geometry, economy criteria can easily be shown to rest entirely 
upon observable parameters; however, for this to be the case, 
the geometry and the conventions of measurement must be known 
in advance.
Neo-realist philosophers of science, such as Hawkins
(196*0, do not accept the relativity of geometry. According
to their point of view, the apparent conventionalism, is due
only to the limitations of contemporary knowledge.
The view set forth here is that physical geometry is 
neither a system of self-evident truths legislating 
for the universe, as some philosophers may have thought, 
nor an explication of mind-dependent forms of percep­
tion, independent, as such, of any empirical tests.
It is, rather, a part of our empirically tested and 
testable knowledge of nature; but it has, in the 
description of nature, a special role and a special
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kind of priority. Spatial properties are involved in 
any demonstrative reference to physical realities, and 
Kant was right in saying that we do not identify phen­
omena as physical except in consequence of their 
spatial ordering. We do not first identify things 
as physical and only afterward find that they have 
spatial location. But metric geometry cannot be 
derived, as Kant supposed, from our11A PRIORI forms of 
intuition." Its theorems can be tested with high 
precision under the given conventions of measurement, 
and these conventions themselves rest upon judgments 
that the growth of knowledge may confirm or cast into 
doubt. (Hawkins, 196*+, PP» 55-56)
Reichenbach (1958) and Hawkins (196V) disagree con­
cerning the nature of the conventions of measurement. Accord­
ing to Reichenbach (1958), these are coordinative definitions; 
therefore, it is logically impossible to confirm them empir­
ically. Hawkins (196V), on the other hand, maintains that 
empirical knowledge can support or cast into doubt the con­
ventions of measurement. The analysis presented here assumes 
that Reichenbach (1958) is correct, at least with respect to 
physical geometry; but even if Hawkins (196V) is correct, 
the points made with respect to the use of Euclidean physical- 
istic descriptions as criteria of reality in psychological 
experiments are still valid. Neo-realists are merely assert­
ing that someday we may be able to confirm or disprove our 
conventions of measurement. Until that day comes to pass 
the experimental psychologist has no criteria for preferring 
one physicalistic description to another.
Gibson's (1966) analysis of illusory perception 
nevertheless rests upon the tacit acceptance of Euclidean 
assumptions. With respect to simple geometrical illusions, 
such as the one in Figure 2, Gibson (1966) maintains that
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the stimulus contains conflicting sets of information. His
analysis of simple geometrical illusions is essentially the
same as that which he gives for reversible figures. About the
goblet figure Gibson says,
In the absence of texture and parallax, the information 
for edge-depth or superposition has been arranged to 
specify two opposite directions of depth. There are 
two counterbalanced values of stimulus information in 
the same "stimulus". The perception is equivocal be­
cause what comes to the eye is equivocal. (Gibson,
1966, p. 2k7)
Equivocation over whether this is a goblet or a pair 
of profiles might be due to the fact that the stimulus is 
equivocal. This does not clarify how equivocal information 
can be considered independent of the observer, since not all 
reversible figures are spontaneous. The case of the pendulum 
is a good example of two sets of equivocal information which 
do not reverse spontaneously. Before Galileo, no one saw the 
pendulum set of information values and, after Galileo, no one 
accepted the older Aristotelian description. In the case of 
the geometrical illusions in figures 1 and 2, Gibson (1966) 
would maintain that the phenomenological stimulus is at a 
different level of sensitivity than the geometrical level.
The lines appear curved because the stimulus information pro­
duced by the combination of lines is different than the 
stimulus information produced by two lines alone. According 
to Gibson1 s definition, however, every variation in eaqper- 
ience must be matched to a measureable variation in the 
stimulus. On this score the non-Euclidean description of 
Figures 1 and 2, given in Chapter V, lends support to 
Gibson's (1966) hypothesis.
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The Kohler (196^) and Ames (1960) experiments lend 
support to Gibson’s (1966) notion that invariant relations 
are what the individual perceives. They contradict the idea 
that these relationships exist in the stimulus independently 
of the observer. Ames' (1960) reliance on the principle of 
equivalent configurations demonstrates very clearly how 
certain invariances, for example between the trapezoid and 
the rectangles viewed from certain perspectives, give rise to 
certain invariant sensations. The Allport (1957) cross cul­
tural study suggests that the perception of these invariances 
relies upon past experience. Kohler's (196*+) experiment shows 
that more than one set of information variables can give rise 
to color perception, depending on the perceiver's set. We 
must conclude, therefore, that terms such as invariance and 
information are only meaningful within a larger context. That 
larger context refers to the assumptions and axioms within 
which the incoming bits of information are incorporated. This 
is why in Gibson's (1966) test we measure the variations in 
experience first, and then see if we can find corresponding 
measurements in the physical realm.
If we maintain the order of presentation used in 
Chapter IV, we should next consider the transactional model. 
The transactional model does not fit into the present scheme 
since it does not promote a candidate for the position of 
"indubitable". We will, therefore, consider the transactional 
model as one which suggests a method of evaluating knowledge 
that is an alternative to those which rest upon indubitable
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observations or facts. As was suggested earlier, Karl Popper 
(1959) is a philosopher who wishes to avoid the psychologisms 
of the type presented in Chapter V. He therefore does not 
wish to rely upon confirmatory observations to evaluate scien­
tific hypotheses. He is a logical positivist who wishes to 
substitute a principle of falsification for the usual principle 
of verification. According to Popper, (1959) the only accept­
able scientific propositions are those which are capable of 
falsification. We can trust our observational capacities when 
it comes to disconfirmatory evidence. In evaluating a prop­
osition we select the hypothesis which has the greatest pos­
sibility of falsification and believe in it in proportion to 
our inability to disprove it.
This dissertation is based on the idea that psychol­
ogisms are unavoidable in scientific verification. Why not, 
therefore, accept the falsification solution? The answer is 
a psychological one. Essentially it is that scientific 
propositions of the most fundamental type, which seem to be 
at the crossroad of breakthroughs, are simple concepts which 
channelize psychological processes in a positive manner such 
that they tell you what to look for. By simple concepts we 
mean the creation of new entities, such as Galileo's pendu­
lum and Kepler's ellipse. There is nothing inherent in these 
concepts to suggest the relevant falsifiers. The discon­
firmatory evidence comes only after an alternative concept 
is available to generate this evidence. Once more we turn 
to the example of the goblet profiles; there is nothing in
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either of these terms to suggest the alternative perspective. 
If we follow the "if, then" logic, which is associated with 
disconfirmation as well as confirmation, we can never go from 
one of these terms to those parts of the other term that would 
really give us good counterevidence. For example, if Popper 
(1959) is correct we should be able to say if this is not a 
goblet then it will have a brow or nose. In essence then we 
agree that disconfirmatory evidence is less subject to the 
psychologisms that Popper (1959) wishes to avoid, but that it 
is these same psychological factors which make disconfirmatory 
evidence so rare, unless there is a competing theory.
Finally, we examine the method which the transactional 
model will use to cope with the difficulties presented by the 
three anomalies. As we said previously, transactional!sm does 
not accept the idea of an observational indubitable. Instead 
it views both observation and perception as relativistic 
processes. Perceptions or observations are not evaluated in 
terms of their correspondence to the real world, and theories 
and ideas are not evaluated in terms of their correspondence 
to known facts; rather, perceptions and assumptions are eval­
uated in terms of their functional utility. This criterion 
implies that there must be a goal, an end which man wishes to 
accomplish which can be used to evaluate percepts and ideas.
In all instances of descriptive complementarity, the descrip­
tion preferred depends upon what we wish to accomplish. In 
addition to the tolerance for multiple descriptions, which is 
built in to this approach, there is the implication that no
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description is ever complete. This is so because perceptions 
or descriptions arise out of the relationship between assump­
tions and givens, and they are evaluated in terms of purposes. 
The givens limit what will be perceived only insofar as certain 
assumptions are disproved, but we can never anticipate from 
this knowledge what future assumptions will be confirmed.
Only man's ability to come up with new goals and assumptions 
can ever give us a measure of the limits.
The Bohr-Heisenberg interpretation of quantum mech­
anics has many characteristics in common with Ames' view of 
perception. Both emphasize that what is observed is a function 
of what the observer does as well as the system being observed. 
Heisenberg (1958A, B) also concurs with Ames (1960) that a 
future experiment may reveal other observations with the same 
system, and that these new revelations will depend on the 
goals the experimenter brings to the situation.
His final conclusion that the probability formulae of 
quantum mechanics include a reference not only to the 
kind of experiment which prepared the state, but also 
to the kind of experiment which is ultimately envis­
aged. By this he means that the development of the 
wave function does not describe a process occurring 
independently of observation, but that it represents 
rather a set of incomplete potentialities which need 
to be completed by a future action of measurement.
(Heelan, 1965, p. *+3)
The transactionalists differ from all the other pos­
itions in one more important characteristic. This has to do 
with the feature of certainty. Epistemological positions which 
promote the notion of an indubitable admit the possibility of 
error in description./ The probability of error increases
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with the complexity of the descriptive task. In this sense, 
the distinction between observation and perception is on a 
continuum of probability. Perception has a higher probability 
of being in error than does observation.
In contrast to this point of view the transactionalist 
indeterminacy position maintains that probability is inherent 
in description and not a measure of technical proficiency.
The probabilities in the quantum mechanical situation are ir­
reducible. They express our knowledge in terms of the likeli­
hood that a particle will appear at a given point under a 
given set of initial conditions. The similarity between this 
view of probability and that expressed by Ittleson (1960) in 
Chapter V is too striking to be accidental. In neither case 
does the acceptance of probability as an inherent feature of 
our knowledge mean ambiguity. If we say that the goblet and 
the profile are descriptions of equal probability, given cer­
tain initial conditions, it means that when one of the two is 
being viewed it is an all-or-nothing perception. Our know­
ledge can only refer to a series of events, not to the abso­
lute outcome of one event. In classical terms this is an 
indication that more work is needed, since probability is a 
measure of ignorance, but in quantum mechanical terms, our 
knowledge is basic even though it cannot make predictions 
about the position and momentum of a particular particle. 
Certainty and independence, therefore, are criteria of objec­
tivity only in a model which insists on absolute indubitables.
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We have repeatedly emphasized the significance of the 
notion of indubitables in both fields of perception and scien­
tific epistemologies. It is therefore not sufficient to say 
that transactionalists abandon the notion of indubitables in 
their account of perception and description. In beginning our 
examination of the transactional substitute, we mark an impor­
tant transition in the course of the inquiry. For just as it 
is not sufficient to show counterevidence to the existence 
of indubitables, it is not sufficient to collect counter­
evidence to the assumption of objectivity. What remains to 
be done is the exposition of a viable alternative. The first 
task in arriving at this alternative involves getting an 
understanding of what transactionalists substitute for the 
notion of indubitables. We will refer to this transactional 
substitute as "devices". It should be pointed out that those 
whom we are calling transactionalists are not self-avowed 
members of any school, and in the case of the towering figures—  
Ames and Heisenberg— there was not even mutual recognition of 
their epistemological similarities. Nevertheless, the two men 
have come to similar conclusions concerning the process by 
which we acquire knowledge. Let us now turn to an analysis of 
the similarities in their understanding of observation and 
perception that led us to coin the term "device".
It is interesting to note some of the similarities 
among Ames' assumptions, Bohr and Heisenberg's instruments, 
and Kohler's central aftereffects. In the first place, each 
is a device which the knower has come to use on the basis
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of prior successful experience. Another expression which could 
be substitued for device would be heuristic function. The 
choice of the word device is clearly appropriate to apply to 
Bohr and Heisenberg's instrument. It is obvious that apparatus 
such as thermometers and interferometers are mechanical devices 
which are not themselves the object of knowledge, but are 
standards used to establish the existence of a property in the 
object of inquiry. Such devices play a unique role in connect­
ing cognition to perception. As we saw on pages 135-136, 181-182, 
instruments of measurement are coordinative definitions and, 
as such, contain a blend of analytic and synthetic elements.
It is in these instruments that the prescriptive elements of 
knowledge, such as our numerical and logical systems, fuse 
with the physical elements of our knowledge such as rigid 
bodies used in the construction of rulers. The ruler is a 
good example. The intervals represented by the numerical 
markings on its surface are determined analytically, and on 
the basis of the scale we wish to use. The choice of a rigid, 
stable material is not arbitrary but, based on our experience 
with this material, we conclude that it will satisfy the 
prescriptive rules of the numerical system.
Coordinative definitions, in many respects, represent 
the state of human knowledge at any given point and can be 
applied to make contemporary experience consistent with past 
experience. These instruments also have been called oper­
ational definitions. (Bridgman, 19^9). It has become 
recognized in recent years that operational definitions have
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both an analytic and a synthetic element, and that the inter­
action of these two elements in a single measurement operation 
means that we are bringing past knowledge to bear on present 
experience. The combined analytic and synthetic status of 
these elements means that in some ways they act as prescrip­
tive rules and in other ways as empirical facts. With respect 
to any particular experimental situation, the coordinately 
defined instruments are prescriptive rules which are not 
questioned.. In the long run, however, experimental evidence 
may come to change the coordinative definition.
The idea that improvement in the realm of observation 
is the mark of scientific progress tends to overshadow the 
most important fact about how such improvements of observation 
comes about. There is the implicit assumption that the changes 
in theory result from an improvement in the precision of our 
observation. Agassi (1968) has reviewed this question care­
fully and concludes that the reverse is actually true. As 
long as we are working within a particular theory the oper­
ational definitions define both the variables to be measured 
and the level of precision which is desirable. It is not 
until a competing theory arises that changes in the operation­
al definitions may require that scientists make even more 
precise observations.
Thus, when an observer highly increases the degree of 
accuracy of observation while referring only to one 
current theory, his observation may be useless (sic) 
if the fit is judged good enough, or useful if he 
calls the fit into question— quite in accord with the 
above observation of the relativity of degrees of
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accuracy. For instance, when the atomic weight of 
oxygen was deemed close enough to 16 there was 
neither any point in increasing the accuracy of 
the measurement of its deviation from 16 to fur­
ther decimals nor even any point in isolating its 
isotopes to find the more precise atomic weight of 
the predominant isotope. Things changed drastically, 
of course, when 16 was not good enough any more be­
cause nuclear physics should yeild the exact devia­
tion from this weight (when the mass of a proton is 
taken to be 1). (Agassi, 1968, pp. 289-290)
If Agassi's analysis is correct, when viewed histor­
ically an increase in precision really is a change in the 
theoretical realm, not in the factual realm. For example, 
we could say that an increase in our precision of observation
of pendulum clocks allows us to decide in favor of Newton's 
2
(a = const 1/r ) over Galileo's (a = g - const). This is so 
because, according to Newton's formula, pendulum clocks at 
various altitudes should, over long periods of time, become 
discrepant with one another, while according to Galileo's 
formula they should not. To attribute the resolution of this 
problem to the more precise observation of the behavior of 
pendulum clocks is misleading because the competing operation­
al definitions must come before the observations can be made. 
Accordingly, Agassi (1968) argues that the increased precision 
is a result of a change in the operational definitions, and 
not an initiator of that change. We do not change our notions 
of acceleration because we observe the discrepancy between 
the clocks; rather it is instead the other way around. Once 
a decision is made about which is the preferred operational 
definition, then it dominates the construction of measure­
ment instrumentation with respect to future observations.
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The application of the term "device" to Ames' assump­
tions and Kohler's central aftereffects may not seem as clear 
as an application toBohr'sand Heisenberg's instruments. Ames' 
assumptions and Kohler's central aftereffects are a means of 
bringing past experience to bear upon immediate perception.
But applying the notion of device to these particular situa­
tions brings an additional insight which carries our under­
standing beyond the traditional explanation of these perceptual 
effects. For the most part, learning theorists have tried to 
subsume Ames' "assumptions" and Kohler's "central aftereffects" 
under the concept of perceptual set. A perceptual set pre­
disposes the organism to have certain experiences. The precise 
nature of this predisposition is a function of past experience 
with that particular set of stimuli. Sets, therefore, are 
exclusively empirical in origin.
If we substitute for this notion of perceptual set the 
concept of device, as delineated above, we gain the additional 
insight that there is an analytic or prescriptive aspect or, 
in psychological jargon, a cognitive aspect, at work in pro­
ducing these perceptual effects. How else could we possibly 
explain the functioning of these devices in situations in 
which the perceiver has had no experience, or in situations 
where the bulk of his experience runs counter to the effect 
of the device? In the case of Ames' assumption of rectang- 
ularlty, for example, the bulk of the subject's optical 
experience runs counter to the effect of the assumption; and 
yet the assumption persists in having its effect in all of
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its relevant situations. If the device was based entirely 
upon descriptive experience, then we should be set to see 
trapezoidal windows, not rectangular ones. The assumption of 
rectangularity is not based on a large number of sensory ex­
periences of rectangular windows, but on the cognition that 
windows are rectangular. If this device were based entirely 
upon sensory learning, then it would work in exactly the 
opposite direction. That is, since the majority of optical 
displays of windows have been trapezoidal, the device should 
work in such a way as to convert non-trapezoidal optical 
windows to trapezoidal ones. Concretely, this would mean that 
we should have no difficulty in seeing Ames1 rotating trape- 
zoid as a rotating trapezoidj but a rotating rectangular 
window frame would appear to us as an oscillating trapezoid. 
This simply does not occur. There is, therefore, a prescrip­
tive element which modifies what we experience so as to be 
consistent with what we know, regardless of the number of 
experiences we may have had to the contrary. To state this 
in terms of operational definitions, we merely mean to say 
that not all operational definitions are given equal weight 
in our awareness.
It is not accurate to say that all publicly observ­
able operations are of equal significance. The usefulness of 
an operation depends upon whether or not the operation can be 
incorporated analytically, not synthetically. Of all the 
potential ways we might measure time, operationally we select 
those which most closely approximate our logical schemes and
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ignore those for which we cannot create convenient prescriptive 
rules.
We have seen that Ames' assumption of rectangular!ty 
demonstrates that these heuristic devices cannot be based 
entirely on sensory learning; this is so because the great bulk 
of sensory experiences with windows give rise to a trapezoidal 
optical display. An examination of Kohler's device also sug­
gests that sensory learning is an insufficient explanation. 
Kohler's "central aftereffect" works in all situations in 
which one would expect a diffraction pattern if there were a 
physical basis for it. It is not that the device works only 
in those situations in which the perceiver has had sensory 
experience with the diffracting lenses; rather, it applies to 
all optical input. Kohler himself refers to the central after­
effect as a mnemonic which acts more as a "sorting" rule than 
as a predisposition of the sensory apparatus. (Kohler, 196^ -)
We have seen, therefore, that perceptual devices have 
an analytic aspect with respect to any one experience. They 
are definitional. In addition to an analytic aspect, such 
devices appear to have a range of convenience built into them. 
The perceptual device of Ames and Kohler are experienced by 
the subject as being "out there" in the stimulus precisely 
because they only affect some of the stimuli, leaving other s 
seemingly untouched. The assumption of rectangular!ty affects 
the windows in a room while not affecting the perception of 
circular table tops. The whole from which the perceiver is 
working appears to determine whether or not a device will be
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used. This is most obvious in the case of experimental de­
vices of measurement. The instrument is only applicable to 
a specific set of phenomena. This is why no one thought to 
build an interferometer for particles of matter until their 
discreteness was in doubt.
The final and perhaps most important aspect which these 
devices seem to share is their dependence on purposive 
behavior. Both Ames and Kohler emphasize that the building 
up of their devices depends on successful action. Ames re­
peatedly demonstrates that the way to bring about modifications 
in the perceptual assumptions a person is making is to make him 
do something. Activity which leads to counterevidence to the 
assumption will eventually force changes in that assumption.
This can be seen simply in the case of the trapezoidal room.
As long as he is assuming a rectangular room, a subject attempt­
ing to bounce a ball off the various surfaces in the room will 
make inappropriate, and therefore unsuccessful movements in 
tlying to catch the ball. Kohler, as well as other perceptual 
psychologists who make use of transformation lenses, has re­
peatedly demonstrated that compensatory adaptation devices only 
evolve if the subject uses the lenses while trying to success­
fully mobilize in the environment.
It is not as easy to demonstrate the role of purposive 
behavior in the development of scientific instrumentation; 
however, the fact that we refer to the apparatus in scientific 
experiments as instruments suggests that they are a means of 
accomplishing a goal.
210
These "devices" are as close as the transactionalist 
comes to offering a conceptual unit to replace the traditional 
indubitables of epistemologies based jipon the "principles of 
separation and verification." This inquiry leads us to be­
lieve that the assumption of objectivity and, therefore, the 
"principles of separation and verification", leave much to be 
desired in the way they account for our scientific knowledge. 
We will rely on transactional devices as one of the building 




SEEKING AN ALTERNATIVE TO 
THE ASSUMPTION OF OBJECTIVITY
The three anomalies demonstrate that descriptions and 
perceptions are influenced by three aspects of knowledge which 
the perceiver or describer brings to the situation to be per­
ceived or described. These three elements are: assumptions,
wholes and goals. Recognizing that this is the case consti­
tutes a rejection of the assumption of objectivity.
To say that science is not objective calls for one of 
two reactions from the reader. The first reaction is that of 
denial; an analysis which concludes that science is not ob­
jective must be fundamentally in error since it runs counter 
to the bulk of our experience and common sense. The second 
reaction, probably less likely, would be to assent but, at 
the same time, to dismiss it. The thinking behind this reac­
tion would involve falling back on the obvious discrepancy 
between science and other kinds of knowledge. It is to say 
that the analysis was successful in debunking but that this 
is an empty victory since, as it turns out, objectivity never 
did form the essential difference between science and non­
science.
The first of these two reactions will undoubtedly find 
some measures of support since there may well be technical 
errors in the expositions of the anomalies in particular. 
Technical errors are not likely to determine the fate of the 
inquiry. In fact, more work should allow us to determine the
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correctness of the conclusions. That is to say, if this 
method is valuable at all, the success or failure of the in­
quiry should not depend on the examples of the anomalies in 
Chapter V, but should be capable of generating others like 
them.
The second reaction which would admit the conclusion 
but not the relevance of the inquiry is more damaging as a 
criticism of the inquiry. For that reason, we shall devote 
the remainder of this Chapter to understanding the implica­
tions of the inquiry and try to state in positive ways the 
consequences of accepting its conclusions. Perhaps the most 
important reason anyone might have for dismissing the inquiry 
and its conclusions would be that one of the consequences 
which follows from the conclusion seems to be impossible.
That seemingly impossible consequence is that, by getting rid 
of the subjectivity/objectivity distinction, we have now com­
pletely lost the basis for distinguishing between science 
and non-science. Few modern thinkers would accept that there 
is no difference between science and non-science. Yet our 
inquiry began on the premise that it was objectivity which 
distinguished science from non-science. If we conclude by 
saying that objectivity is not possible, then we must find 
another basis for distinguishing science from non-science.
We have seen that there is a long-standing tradition which 
can be traced at least as far back as Aristotle. This trad­
ition remains essentially true about contemporary theories 
of knowledge which make a firm distinction between science and
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other aspects of knowledge. We discussed this tradition 
earlier as the “principle of separation and verification." 
According to the principle of separation, only parts of ex­
perience can he trusted and, according to the principle of 
verification, only science can identify those parts. Accord­
ingly, the scientific method relies on the acquisition of 
prediction and control in order to establish the objective 
truth of a proposition. How do the conclusions of this in­
quiry affect this traditional model for scientific knowledge? 
They indicate that the criteria of verification, for example 
prediction and control, are a measure of success rather than 
a measure of objectivity.
Scientific descriptions, like perceptions, are human 
achievements; not passively received messages from nature. To 
say that scientific method can distinguish success from non­
success, rather than distinguishing objective from non-objective, 
may at first glance appear to be a very small accomplishment.
In actuality, it represents a very significant step. There 
are at least three major changes which the conclusions of the 
inquiry suggest. The first and most important is the revit­
alization of a field of inquiry which had been laid to rest 
by the assumption of objectivity. This field is the psych­
ology of knowledge. Formerly, inquiry into the psychology 
of knowledge was, by prescription, bound to be fruitless 
since the principle of verification gave us normative stand­
ards which defined for all times the standards by which 
acceptable knowledge must be judged. Under this system,
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improvement in our methodology could only come from two 
directions: from improvements in our logical tools of anal­
ysis such as probability theory and mathematics, and from 
improvements in our technical apparatus of observation. The 
psychology of knowing was prescriptively defined. Since this 
was assumed to be fixed for all times, inquiry into the 
question was bound to be fruitless.
The second important change to result from this in­
quiry has to do with the identity of three important factors 
in the psychology of scientific observation which were hereto­
fore prohibited by prescription. Under the assumption of 
objectivity, scientists were not only unaware of certain 
psychological factors influencing their observations, but they 
were trained to ignore the possibility of such factors. In 
this inquiry, we have seen the influence that assumptions, 
wholes and goals can have on perception. The influence of 
these psychological factors on perception was presented in 
a negative context. This was done deliberately in order to 
show some of the problems xfith the assumption of objectivity. 
There is also a positive aspect to the knowledge obtained in 
Chapter V, since what is demonstrated there is that we can 
become aware of the influence of these psychological factors. 
There is no need to relegate those to the realm of non- 
conscious influences. In fact, we shall attempt to advance 
the thesis that those influences were relegated to a non- 
conscious status only by conscious and deliberate prescrip-
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tions which scientists and others promote in the process of 
education.
The third important change results from the fact that 
this inquiry represents the viability of a methodology which 
is neither analytic nor ejqperimental. There are reasons to 
believe that methods similar to this one could be fruitfully 
employed in almost any science. In particular, there are 
reasons to believe that this method will be especially appli­
cable to the study of the psychology of knowledge. If in fact 
the methods for the construction and use of knowledge cannot 
be exclusively prescriptive, then there is room for improve­
ment in this domain. On the other hand, there is no denying 
that knowledge is at least partially prescriptive. The appro­
priate method for studying knowledge will, therefore, have to 
include both analysis and observation without giving prefer­
ence to one or the other.
We have already discussed the influence that the 
whole has on the perception of the parts. The many conse­
quences that result from the conclusions of the inquiry about 
the assumptions of objectivity are all "parts" of a "whole" 
new picture of science. In order to properly communicate the 
meaning of each particular consequence, we must begin by 
presenting the whole to which it belongs. This will be done 
by making use of two analogies. One is the analogy of puzzle- 
solving which we will use to represent the "whole"picture of 
science when viewed under the assumption of objectivity.
The other analogy will be that of map-making. We shall
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use the analogy of map-making to represent the "whole" pic­
ture of science viewed without the assumption of objectivity.
As long as we could make the assumption of objectivity, 
we assumed that the fundamental job of science was to discover 
facts. These facts, we assumed, represented small pieces of 
indubitable information about reality or nature. The thing 
which primarily characterized science was its reliance upon 
a method which could establish the factuality of a proposi­
tion. Though we readily admitted that there were many diffi­
culties surrounding the enterprise of scientific knowledge 
making, these difficulties we thought would be resolved by 
the eventual accumulation of the relevant factual information. 
The analogy of puzzle-solving is only appropriate if we 
assume that, in this particular case, the pieces of the puz­
zle are not all available and that before we can put it to­
gether, we must discover each piece. Facts, therefore, are 
like the pieces of a puzzle and science is the method for 
the discovery of these facts. How the facts relate to one 
another as well as the relevance of any one particular fact 
may be theorized about but a final answer must await the 
discovery of all the facts. Consequently, all facts are 
assumed to be of eventual relevance and, therefore, of 
equal significance. Similarly, the accuracy of our theor­
izing concerning any local area within the puzzle is a 
function of the number of facts available in this area.
The puzzle-solver is involved in the processing of informa­
tion, the bits of which are given by objective observation.
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If, on the contrary, we cannot assume the independence 
and certitude of any observations, then it follows that facts 
cannot be clearly identified. Consequently, what science is 
engaged in appears to be more like the art of map-making than 
that of puzzle-solving. The good map-maker must have precise 
methods of observation and he must keep a close guard against 
misrepresenting any of his observations. However, none of 
his observations is considered an independent unit which he 
must somehow accommodate. In addition to paying attention to 
the faithfulness of his observations, his methods must some­
how incorporate three other aspects of knowledge besides the 
experiential. First, he must recognize the role of assump­
tions and conventions. This means that he must bridge the 
gap between the subject and object of knowledge. As a good 
map-maker, he considers the user of the map as much as he 
does the producer. Second, he must consider the influence of 
the whole on the parts of the map. The meaning of both ob­
servations and symbols can only be found in the relationship 
of a particular segment to the whole. Third, the map-maker 
must consider the goal or the purpose for which the map is 
being constructed, for example, an aviator's map will differ 
significantly from a trucker's map of the same region. The 
map-maker, therefore, is seen as a producer, as well as a 
processor of information.
The first thing which becomes obvious from comparing 
these two analogies is that they are a set of complementary 
pictures of a kind familiar to us in this inquiry. Goblets
218
or faces, pendulums or bodies in constrained fall, wave or 
particle, and, finally, puzzle-solving or map-making— each 
pair represents complementary wholes which significantly in­
fluences our awareness of the parts. It is not possible in 
any case to absolutely establish one over the other. How­
ever, as is clear in the case of some of these, one may have 
the predominance over the other for long periods of history.
In the training of scientists in our institutions of higher 
education the puzzle-solving picture of scientists has been 
so predominant as to virtually exclude the map-making picture 
of science.
At this point, we wish to change the course of our 
inquiry. Until the beginning of this Chapter, the focus has 
been on a narrowing down of an evaluation of the assumption 
of objectivity. This was done in order to demonstrate the 
inherent weakness is an assumption of objectivity. Having 
accomplished this, we are now required to examine the impli­
cations of abandoning objectivity.
Understanding the implications of abandoning the 
assumption of objectivity will require looking at three kinds 
of changes in our view of science. The first of these in­
volves the identification of proscriptions now existing in 
scientific culture which are based on a puzzle-solving account, 
rather than a map-making account of science (or the origins 
of our knowledge). The second involves changes in require­
ments or assumptions that must be made if knowledge is to 
be called scientific. The third involves changes in the
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essential methodology of science. It is perhaps not correct 
to use the word change to refer to these sets of recommenda­
tions. It might he better to call them complementary or 
alternative courses of action. They may be considered com­
plementary because the proscriptions and prescriptions, the 
requirements and methods, of a science will vary, depending 
on whether one views science as map-making or as puzzle- 
solving. Our inquiry into objectivity has been undertaken 
in order to present the case against the assumption of objec­
tivity, and to the extent that it has succeeded it may be 
viewed as supporting to the map-making picture. Understanding 
the implications of the study, therefore, requires that we 
understand the consequences of this point of view. Not all 
of the epistemological and methodological consequences of 
these two divergent views of science can be dealt with in a 
single inquiry. We shall attempt to contrast the complemen­
tary sets of consequences which follow from our analysis of 
the anomalies in Chapter V.
As was stated above, the first and most important 
consequence of accepting the map-making picture of science is 
that it makes possible a psychology of science. Map-making, 
unlike puzzle-solving, has no prescript! vely, non-psychological 
entities in it. This means the kind of human creativity which 
is possible differs in each of these pictures of science. As 
long as the belief in objective facts prevailed, their prim­
acy as the most significant elements in our knowledge forbade 
any psychological influences from entering into the shaping
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of these facts. In recent years, the role of creative 
thinking has played an expanding role in accounting for the 
discovery of facts in the puzzle-solving picture. Jlnding 
the pieces of the puzzle required elaborate and intelligent 
schemes. Establishing the correctness of a discovery, how­
ever, remained a non-psychological enterprise. The few 
vrriters who recognized psychological variables in the con­
text of justification put the process of confirmation through 
a long series of interpretations. These writers tried to 
establish the verification and falsification principles which 
could assure that the facts did not involve any psychological 
determinants in their make-up. Even if creativity was ad­
mittedly an important aspect of discovering facts, it could 
have nothing to do with what the facts told us about nature. 
Analogously, we would say that it is permissible to give 
credit for the genius of finding a piece of the puzzle but 
it is assumed that the shape of the puzzle piece is indep­
endent of the finder.
The kind of creativity which the puzzle-solving pic­
ture calls for admits to only two kinds of improvements. We 
can improve by extending the reach of our senses. This is 
accomplished by the proliferation of scientific instrumenta­
tion. This kind of improvement should increase the number 
of facts we discover by expanding the area within which we 
can search for the pieces. The other way in which we can 
improve according to the puzzle-solving picture, is by the 
use of logic and better formal arrangements. The organiza-
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tion, manipulation, and storage of the facts is done within 
logical systems which are theories. Theories may vary in 
their logical exactness from the rigor exemplified by geometry 
to the ambiguity of psychological and sociological theory. 
Proponents of this view differ as to how precisely we make 
progress theoretically, though most agree that the number of 
facts available in any particular area influences the exact­
ness of our theories. Psychological variables may be impor­
tant in arriving at theories but they are prescriptively 
forbidden from being influential in the realm of factuality.
In essence, we are saying that the assumption of ob­
jectivity prevents any improvement in the psychology of science. 
That which defines science is its non-psychological method of 
establishing facts. This single capacity to establish facts 
is the one thing which must remain fixed in the puzzle- 
solving picture of science. Logicians may improve our man­
ipulation and interpretation of facts, and technicians our 
ability to observe them, but the fundamental method of know­
ing the facts is fixed.
We will postpone the discussion of the subject matter 
and method of the psychology of science as it would appear in 
what we are calling the map-making picture. This discussion 
will come more appropriately after a discussion of the limita­
tions placed on psychological factors existing in the current 
picture of science. In the puzzle-solving account, there is 
always, as we have previously documented, the promotion of 
an indubitable fact. These facts are like the pieces of the
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puzzle. As we have already said, methods for accounting for 
the discovery of such facts have run the gamut from induction 
by enumeration (Mills) to induction by intuition (Frank) to, 
finally, the creativity of human genius (Einstein). Likewise, 
the methods for verification or confirmation have run the 
gamut from sense-data to physical protocols and, finally, to 
falsibiability potential. Regardless of which set of these 
alternatives is preferred by any particular philosopher of 
scientist, the central question is always one of factual!ty. 
This means, in effect, that while there may not be agreement 
about how facts are obtained, there is agreement that they 
are indeed obtained. Whatever the currently popular principle 
of verification happens to be, be it phenomenal, physicalistic 
or operational, it is believed to be a measure of the truth.
It is probably correct to say that currently the criteria of 
verification are prediction and control. Presumably, if we 
establish prediction and control over a phenomenon, then that 
is a sufficient criterion for asserting that our knowledge is 
factual. That assertion is equivalent to asserting that we 
know the truth about that particular phenomenon.
Let us contrast to this picture one in which the ac­
count of scientific knowledge must proceed without the 
assumption of objectivity. As we said above, if we do not 
believe in the factuality of any assertions, then we must 
provide an alternative account of what it is that the prin­
ciples of verification do for us. What exactly do we estab­
lish by the experimental verification of a proposition, if
223
not its truth? The alternative suggested by the abandonment 
of objectivity is that verification is a measure of success, 
rather than a measure of truth. Prediction and control are 
a measure of the fruitfulness of our constructions rather 
than the faithfulness of our representations. Once more it 
is important to recognize that success and truth are com­
plementary pictures which are so broad in their significance 
that neither can be absolutely preferred over the other. 
Nevertheless, it is important to realize that these differ­
ences are more than linguistic— they are substantive. Under­
standing the substance of the differences between the two 
alternatives requires an examination of many aspects, only 
some of which are touched upon in this inquiry. Among these 
important differences which can be identified as a result of 
this inquiry are three negative proscriptions at work in the 
present scientific culture. These proscriptions are explicit 
and implicit patterns of avoidant behavior trained into the 
scientific mind because of its acceptance of the assumption 
of objectivity. These proscriptions are an essential part of 
the "hard-nosed" attitude which is considered essential in 
a good scientist. They are only negative proscriptions if 
the conclusions drawn from this inquiry are in fact correct. 
Their effect on the product of science is diminishing, only 
if one assumes that science is engaged in marking successes, 
rather than in discovering truth.. Few will doubt that these 
proscriptions do exist; many may argue that they are justified. 
It is important to notice, however, than an exact identifi­
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cation of the proscriptions can only come about if we recog­
nize the contrast between the two views.
The first of the three proscriptions is that which 
proscribes against a consideration of goals. The proscription 
evolves naturally from the belief that science discovers truth 
rather than achieving successes. If science is engaged in 
discovering factual truth, then it would be nonsense to ask 
"truth for what?" However, if science is engaged in achieving 
successes, it is not nonsense to ask "success at what?" If 
our method reveals facts, then we need only be concerned with 
the proper application of this method and rest assured that 
the outcome eventually will be significant. In addition to 
the fact that it is illogical to question the significance of 
truth, the evaluation of performance by means of established 
goals is associated by the scientific community with engin­
eering and other applied fields. Therefore, the proscription 
against goals not only is logical but it promotes purity.
The great difficulty which arises as a result of the 
goal proscription is that there is a tendency to evaluate all 
work of science methodologically. We cannot question the 
values of the pieces of the puzzle being brought forth. Their 
quality is presumably all equal. We can only criticize the 
quantitative productivity of various methods. Since the one 
area in which scientists are open to criticism is method, 
they are certain to keep this fixed. They are more willing 
to let the method prescribe what they will study, than let 
what they are to study prescribe the methods appropriate to
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its study. It is on this account that Wertheimer was so
critical of science.
We go from the world of everyday events to that of 
science, and not unnaturally assume that in making 
this transition we shall gain a deeper and more 
precise understanding of essentials. The transi­
tion should mark an advance. And yet, though one 
may have learned a great deal, one is poorer than 
before. It is the same in psychology. Here too 
we find science intent upon a systematic collection 
of data, yet often excluding through that very 
activity precisely that which is most valid and 
real in the living phenomena it studies. Somehow 
the thing that matters has eluded us. (Wertheimer,
1959, P. 1)
At least in some instances, the goals of a science 
have been allowed to change beyond our recognition because 
the product of science could only be evaluated methodologically. 
Psychology is an example of a science in which this is the 
case. The original goal of psychology presumably was to ex­
plain knowledge, experience and behavior. It must be admitted 
that psychologists had been applying a methodological criter­
ion to their accomplishments which very often means accepting 
something far less than this original goal called for. We 
shall see that if science is construed as a method for 
achieving success, then the role of goals is returned to a 
central position in the psychology of science— one which 
permits other than methodological criteria for the evalua­
tion of scientific accomplishments.
The second proscription of science which evolves from 
the assumption of objectivity is that which calls for ignor­
ing the whole. According to this view, progress in science 
is achieved from the discovery of facts. How facts relate
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to one another within any particular discipline is the problem 
of theoreticians. The status of theoreticians in science is 
almost deliberately ambiguous. In the training of our scien­
tists, little or no systematic attention is paid to the expli­
cit development of theoreticians.1 There is a mysticism 
prevalent around the question of theory within science.
Great theories are the result of genius. Men like Newton, 
Einstein, Freud, Marx, are held up as examples of creative 
genius. The training with respect to the work of these men 
differs significantly from the training scientists receive 
with respect to the work of great experimenters. Great ex­
periments are held up as examples which the initiate can 
someday imitate. We study their general character and anal­
yze them into a systematic body of knowledge which we call 
methodology. Methods become separated from their discover­
ies. The study of theory and theorizing is far less system­
atic. Theories tend to remain associated with the name of 
their creators. Though the initiate is trained to imitate 
in the methodological realm, he is trained only to admire in 
the theoretical realm. This is consistent with objective 
epistemology since it would be nonsense to imitate creativ­
ity and genius.
Within any particular area of scientific inquiry, 
placing the facts into meaningful relationship is the prob­
lem of theory. But placing the disciplines in relationship
1The conspicuous exception to this is physics. The 
development of theoretical physics as a specialty within the 
discipline indicates that this science more than any other has 
abandoned the puzzle-solving picture of science.
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with one another, which after all is the next largest whole, 
seems to fall completely outside the realm of science. If 
psychologists are hard-pressed to understand the relationship 
between all the facts within psychophysics, let them try to 
relate psychophysics to personality, psychology to sociology, 
and psychology to all other disciplines. Whose problem is 
this? In theory, one supposes that this is the problem of 
philosophy but in practice it becomes a problem of adminis­
tration. If we assume that science is a process by which we 
discover objective facts, then there is no need to worry how 
academic departments are created and dissolved since even­
tually the facts will emerge independently of such adminis­
trative decisions. If, however, we assume that the parts of 
knowledge being generated are influenced by the whole from 
which they come, the scientists can no longer afford to ig­
nore the sociology of science.
The third and final negative proscription is that 
which calls for deliberately ignoring the subjective in the 
act of knowing. As long as we believe ourselves to be en­
gaged in the objective description of reality we believe it 
desirable to eliminate all subjective elements from our des­
criptions. In the past this was accomplished by using 
descriptive languages with the greatest amount of logical 
explicitness. It is this aspect more than any other which 
makes quantifiability desirable. In recent years, there has 
been increasing awareness that these logical systems of des­
cription, such as geometry, are conventions. Though they
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are public entities, they are nevertheless subjective insofar 
as they are something which the observer brings to the ob­
served. They are also arbitrary insofar as there is nothing 
about the object which enables us to establish a preference 
for using one convention rather than another. Though this 
conventionality of descriptive languages has been recognized, 
its most important implications have not been delineated. In 
recognizing that data language is conventional, it becomes 
important to establish criteria according to which we may 
prefer one convention over another.
In principle at least, it is no longer a question of 
how faithfully one convention, rather than another, repre­
sents the facts. Conventions are selected on the basis of 
convenience, not on the basis of truth. The next question 
is of the utmost significance— that is, "convenient for 
whom?" The way our scientific knowledge has evolved a class 
of everts in any given domain is necessary in order that 
the knowledge in that area can be understood. As long as 
this expertise was a natural outgrowth of the complexity of 
the facts, then it could not be questioned. But, if in fact 
the language of scientific knowledge is selected on the basis 
of convenience, this means that the user of the knowledge is 
being incorporated into the criterion for the selection of 
convention systems. There is a sense in which Einstein rec­
ognized this when he chose a non-Euclidean geometry in order 
to preserve our conventions of measurement. To do the 
opposite would have meant a far more disruptive effect on
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our picture of the world. There is a sense also in which 
Bohr recognized this point when he insists upon the fact that 
we must represent the facts of quantum mechanics in the lang­
uage of classical physics, not to preserve a faithful repre­
sentation of the facts but to maintain a connection between the 
two fields of knowledge. There are in these positions the 
seeds of an obligation which have not yet been recognized.
If scientists do in fact have a choice in the assumptions and 
conventions which they make and use in describing the aspect 
of the world which they study, then is it not their obliga­
tion to amplify the degree of freedom available to them and 
make explicit the criteria they use in choosing their conven­
tions? This would mean ultimately that the producers of 
knowledge must not only take an interest in what the know­
ledge is about, but they must take into account those who 
are to profit from that knowledge.
There would appear to be two criteria for evaluating 
the worth of a particular contribution. The first is onto­
logical consequences; that is, according to the improvement 
that it affords in prediction and control of relevant areas.
We measure a scientific contribution epistemologically in 
terms of the number of men who can incorporate the knowledge 
into their lives. The epistemological criterion increases 
in significance as the scientific domain in question comes 
closer and closer to man. We are at the present time reaping 
the fruit of having ignored this epistemological aspect of 
our knowledge in areas such as ecology, sociology and
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psychology. By using only our ontological criterion, we
have produced a class of experts who in turn have produced a
great deal of knowledge about each of these domains. But 
since they paid no attention to the user of the knowledge, 
the potential significance of their accomplishment was wasted. 
What we need in these areas is knowledge for man, not know­
ledge about man. The producer of knowledge must take into
consideration the potential user of knowledge.
We have already pointed out that abandoning the 
assumption of objectivity leads us to the conclusion that 
science is involved in achieving successes, rather than in 
discovering truths. One of the most significant differences 
between these two pictures of science is that we can have 
levels or grades of successes, but we cannot have levels or 
grades of truth. This realization is of the utmost sig­
nificance since it is helpful in resolving one of the prob­
lems which arose repeatedly in this dissertation; namely, 
how does one establish a preference among equally objective 
descriptions.
From the point of view of the history of science 
this is a theoretical problem, not a practical one. There is 
no doubt that we did come to prefer Galileo's pendulum to 
Aristotle's body in constrained fall. There is equally no 
doubt that we came to prefer Newton's (a = const 1/r2) to 
Galileo's (a = g = const). The question is: how did we
establish this preference? As long as we believed we were 
involved in verifying truths, there was no principle by
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which we could discriminate between alternative constructions 
of the same verifiable phenomena.
If we recognize that that the processes of perception 
and description are achievements instead of representations 
of fact, then it is possible to accept a principle of grada­
tions among perceptions and descriptions with respect to a 
particular set of givens. We may term this principle the 
"inclusiveness of the goal." That is, we can grade the level 
of descriptive achievement by reference to the inclusiveness 
of potential achievements which it allows us to accomplish.
We prefer pendulums to bodies in constrained fall because 
pendulums allow us to accomplish more in a greater number of 
diversified settings than do bodies in constrained fall. Any 
particular description is valid to a degree and can never be 
evaluated by itself. Levels or gradations imply a process 
of rank ordering which requires at least two competing des­
criptions. This is why the establishment of descriptive value 
is a theoretical task, not an experimental one. All exper­
iments can ever tell us about Galileo's (a = g = const) is 
that it is essentially correct as far as it goes. One would 
never think to look for differences due to altitude until 
one is given the competing (a = const 1/r ). We can grade 
the two formulas for acceleration with respect to potential 
accomplishment afforded rather than with respect to factual 
validity.
Another example of the use of the principle of goal 
inclusiveness to grade alternative constructions is provided
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by clinical psychology. A client complains of aversive 
reactions to sexual situations. This has led in her case to 
the dissolution of two marriages and is threatening to destroy 
a third. The Freudian construct of frigidity is available 
as a description of the clinical condition. If we limit our 
goal to that of understanding the client's marital sexual re­
lations, the construct of frigidity would seem appropriate, 
though limited. But, if we wish to include behaviors outside 
the domain specified by this construct, then we find that the 
concept is not generally useful.
A preferable construct would be one which would ac­
count satisfactorily for the range of behaviors referred to 
by the diagnosis of frigidity, and at the same time be capable 
of shedding light on other aspects of the client's behavior.
One such alternative assumes that the client avoids situations 
in which she is to be evaluated on the ^asis of her physical 
performance. Using this concept we find that she has similar 
aversive reactions to sports which are similar to her re­
sponses to sex. It is also noted that she has high standards 
of performance in those areas in which she does engage her­
self. We find that she is extremely successful in those things 
which she does undertake and avoids situations in which she 
does not meet her own standards of performance. In some 
respects this conception is similar to the clinical diagnosis 
of frigidity, but it has a much wider range of applicability.
It allows the therapist to recommend preliminary therapeutic 
steps outside the range of sexual behavior, the aspect of
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the person's frigidity that is most threatening. The client 
is given an opportunity to learn that the consequences of 
failure at playing golf are not as threatening as she had 
thought. Once she has overcome her avoidance behavior to 
sports, she has the basis in her experience to begin moving 
with confidence in other areas of physical performance. With 
respect to this example, the avoidance construct is preferable 
to the frigidity construct, not because one is true and the 
other is false but because one is more inclusive of potential 
accomplishments than is the other.
This method for evaluating scientific propositions is 
offered as a substitute for the various principles of verifi­
cation proposed by those philosophies of science which adhere 
to the assumption of objectivity. In combination with the 
notion of devices which we discussed previously, it produces 
a picture of science significantly different from those avail­
able in the objectivist tradition. According to this picture, 
science is engaged in producing devices which are evaluated 
according to their ability to actualize potential. Whenever 
two devices are competing within a domain, we prefer that 
which includes the widest range of potential accomplishments.
Finally, we return to the first and most significant 
implication of abandoning objectivity; namely, that a psychol­
ogy of science is provided a most important role in the ex­
pansion of knowledge. As was indicated earlier, the assumption 
of objectivity asserted that the fundamental method of knowing 
for all science was fixed for all time. That method was the
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establishment of facts by means of observation. We could 
improve our processes of knowing in all respects except this 
one. It will help to return to our analogies and say that, 
in the puzzle-solving picture, we can improve the process by 
any method which will improve the processing of the pieces. 
According to this view, the scientist is only a processor 
of information. We may improve by extending the range of 
his senses and the logical systems for storing the information, 
but nothing must be allowed to interfere with the essential 
pieces as they are given to us by reality.
In the map-making picture, the agent of knowing is in­
volved in producing information. According to this picture, 
assumptions, wholes and goals, as well as the experimental 
actualization, all influence the information produced. This 
latter picture points to the reinterpretation of many of the 
traditional methods of science in addition to indicating the 
explicit use of methods which, until now, have operated 
covertly in science. According to this map-making picture, 
an experiment is a demonstration of the actualizing potential 
of certain concepts. It does not give us a measure of truth, 
but it does give us a measure of success. Consequently, 
experiments are not the only method by which scientific aware­
ness is extended. We must develop methods which allow us to 
understand how assumptions and conventions influence our 
scientific awareness of the world. Perhaps, the best example 
of these methods is the "thought experiment" which allows us 
to compare the contrasting influences of alternative sets of
235
assumptions on our awareness of a particular domain. This 
dissertation is an example of such a "thought experiment."
There is reason to believe that in physics at least, "thought 
experiments" played a crucial role at every major turning 
point. The thought experiments of Galileo, Einstein and 
Heisenberg seem to come at those points in the history of 
physics when the most basic of assumptions were being ques­
tioned. This method makes possible a form of knowing which 
laboratory experiments cannot develop. It makes possible 
an awareness of "what is being omitted," and it allows us 
to produce information from "nothing." Producing information 
from "nothing" can only be accomplished by the manipulation 
of theoretical entities. It cannot result from experimental 
observation. We have already discussed an example of this 
kind of awareness when we discussed the criterion for pre­
ferring one construction over another within a particular 
domain. In that discussion we noted that our rejection of 
Aristotle's body in constrained fall and Galileo's acceler­
ation was not based on a substantive error in their formulations, 
but on the basis of a comparitive omission in their formulation. 
It is because Aristotle said nothing about time per swing and 
Galileo said nothing about altitude that we eventually pre­
ferred competing constructions which did include these omitted 
variables. Becoming aware of these omissions requires bring­
ing an alternative set of expectations to the observation.
Such expectations are governed by the constructs we bring to 
the observation situation. This is another way of saying that
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within any particular construction there is nothing to tip the 
observer off about its limitations. Only when an alternative 
set is provided can we become aware of what a construction 
does not do for us.
Since this particular dissertation demonstrates the 
influences of assumptions, wholes and goals on awareness, it 
suggests that the deliberate manipulation of any of these 
can improve our awareness within a particular domain. We 
have already noted that the prevalent conception of science 
prescribes against the explicit considerations of such fac­
tors as assumptions, wholesand goals, and proposes no method 
by which we can systematically study their influence. This 
inquiry is thought to be an example of a scientific enter­
prise which bears the seeds of a new method which will allow 
us to examine the influence of psychological factors— in our 
scientific knowing of the world. In calling for an explicit 
consideration of wholes and goals in particular, it seeks to 
establish a counterbalancing force of the utmost significance 
in contemporary science. The direction of this force only 
begins to emerge from this particular inquiry but its sig­
nificance is so important that it must be delineated despite 
its inexactness. The methods suggested by this inquiry aim 
at achieving an integration rather than further differentia­
tion within science. They place the stress on the inclusive­
ness or breadth of applicability of scientific findings, 
rather than on their certainty. These methods also suggest 
that a systematic approach to theoretical work is as feasible as a
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systematic approach to experimental work. All of which is to 
say that methods are available to remove the process of knowing 
from the realm of prescriptive philosophy and place it in-the 





In Chapter I, it was asserted that the subjectivity/ 
objectivity distinction underlies what C.P. Snow has called 
"the two culturesw" In particular, the assumption that man 
can make objective observations by using scientific methods is 
one which is generally made and which is central to under­
standing the relationship between scientific and non-scientific 
knowledge. All of this is given as justification for this in­
quiry, which attempts to establish whether or not we are 
justified in assuming the capacity for objective observation. 
This question is seen as central to an eventual understanding 
of the psychology of knowledge.
Chapter II briefly reviewed the history of this prob­
lem. This analysis revealed that two principles of scientific 
epistemology have remained constant throughout the history of 
science. The first is the principle of separation, according 
to which human experience can be separated into subjective and 
objective experiencing. Specific expression of this principle 
has changed during various periods of scientific history. At 
times, there was a preference for expressing it in ontologi­
cal terms, such as primary and secondary qualities, while at 
other times the principle of separation was expressed in 
epistemological terms, such as analytic and synthetic.
The second principle of scientific epistemology to 
emerge is referred to as the principle of verification.
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According to this principle, the scientific method is held to 
be the only one by which one can distinguish the veridical from 
the illusory aspects of experience. In general, changes in the 
manner of expression of the principle of separation were 
accompanied by appropriate changes in the manner of expression 
of the principle of verification. That is to say, the specific 
criteria by which a genuinely scientific procedure was identi­
fied changed along with the way in which we separated objec­
tive from subjective experience.
The most important conclusion to emerge from the ex­
amination of the background of this problem is that the assump­
tion of objectivity has played such an important role in 
molding our Western ways of knowing that most of the existing 
credible methods of inquiry have the assumption embedded in 
them. Contemporary disciplines suited to deal with epistem­
ological questions tend to adopt experimental or analytical 
methods of inquiry, and the distinction between these kinds of 
methods are themselves baeed on the assumption of objectivity. 
Since the assumption of objectivity is the subject of this 
inquiry, it was concluded that methods which are based on the 
subject/object distinction would not be appropriate here.
In Chapter III the method of anomalies was described. 
This method was deemed appropriate for this inquiry since un­
like most other available methods it is neither analytic nor 
experimental. It is based on the method of thought exper­
iments in which facts, theories and assumptions about initial 
conditions are viewed together in order to discover new rela­
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tionships. Anomolies-are described as old facts seen in a 
new light. Their utility is in their ability to demonstrate 
to us the experiential consequences of particular assumptions. 
In the context of this particular inquiry, the method of 
anomalies is particularly useful since it allows us to hold 
in abeyance the assumption of objectivity. This in turn allows 
us to bring scientific epistemology and the psychology of 
perception together, since the assumption of objectivity is 
what held them apart. This is accomplished by asking that 
theories of scientific observation be capable of accounting 
for the facts of perception, and that theories of perception 
be capable of accounting for the facts of scientific observa­
tion.
In Chapter IV, models of perception and observation 
were reviewed in order to understand the role of the assump­
tion of objectivity in the various theories of perception 
available. Five broad models of perception and observation 
were identified. They were realism, logical positivism, 
configurationism, neo-realism, and transactionalism. It was 
found that all but the transactional model subscribed to the 
assumption of objectivity. Each of the other models promote 
the belief that under special circumstances man is able to 
make objective observations and that knowledge obtained in 
this manner can be considered factual. Despite the agreement 
concerning the belief in the existence of facts, each of these 
models promotes a different description of the nature of facts 
and the process of observation.
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Chapter V presented three specific anomalies to the 
assumption of objectivity. Each anomaly consists of a com­
bination of information derived from two sources: scientific
epistemology and the psychology of perception. The first 
anomaly demonstrates the inseparability of logical and em­
pirical elements in perception. Specifically, it demonstrates 
that the real and the illusory can only be separated after 
certain logical assumptions are made. This indicates that 
the logical assumptions are as fundamental to the definition 
of the real as are the sensory elements. The second anomaly 
demonstrates the influence of the whole on the experience of 
the parts in both scientific measurement and in normal per­
ception. Specifically, it shows that concepts or constructs 
define and select the appropriate measurements to be taken, 
as well as those to be ignored. The third anomaly demon­
strates that the qualitative experience in observation and 
perception is, in part, determined by the purpose of the ob­
servation or perception. This means that the act of measure­
ment or perception in part determines the result of the 
perception or measurement.
In Chapter VI the impact of the anomalies on the 
assumption of objectivity was assessed by taking each of 
the definitions of fact (which had been identified in the 
various models of Chapter IV) and determining how each 
definition is affected by the anomalies. It was concluded 
that none of the definitions of fact are capable of dealing
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with all of the anomalies. This was interpreted to mean that 
the idea of factuality is misleading, and led to an attempt to 
describe an alternative epistemological unit called "devices." 
Devices are forwarded as an alternative building block for a 
theory of knowledge which would not be based on the assumption 
of objectivity. In defining this unit, we depend a great 
deal on the transactional perspective which we found to be 
the only existing model that did not depend on the assumption 
of objectivity.
Chapter VII concludes the Inquiry by depicting a view 
of science which does not depend on the assumption of objec­
tivity. This picture of science differs from the more trad­
itional view In two basic ways. It substitutes for the notion 
of facts the concept of devices and it replaces objective 
truth with relative success. Pacts were held to be indepen­
dent and certain. In sharp contrast, devices are demonstrated 
to depend upon three sets of psychological variables: assump­
tions which we make about their domain, the influence of 
"whole" patterning tendencies of knowledge already existing 
in the relevant domain and the goals we wish to achieve in 
the particular area. The criterion of objective truth does 
not allow for intermediate degrees of truth, but the criterion 
of relative success allows for a variety of degrees of value.
These basic changes which resultNfrom having aban­
doned the subject of objectivity also suggest some important 
methodological changes. It suggests a need to expand our 
methods for dealing with theoretical problems. Methods such
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as the thought experiment and the method of anomalies are put 
forward as examples of fruitful non-experimental methods. 
Abandoning objectivity also places new responsibilities on 
the scientist. It calls upon the scientist to make explicit 
his assumptions, wholes, and goals. He must develop criteria 
for selecting among these psychological variables when a 
plurality exists. He must develop some epistemological 
standards to complement his experimental criteria of success. 
In addition to pointing to a need for such epistemological 
standards, Chapter VII suggests a set of possible standards 
which follow from this inquiry.
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